ΧΑ'ΡΙΣ ΚΑΙ' 'ΕΙΡΗ'ΝΗ,

OR

A *Pacifick* Diſcourſe of Gods *GRACE* and *DECREES*:

In a Letter, of full Accordance, written to the Reverend, and moſt learned, Dr. *Robert Sanderſon*.

By *Henry Hammond*. D.D.

To which are annexed the Extracts of three Letters concerning Gods *Preſcience* reconciled with *Liberty* and *Contingency*.

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TO
All our BRETHREN
Of the
Church of *ENGLAND.*

3D Aug. 43 C.O.L

Q. 1. *IN relation to the Controverſies concerning* Gods Grace *and* Decrees, *nothing was ever Superior, in my thoughts, to the feare that the great Intereſts of Religion,* Chriſtian practiſe, *and particularly that of* Charity, *might be obſtructed by them.*

Q. 2. *It hath long been the Complaint of pious and learned men, (of the juſtice whereof, if formerly we had, we cannot now reaſonably retain any doubt,) that the crude and unwary treating of theſe, and (from thence derived,) an haſty premature perſwaſion of their being in Chriſt, (aſsiſted by a beliefe of* irreſpective Decrees, *and* Grace irreſiſtible, *and no poſſibility of* interrupting *their juſtified eſtate,) was apt to contribute to the preſumtions, and ſecurities, and finall impenitences of ſome men,*

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who having moſt loudly renounced the power, *chooſe yet not to quit* the forme of Godlineſs.

§. 3. *And for the heates, and uncharitable diſtempers, which the managing of theſe controverſies particularly have been guilty of, we need not look abroad among the* Dominicans *and* Jeſuites, Janſeniſts *and* Moliniſts, *for proofes. Our own Region hath not of a long time failed of evidences. The old weapon of* Ω *κατάραλε, crying down for* carnall *men and* hereticks, Pelagians *and* Semipelagians, Papiſts, Socinians, *and what not? (even rifling the Poets Hell to fetch out Titles for their adverſaryes,) hath never been more nimbly taken up, and vigorouſly handled, then in theſe dayes.*

§. 4. *And as if fewell to diſſentions were ſtill wanting, it hath been the endeavour of ſome to ſuggeſt this jealouſy, and clancularly to infuſe it into the minds of men, that they which oppoſe* unconditionate Decrees, *&c. (and pretend to think they effectually ſerve the ends of Chriſtianity thereby,) have entertained ſuch vehement diſlikes, and averſations to all that Scheme of doctrines, that they retain no* charity *to the maintainers of them, though they be in other things as conſtant, obedient ſonns of the* Church *of* England, *as any; and when opportunity ſhall aſſiſt their deſigne, will take care rigorouſly to fence their communion from them, and whatever*

the accord be in other doctrines, (wherein our Church is eminently concerned againſt the common Adverſaries,) will proceed finally to exterminate and exclude them.

§. 5. The Conſequences of this perſwaſion, once imbibed, be it never ſo cauſeleſſe and unprovoked, how noxious and inauſpicious they may prove to all that are on either ſide concerned in them, what leven of bitter zele *and animoſityes it may cauſe to ferment in the minds of ſome, what blaſts and improſperityes it may bring on the endeavours of others; and, betwixt both, what detriment to the true and ſolid ends, whether of* Religion, *or* Reformation, *(the ſquaring of our lives according to that other, more ſublime, patterne in the mount,* Mat. v. *the inhaunſed, tranſcendent, indiſpenſable Lawes of* Purity *and* Peaceableneſs,*) I ſhall not here need to ſet forth, every man's ſagacity ſerving him competently to make this diſcovery.*

§. 6. Yet was it not a rationall hope, that the bare diſclaiming and renouncing ſo great a guilt, would be admitted to the purgation of thoſe, againſt whom it had been ſuggeſted and believed. It therefore ſeemed to me more ſeaſonable to tender an ocular demonſtration of the contrary, by bringing my Lamb, *or* Turtle, *(my offering to the* Temple *of* Peace,*) and really exemplifying the* charity *and accordance, that may readily be attained between diſſenters,*

when

when minds prepared with meekneſs, and love of the Truth, whereſoever they meet with it, can take courage to deny themſelves, and ſo to depoſit prejudices, and inſtead of names and ſhadowes, to give themſelves up to the entire guidance of that light which ſhines in Scripture.

§. 7. *In order to this end, it ſeemed not improper, to offer at this time to publick view the preſent Sentiments of the Judicious Dr.* Sanderſon, *the* Regius Profeſſor *of the* Univerſity *of* Oxford, (*and the rather, becauſe ſome manuſcript Tables of his former thoughts, and ſome paſſages from his Sermons, long ſince preached, and now republiſhed, have been made uſe of, to gain authority to thoſe Doctrines which he is now far from owning,*) *and briefely and perſpicuouſly to annex unto, and compare with them, thoſe* Amicable *and* Pacifick *Reflexions, which may hope to gain the unanimous conſent of all true Sons of our Venerable Mother, the* Church of England, *whoſe chiefe aime it hath alwayes been to diſcountenance diviſions and fractions, and occaſions and fomenters of thoſe, eſpecially* ſingular Doctrines *and* Novell Articles *of* Faith, *and in a* Catholick *harmonious charity, to plant* Primitive *belief, and* zele of good workes, *and ſo inſtead of the empty* Forme, *the full* power of Godlineſſe.

§. 8. What

Q. 8. *What is ſo largely added on that one head of* Preſcience, *had ſome appearance of neceſſity, to repell a ſhaft borrowed of late from the* Socinian's *quiver, who having reſolved it impoſſible for God himſelf to foreſee future Contingents, have given diſputers their choice, whether they like beſt, bluntly to deny* God's Preſcience, *and ſo, at his coſt, maintain their own* Liberty, *or more piouſly to maintain* Preſcience, *and then give it the ſame force of evacuating all* Liberty *and Contingency, which* Predetermination *of all events was juſtly accuſed to draw after it; The miſtake very dangerous on either ſide, and the temtation equally fitted for both, if it were not timely obviated.*

Q. 9. *That theſe enſuing Diſcourſes may be effectually ſucceſsfull to the deſigned end, of advancing the threefold intereſt of* Truth, *and* Peace, *and* Uniforme Chriſtian obedience, *that it may ſupplant the* Vineger *by the* Oyle, *the* Nitre *by the* Ballſome, *and procure, by conſent of Litigants, a ſolemne Superſedeas, if not Concluſion to debates, (an averſion to theſe heathen* Agones, *which afford nothing, but to the combatant blowes, and leaves to the conquerour,) above all, that it may provide us, by this truce, a greater vacancy for the continued exerciſes of reall* Piety, *and engage us to make diligent uſe of it, (to* adde, *as* to our Faith vertue, (*or* courage,) *ſo to our* Godlineſſe brotherly-kindneſſe, *and to that the yet higher aſcent and accompliſhment of* charity,) ἀρετὴν, 2. Pet. 1. 5.

charity,) *that it may compact us all into that union that most succesfully contributes to our* growth, *and so possess us of that qualification, to which* immarcessible *joyes are awarded by our* Righteous Judge, *shall be continually the prayer, as in the following sheetes it hath been the sincere single endeavour, of*

Festo Omnium Sanctorum.

Your-fellow Labourer
H. Hammond.

A *Letter* of full *Accordance*,

Written to

D. *ROBERT SANDERSON*,

CONCERNING

Gods Grace and Decrees.

Dear Sir,

HAving had a ſight of the Letter which you ſent M.—— about the Antiremonſtrant Controverſies dated *Mar.* 26. and obſerving one of the reaſons, which you render of your having avoided to appear on that theme, [*A loathneſs to engage in a quarrell whereof you ſhould never hope to ſee an end*] I thought my ſelf in ſome degree qualified to anſwer this reaſon of yours, and thereby to do acceptable ſervice to many, who do not think fit that any conſiderations, which have not real and weighty truth in them, ſhould obſtruct that which may be ſo much to the common good, I mean, your writing and declaring your mind on any profitable ſubject. §. 1.

§. 2. That which qualifies me more then ſome others, to evacuate the force of this one reaſon of yours, and makes me willing to attempt it, though not to appear in oppoſition to any other paſſage, that ever you have written, is the true friendſhip that hath paſſed between us, and the ſweet converſation that for ſometime we enjoyed, with-

out any allay or unequableneſs, ſharp word, or unkind, or jealous thought. The remembrance whereof aſſures me unqueſtionably, that you and I may engage in this queſtion, as far as either of us ſhall think profitable, without any the leaſt beginning of a *quarrel*, and then that will competently be removed from ſuch, as of which *you cannot hope to ſee an end.*

§. 3. And before I go any farther, I appeal to your own judgement, whether herein I do not at leaſt ſpeak probably, and then whether it were not a miſpriſion, which you are in all reaſon to depoſite, to apprehend ſuch inſuperable difficulties or impoſſibilities at a diſtance, which when they are prudently approached, and examined, ſo preſently vaniſh before you. If this one reflection do not convince you, it remains, that the ſpeculation be brought to practice, and exemplified to your ſenſes.

Five Poſitions agreed on by all.

§ 4. You ſet out with a mention of ſome *poſitions, wherein, you ſay, Divines, though of contrary judgements, do yet all agree.* And then it is not credible that you and I ſhould be ſo ſingular, as to differ in them endleſly; of this number you propoſe five, 1. *That the will of man is free in all his actions.* 2. *That very many things in the world happen contingently.* 3. *That God from all eternity foreſeeth all, even the moſt free and contingent events.* 4. *That whatſoever God foreſeeth ſhall infallibly come to paſs.* 5. *That ſinners are converted by the effectual working of Gods grace.* Of each of theſe you ſay *we have from Scripture, Reaſon and Experience, as good and full aſſurance, as can be deſired for the* ὅτι, *or truth of them, that they are ſo.*] And I who fully ſub-

ſcribe

ſcribe to the undoubted truth of each of the Propoſitions, and do it alſo upon the very ſame three grounds (of Scripture, Reaſon, and Experience) which you mention, need not the interceſſion of our friendſhip to render it impoſſible to give you any the leaſt trouble of ſo much as explaining your ſence in any of theſe.

§. 5. Next, when you reſolve, that *all the difficulty is about the πῶς* (referring that to no more then *three heads*) 1. *How to reconcile the certain futurition of what God foreſeeth, with the liberty of the rational creature, and the contingency of caſual effects, as they proceed from inferiour cauſes.* 2. *In what manner or meaſure the effectual Grace of God cooperateth and concurreth with the free will of man, in the converſion of a ſinner.* 3. *How to cut ſo even a thread, as to take the whole of what we do amiſs to our ſelves, and leave the whole glory of what we do well to his grace.*] You are again as ſecure as any amulet can make you, that this reſolution of abbreviating the Controverſies, and confining them to theſe few heads, ſhall never engage you in the leaſt degree of Debate: And then I ſhall challenge you to feign, how it can remain poſſible, without contradicting ones ſelf (which ſtill is not quarrelling with you) to engage you in any uneaſie contention, unleſs it be on one of theſe *three* heads, and when I have by promiſe obliged my ſelf, which now I do, not to raiſe any Diſpute, or attempt to enſnare or intangle you in any of theſe three, you have then nothing to retract but your fears, to which if I tell you, you cannot adhere, diſcerning a ſure and near period to that which you apprehended *endleſs*; this is all the victory I ſhall project, or be capable of in this matter. *Three heads of difficulty.*

Of reconciling Præſcience with Liberty of Contingency.

§. 6. Of the firſt of theſe three Difficulties, the *reconciling the certain futurition of what God foreſees, with the liberty of the rational creature, and the contingency and caſual effects*, It falls out, that you have in your ſhorter Letter, dated *Ap.* 8. given that account, which evidenceth it to be, in your opinion, no invincible difficulty, your words are theſe, [*That Gods præſcience layeth no neceſſity at all upon any event, but that yet all events, as they are foreſeen of God, ſo ſhall they certainly and infallibly come to paſs, in ſuch ſort as they are foreſeen, elſe the knowledge of God ſhould be fallible, which certainty of the event may in ſome ſort be called neceſſity, to wit,* conſequentis *or* ex hypotheſi, *according as all the moſt contingent things are neceſſary, when they actually exiſt, which is a neceſsity infinitely diſtant from that which prædetermination importeth.*] This I take to be ſo clear an explication of that difficulty, and ſo ſolid a determining of the τὸ πῶς, the manner of reconciling præſcience with contingency, that as I fully conſent to it in every part of your period, ſo I doubt not but the laſt part alone hath made it as intelligible to any ordinary underſtanding, as whole books of Philoſophers have attempted to do.

§. 7. For Gods præſcience from all eternity being but the ſeeing every thing that ever exiſts, as it is, contingents, as contingents, neceſſary, as neceſſary, can neither work any change in the object, by thus ſeeing it, (convert a contingent into a neceſſary) nor it ſelf be deceived in what it ſees, which it muſt be, if any thing in proceſs of time ſhould be otherwiſe, then from all eternity God ſaw it to be.

§. 8. I was lately adviſed with by a Divine, to

me,

me unknown, but one that ſeems to be a man of good learning, about the diſtinction frequently made in this matter, betwixt *inevitably* and *infallibly*, and my anſwer and replyes to his ſeverall objections, (becauſe I would demonſtrate the perfect accordance betwixt you and me in this, which, within this year or two is put into a very grave attire, and revered as a great difficulty) I will give you at large by way of Appendage at the end of this Letter, having by hap a copy retained by me, and though it coſt you ſome minutes to ſurvey them, yet I know your patience of all ſuch exerciſes ſo well, that I doubt not of your willingneſs to be thus detained by me, which yet here you ſhall not, *loco non ſuo.*

§. 9. Then for the ſecond, *In what manner and meaſure the effectuall Grace of God cooperateth, or concurreth with the free will of man in his converſion*] you ſeem to me to have given a punctuall account of each part of that alſo, in the ſaid ſecond Letter, in theſe words, *That God worketh not by his Grace irreſiſtibly, but yet ſo effectually on thoſe whom he hath* ex beneplacito *appointed to ſalvation, in ordering the means, occaſions and opportunities with ſuch congruity to that end, as that* de facto *it is not finally reſiſted*] Here it is evident your reſolution comes home to each terme in the difficulty; For if effectuall Grace worke not irreſiſtibly, then we ſee in what manner it *cooperates with the free will of man*, viz. ſo as it ſtill remains poſſible for him to reſiſt it. And if the effectualneſs of his working conſiſt in *ordering the means, occaſions, and opportunities with ſuch congruity, &c.* then as that ſtateth the meaſure of the cooperation (the onely ſecond part of the difficulty)

Of the manner and meaſure of the cooperation of Effectuall Grace with the free will of man.

vide Fulgent. de verit. Prædeſtin. l. 1. c. 9, 10

ficulty) and doth it expreſly in Biſhop *Overals* way, ſo this ſuppoſeth Grace ſufficient to converſion and ſalvation to be given to thoſe, who are not converted, and ſaved, quite contrary to the three grand prætenſions of Doctor *Twiſſe*, the *Supralapſarians*, and *Sublapſarians*, and whether it be true or no, is preſently freed from all the odious conſequences charged on the ſeveral Schemes of the Antiremonſtrants, and ſo may ſafely be granted, or not oppoſed by them, who yet want evidence of Scripture to eſtabliſh it, and ſo this is not likely to bring any uneaſie engagement upon you.

How to attribute all good to God, and evil to our ſelves.

§. 10. And then as there remains no more difficulties, but the third, ſo, if you mark it, the grounds are already laid, whereby that is unqueſtionably reſolved, for having granted that God gives *ſufficient* Grace, and yet, when he cooperates moſt *effectually*, he doth it *not irreſiſtibly*, this is the very *thred* you ſeek *to cut by*, ſo as to devolve the whole blame of all our miſcarriages on our ſelves, and the entire glory and praiſe of all our καλῶν ἔργων, good performances, or good ſucceſſes on his Grace. Were any of us ſo left or paſt by, as to be denyed *ſufficient grace*, and yet deſtined to periſh, meerly through want of neceſſaries; the whole blame could not rationally fall on our ſelves, it could not be ſaid of Chriſts *yoke*, that it were * *eaſie*, or his † *Commandment not far from us*, the *fault* that was found with the Moſaical œconomy, *Heb.* viii. 8. and which made another (the Evangelical) neceſſary, would ſtill lye againſt this, *viz.* that men were not enabled to perform what was required, and yet the non-performance eternally revenged on many of them.

* Matth xi.
† Rom. x.

But

But *ſufficient Grace* being tendred by God, and by no default, but their own, proving ineffectuall, the entire blame falls unavoidably on thoſe, who do not thus *open* to him that *knocks*, ſo receive, as to make uſe of it, but *reſiſt*, or *grieve*, or *quench* what was ſo mercifully deſigned, and might have been improved by the humble and diligent receivers unto their greateſt advantages.

§. 11. On the other ſide, if our nature being univerſally corrupted by *Adam's* fall, all poſſibility of riſing out of that grave of ſin be the effect and benefit of the *Grace*, as that is of the death of Chriſt, if it be *God that worketh in us both to will and to do, of his good pleaſure*, the firſt by his preventing, the ſecond by his aſſiſting Grace, and both thoſe bottom'd meerly in his εὐδοκία *good pleaſure*, nothing in us any way meriting the firſt act, or purpoſe of Giving Grace, any farther then our wants and miſeries rendered us the proper objects of his compaſſions and reliefs; and the ſubſequent aids in like manner challengeable, onely from his promiſe, and the purport of the parable of the Talents, of *Giving to him that hath*, rewarding the uſe of the lower, with the gift of an higher degree of Grace, then ſtill is this, the attributing nothing to our ſelves, but demerits, and provocations, and giving the whole glory to God.

§. 12. Having gone thus far without any conſiderable diſagreement, about the τὸ πῶς, how to reconcile theſe three ſeeming repugnancies, wherein you apprehended the greateſt difficulty to lye, and being hereby, as by ſo many *poſtulata* accorded between us, competently provided and furniſhed of a ſtandard, and umpire, (in

Saint Pauls O the Depth.

caſe any light difference ſhould ariſe) what objection can S. *Pauls* Ὦ βάθος, *Rom.* xi. 33. (belonging expreſly to another matter, the cutting off the obdurate, and gathering all perſwaſible believing Jews and Gentiles, and no way applicable to this) interpoſe, why we ſhould not proceed together to the conſideration of the Doctrine of Decrees, as it hath been variouſly debated by others, and by you perſpicuouſly recapitulated in the proceſs of your papers?

§. 13. To this therefore I preſume of your good leave that we now proceed, and whereas you have prudently choſen to begin with an hiſtory of your own thoughts on this ſubject, which you have laid down with great particularity, I ſhall ſet out with a bare tranſcript of that, which will need no comment of mine, to render it uſefull to the Reader, in diſcovering to him the true and ſole originall of the thriving (for ſome time) of thoſe Doctrines among us, and how ſo many of our Church came to be ſeaſoned with them, and in giving him a but neceſſary caution for the laying the grounds of the ſtudy of Divinity in the writings of the antient Church, rather then in our modern ſyſtemes and Inſtitutions. Your words are theſe,

An Hiſtory of Doctor Sanderſons thoughts in theſe points.

§. 14. *When I began to ſet my ſelf to the Study of Divinity as my proper buſineſs, (which was after I had the degree of Maſter of Arts, being then newly xxi. years of age) the firſt thing I thought fit for me to do, was to conſider well of the Articles of the Church of England, which I had formerly read over twice, or thrice, and whereunto I had ſubſcribed. And becauſe I had then met with ſome Puritanicall Pamphlets written againſt the*

Liturgy,

Liturgie, and Ceremonies; although moſt of the Arguments therein were ſuch as needed no great skill to give ſatisfactory anſwers unto, yet for my fuller ſatisfaction (the queſtions being de rebus agendis, *and ſo the more ſuitable to my proper inclination) I read over with great diligence and no leſs delight that excellent piece of Learned* Hooker's *Eccleſiaſticall Politie. And I have great cauſe to bleſs God for it that ſo I did, not onely for that it much both cleared and ſetled my judgement for ever after in very many weighty points (as of Scandall, Chriſtian Liberty, Obligation of Laws, Obedience, &c.) but that it alſo proved (by his good providence) a good preparative to me (that I ſay not, Antidote) for the reading of* Calvin's *Inſtitutions with more caution then perhaps (otherwiſe) I ſhould have done. For that Book was commended to me, as it was generally to all young Scholars in thoſe times, as the beſt and perfecteſt ſyſteme of Divinity, and fitteſt to be laid as a ground work in the ſtudy of that profeſſion. And indeed being ſo prepared as is ſaid, my expectation was not at all deceived, in the reading of thoſe Inſtitutions. I found, ſo far as I was then able to judge, the method exact, the expreſſions clear, the ſtyle grave, equall and unaffected: his Doctrine for the moſt part conform to S.* Auguſtines, *in a word, the whole worke very elaborate, and uſefull to the Churches of God in a good meaſure; and might have been (I verily believe) much more uſefull, if the honour of his name had not given ſo much reputation to his very errours. I muſt acknowledge my ſelf to have reaped great benefit by the reading thereof. But as for the queſtions of Election, Reprobation, Effectuall Grace, Perſeverance, &c. I*

took

took as little notice of the two firſt, as of any other thing contained in the book; both becauſe I was alwayes affraid to pry much into thoſe ſecrets, and becauſe I could not certainly inform my ſelf from his own writings, whether he were a Supralapſarian (as moſt ſpeak him, and he ſeemeth often to incline much that way) or a Sublapſarian, as ſundry paſſages in the book ſeem to import. But giving my ſelf moſtly ſtill to the ſtudy of Moral Divinity, (and taking moſt other things upon truſt, as they were in a manner generally taught both in the Schools and Pulpits in both Vniverſities) I did for many years together acquieſce without troubling my ſelf any farther about them, in the more commonly received opinions concerning both theſe two, and the other points depending thereupon. Yet in the Sublapſarian way ever, which ſeemed to me of the two, the more moderate, rationall and agreeable to the goodneſs, and juſtice of God: for the rigid Supralapſarian doctrine could never find any entertainment in my thoughts from firſt to laſt. But MDCXXV. a Parliament being called, wherein I was choſen one of the Clerks of the Convocation for the Dioceſſe of Lincoln, during the continuance of that Parliament (which was about four moneths, as I remember) there was ſome expectation that thoſe Arminian points (the onely queſtions almoſt in agitation at that time) ſhould have been debated by the Clergy, in that CONVOCATION. Which occaſioned me (as it did ſundry others) being then at ſome leaſure, to endeavour by ſtudy and conference to inform my ſelf, as throughly and exactly in the ſtate of thoſe Controverſies, as I could have opportunity, and as my wit would ſerve me for it. In order whereunto, I made it my firſt buſineſs

ſineſs to take a ſurvey of the ſeverall different opinions concerning the ordering of Gods Decrees, as to the ſalvation or damnation of men; not as they are ſuppoſed to be really in Mente Divina *(for all his Decrees are eternall and therefore coeternall, and ſo no priority or poſteriority among them:) but* quoad noſtrum intelligendi modum, *becauſe we cannot conceive or ſpeak of the things of God, but in a way ſuitable to our own finite condition, and underſtanding: Even as God himſelf hath been pleaſed to reveal himſelf to us in the holy Scriptures by the like ſuitable condeſcenſions and accommodations. Which opinions, the better to repreſent their differences to the eye,* uno quaſi intuitu, *for their more eaſie conveying to the underſtanding by that means, and the avoiding of confuſion and tedious diſcourſings, I reduced into five Schemes or Tables, much after the manner as I had uſed to draw Pedigrees (a thing which I think you know I have very much fancied, as to me of all others the moſt delightfull recreation) of which Schemes, ſome ſpeciall friends, to whom I ſhewed them, deſired copies: who, as it ſeemeth, valuing them more then I did (for divers men have copies of them, as I hear, but I do not know that I have any ſuch my ſelf) communicated them farther, and ſo they are come into many hands. Thoſe are they which Doctor* Reynolds, *in his Epiſtle prefixed to Maſter* Barlees *Correptory Correction, had taken notice of. Having all theſe Schemes before my eyes at once, ſo as I might with eaſe compare them one with another, and having conſidered of the conveniences and inconveniences of each, as well as I could, I ſoon diſcerned a neceſſity of quitting the Sublapſarian way of which I had a better liking before, as well*

as

as the Supralapſarian, which I could never fancy.]

§. 15. *Thus far your hiſtory*, which, I verily believe to have perfect truth in every ſtep of it, without any diſguiſe or varniſh, and ſo I paſs from it without any farther Reflections.

§. 16. Next then follows your diſtincter view of the ſeverall wayes, which have been embraced by thoſe of the Antiremonſtrant perſwaſion, and the motives on which you were forced to diſſent and depart from each of them, and to this I am obliged to attend you μετὰ πόδα. And the wayes being eſpecially three, the method of greateſt advantage will be to begin with a tranſient view of thoſe, each of which you with great reaſon reject, and to ſet Doctor *Twiſſes* firſt (though it came laſt into the world and adorn'd it ſelf with the ſpoiles of the other two) becauſe that ſets the object of Election higher, then the other do, *homo creabilis*, man conſidered before he is created. His deſign and ſcheme you have perſpicuouſly drawn, thus, [*That God making his own Glory the only end of all other his Decrees, all theſe decrees of creating man, of permitting ſin, of ſending Chriſt, of preaching the Goſpel, of Electing ſome, of Reprobating others, and the reſt, make up one entire coordinate Medium, conducing to that one End, and ſo the whole ſubordinate to it, but not any one part, or joynt thereof ſubordinate to any other of the ſame.*] Againſt this, your objection I profeſs to be very convincing, taken from his own beloved axiome, ſo oft repeated by him, (and borrowed from him, and built upon by others) that *whatſoever is firſt in the intention, is laſt in the execution.* For as it is moſt evident, that

D. Twiſs his way.

Cauſes of rejecting it.

that of theſe his ſuppoſed coordinate decrees ſome are after others in execution (the fall after the creation, the coming of Chriſt after both, and ſo of the reſt) ſo if he will ſtand to his principle, he muſt, as you ſay, grant, *that thoſe that were thus after any other in the execution, were in Gods intention before them*, which will neceſſarily bring in a *ſubordination* among them, and *ſo quite overthrow this* (as you call it) *new crochet of coordination.*

§. 17. Your other cauſes of diſlike to His way are equally rational, 1. the *falſneſs of that his Logick Maxime*, which he builds ſo much upon, which yet hath no *certain truth, or other then caſuall, but when it is applyed to final cauſes, and the means uſed for the attaining any end.* 2. The prodigiouſneſs of his other doctrine, that there are *more degrees of bonity* in damnato quam annihilato, (becauſe the *bonitas entis*) and ſo that it is better for the *Creature* to be *in eternall* miſery, then ſimply not to be; when Chriſt expreſly pronounceth the contrary of wicked men, that it had been *better for them never to have been born*, to have a *milſtone about the neck, and to be caſt into the ſea*, (a figure to repreſent annihilation) then to be involved in thoſe dangers that attend their ſins. 3. His *reſolving Gods Election of a man to life eternall to be* * *no act of his mercy, and likewiſe his* † *reprobating and ordaining to damnation to be no act of his Juſtice, but of his pleaſure.*] A few ſuch Propoſitions as theſe are competent to blaſt and defame any cauſe, which requires ſuch aids, ſtands in need of ſuch ſupporters, and therefore you will be confident I concurr with you in rejection of that, though I think neither of us likely to undertake the travel of refuting of his whole work.

* L. 1. digr. 9.
† Ibid. digr. 10.

§. 18.

The Supralapsarians way. The Sublapsarians.

§. 18. Next then for the Supralapsarians, with whom the *object* of the *decree* is *homo conditus*, man *created*, not *yet fallen*, and the *Sublapsarians*, with whom it is Man fall'n, or the *corrupt Mass*, your rejections and reasons thereof are twined together, and are especially *two*, which you justly call very weighty, and so I suppose they will be deem'd by any man, that shall consider the force of them, without prejudice, I shall therefore set them down from your letter in your own words.

Reasons against both.

§. 19. The first reason is, *because though it might perhaps be defensible, as to the justice of God, in regard of his absolute power over his own creature, yet it seems very hardly reconcileable with the goodness of God, and his exceeding great love to mankind, as they are plentifully and passionately set forth in his holy word, to decree the eternall damnation of the greater part of mankind, for that sin, and for that sin onely which was utterly and naturally impossible for him to avoid, for the Decree of Reprobation according to the Sublapsarian Doctrine, being nothing else but a meer preterition or non-election of some persons whom God left, as he found them, involved in the guilt of the first Adams transgression, without any actuall personall sin of their own, when he withdrew some others, as guilty as they, without any respect to Christ the second Adam, it must needs follow that the persons so left are destin'd to eternall misery, for no other cause, but this onely, that Adam some thousand years since did eat the forbidden fruit, and they being yet unborn could not help it.*

§. 20. The other reason was, *because the Scripture not onely saith expresly, that God hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world,*

Eph.

Eph. 1. 4, 5. *and conſequently the decree of ſending Chriſt muſt be præcedaneous to that of Election, but alſo doth every where, and upon all occaſions hold forth the death of Chriſt, as intended by God for the benefit of mankind, in the utmoſt extent,* [*the world, the whole world, mankind, every man, &c.*] *and not for the benefit of ſome few onely, the reſt by an antecedent peremptory decree excluded. To which it would be conſequent, that according to the tenure of* (*the more moderate of theſe*) *the Sublapſarians doctrine, Jeſus Chriſt the Judge at the laſt day, when he ſhould proceed to pronounce ſentence upon the damned, ſhould beſpeak them to this effect,* Ite maledicti, voluit enim Pater meus pro beneplacito, ut Adam peccato ſuo vos perderet, noluit ut ego ſanguine meo vos redimerem, *Go ye curſed, for my Father of his meer pleaſure will'd that Adam by his ſin ſhould deſtroy you, will'd not that I by my blood ſhould redeem you, the very thought whereof* (you ſay) your *ſoul ſo much abhorr'd, that you were forced to forſake that opinion of the Sublapſarians,* (having, as you profeſs, never *phanſied the Superlapſarians*) *and conclude it unſafe to place the decree of Election before that of ſending Chriſt.*

§. 21. Theſe two reaſons of changing your judgement, are, I confeſs, ſo worthy of a conſidering man, who makes Gods revealed will his Cynoſure, and doth not firſt eſpouſe doctrines of men, and then catch at ſome few obſcure places of Scripture, to countenance them, nor makes his retreat to the abyſs of Gods unfathomable Counſels, as the reaſon of (that which is its contradictory,) his attempting to fathome and define them, that I doubt not but the tendering of them to all diſpaſſionate ſeekers of truth, that have not ſome

intereſts

intereſts to ſerve by adhering peremptorily and obſtinately to their prepoſſeſſions, will be of the ſame force to diſabuſe and extort from them the ſame confeſſions, which they have from you, cauſing them fairly to depoſite theſe two Schemes, and either not to define at all, or to ſeek out other ſolider Methods, and more Catholick Grounds of defining; and if the wiſe heathen were in the right

Virtus eſt vitium fugere, & ſapientia prima
Stultitia caruiſſe——

this will be ſome degree of proficiency, which they that ſhall with unſpeakable joy have tranſcribed from you, will alſo have temptation to accuſe your fears, or waryneſs, that they received not this leſſon ſooner from you, eſpecially when they are told, what here you expreſs, that *theſe have been your thoughts, ever ſince the year* 1625. *i. e.* 34. years ſince, which is an age or *generation* in the Scripture-uſe of the word.

§. 22. That none may be any longer deprived of this means of their conviction, or permitted to think or teach ſecurely and confidently, and as in accord with you, what you profeſs your *ſoul* thus long to have *abhorred the very thought of*, I deſire you will at length communicate your thoughts your ſelf; or elſe allow this letter of mine to be your ὑποφήτης and do it for you, under ſome teſtimony of your full approbation of this your ſence.

§. 23. But all this, thus far advanced, is but the rejection of the ſeverall erroneous wayes, and onely the negative part of your thoughts, which yet

yet, by the way let me tell you, is fully sufficient both to the peace of Churches, and of particular souls; If the erroneous wayes be rejected, from whence all the misapprehensions of God, and ill consequences thereof flow, the Church is competently secured from tares, and then what need expres articles, and positive definitions come in to her rescue? *The negative part sufficient to Peace, &c.*

§. 24. This I suppose the reason both of our Churches Moderation in framing the *Article of Predestination*, and of our *late Kings Declaration*, in silencing the debate of the questions. For if by these methods the Church could but have prevailed to have the definitions of the several pretenders forgotten, all men contenting themselves, as our Article prescribes, with the *promises of God, as they are declared in Scripture*, (which sure are *Universal* and *conditionate*, not absolute and particular) the turmoil and heat, and impertinence of Disputes had been prevented, which now goes for an engagement in Gods cause, the bare fervour and zeal in which is taken in commutation for much other piety, by many the most eager contenders. The doctrines being deemed doctrines of God, are counted evidences of sanctified men, and affix the censure of carnality on opposers, and from hence come *bitter envyings, railings*, and at the least *evil surmisings*, and these are most contrary to the outward peace of a Church or Nation. *Our Churches moderation. The Kings Declaration in order to Peace.*

§. 25. And for particular mens souls, if the rigid doctrines be found apt to cool all those mens love of God, who have not the confidence to believe themselves of the number of the few chosen vessels, and to beget security and presumption in others, who have conquered those difficulties, and *Good life.*

reſolved that they are of that number, and to obſtruct induſtry and vigorous endeavours, and fear of falling, and ſo to have malignant influences on practiſe, yet ſeeing it is the believing the Antiremonſtrant Schemes (one or other of them) to be the truth of God, which lyes under theſe ill conſequences, the bare laying them aſide, leaves every man indiſpenſably under the force of Chriſts *commands* to diſciples, *terrours* to the unreformed, and *conditional* (moſt expreſly *conditional*) *promiſes* to all; and thoſe being ſubſtantially backed with the firm belief of all the Articles of the Creed, particularly of the judgement to come, are by the grace of God abundantly ſufficient to ſecure Evangelical obedience, the true foundation of peace to every Chriſtian ſoul, and therefore I ſay, *eſt aliquid prodire tenus*, your *negative* part, if there were no more behind, will be of ſoveraign uſe to all that have been ſeduced into any liking of thoſe errours, which are by a man of your moderation and judgement, in deſpight of contrary prepoſſeſſions, on reaſons ſo convincing and perſpicuous, rejected.

§. 26. But in the ſpace of thirty four years, though you have permitted your genius to lead you to other ſtudies (which if your rejections be granted, I ſhall willingly confeſs to be more univerſally profitable, then any minuter ſearches into the decrees) thoſe of *moral or practical Divinity*, yet it ſeems you have not liv'd ſuch an obſtinate Recluſe from the diſputes and tranſactions of men, but that occaſions you have met with to excite your faculties, to wade a little farther into the Poſitive part of theſe Doctrines: and indeed it is hard to conceive how a man can have ſpent ſo many hours, as the Survey of Doctor *Twiſſes Vindiciæ Gratiæ*, were

were it never ſo ſlight and deſultory, muſt have coſt you, without ſome other reflections, beſides thoſe of bare averſation to his Hypotheſes.

§. 27. To theſe you at length proceed, propoſing them with difference, owning ſome of them, as your *preſent thoughts*, and *opinion*, whilſt in others you profeſs to be purely *ſceptick*, and to propoſe them *onely as conjectures*, that ſeem to you in the mean time not improbable, untill you meet with ſome other more ſatisfactory. And in making this difference I fully accord with you, diſcerning that undeniable evidence of grounds in the former, which is not ſo readily diſcoverable in the latter. I ſhall therefore follow your direction herein, and rank theſe ſeverally, ſetting down thoſe which you own as your *opinion* firſt, and afterward, with that note of difference, proceed to your *Conjectures*. *Difference between Opinions and Conjectures.*

§. 28. Concerning the *Decrees of Election and Reprobation*, your *preſent opinion* is contained in theſe three propoſitions (prefaced with two more, which are but the diſavowing the three wayes of *Maſſa nondum condita, condita ante lapſum, & corrupta.*) *Three Propoſitions concerning Gods Decrees.*

§. 29. 1. *That man being made upright, and ſo left in* manu conſilii ſui *(God permitting him to act according to that freedome of will wherewith as a reaſonable creature he had endowed him) did by his own voluntary diſobedience, through the cunning of Satan, tempting him thereunto, fall away from God, caſt himſelf into a ſtate of ſin and miſery, under the bondage of Satan, without any power, poſſibility, or ſo much as deſire to recover himſelf out of that wretched condition; All which God did decree not to hinder, as purpoſing to make uſe thereof, as a* *Mans Fall.*

fit occaſion for the greater manifeſtation of his power, wiſdome, goodneſs, mercy, juſtice, &c. Of this my opinion is, that it is, in every branch of it, ſo undeniably founded in the expreſs affirmations of holy Writ, that there can be no doubt of it to any Chriſtian.

The giving of Chriſt for Mankind.

§. 30. II. *That man being thus falln, God out of his infinite compaſſion to his creature, made after his own image (and that Satan might not finally triumph in ſo rich a conqueſt, if the whole maſs of mankind ſhould periſh) decreed to ſend his onely begotten Son Jeſus Chriſt into the world, to undertake the great work of our Redemption, and to ſatisfie his juſtice for ſin, that ſo notwithſtanding the ſame, the whole maſs of mankind loſt by the fall of the firſt Adam, might be reſtored to a capability of ſalvation, through the mercy of God, and the merits of Jeſus Chriſt, the ſecond Adam.*

In this, compared with what you before ſaid, and afterwards add, I diſcern your full agreement to the words of our Church-Catechiſm, as thoſe are exactly conſonant to the manifold teſtimonies of ſacred Writ, that Chriſt dyed for, and thereby *redeemed all mankind*; your words being not (to my apprehenſion) capable of any of thoſe evaſions, that others are willing to reſerve themſelves in this buſineſs, as of his dying ſufficiently, but not intentionally for all, for that χρησοφύγεσον is ſuperſeded by your words of *Gods ſending Chriſt &c. that ſo mankind &c.*] which muſt needs import his unfeigned intention, that mankind ſhould be reſtored to a reall capability of ſalvation, which is not with truth affirmable, if any one individuall of that whole kind be abſolutely paſſed by, or left, or excluded from his part in this reſtauration, and

capability

capability of ſalvation, which yet we muſt reſolve many millions to be, if that which is perfectly neceſſary to the recovery of thoſe which were ſo totally loſt, as your former propoſition truly ſuppoſed, be not really and effectively made up to them by Chriſt. And as in this full latitude I am obliged to underſtand you, ſo I wiſh not any more pregnant words to expreſſe it, then thoſe which you have choſen.

§. 31. III. *That man having by his fall rendred himſelf uncapable of receiving any benefit from the Covenant made with him in his firſt Creation, God was graciouſly pleaſed to enter into a new Covenant with mankind, founded in his Son Jeſus Chriſt, conſiſting of Evangelical but conditional promiſes, of granting remiſſion of ſins, and everlaſting life, upon the condition of faith in Chriſt, repentance from dead works, and new obedience: and gave commandment that the ſaid Covenant by the preaching of the Goſpel ſhould be publiſhed throughout the world.* this, you ſay, you conceive to be *that which the Arminians call the generall decree of Predeſtination, but is rejected by the Calviniſts,*] *And that all theſe Decrees are* (*according to our weak manner of underſtanding the way of Gods counſells,* ſalva coexiſtentiâ & præſentialitate rerum omnium in mente divinâ ab æterno) *antecedent to the decrees of Election and Reprobation.*] The new Covenant,

To this alſo I fully aſſent, both as to the truth, and fulneſs of the expreſſion in every part, eſpecially in that of Gods entring with *mankind* (without any reſtraint) the *new Covenant*, founded in Chriſt: of the *conditionateneſs* of the *promiſes* of that new *Evangelical Covenant*: of *repentance* and *new obedience*, together with *faith* in *Chriſt*, making

up that compleat *condition*: of the *antecedency* of this *Covenant* in *Chriſt* (and the command of publiſhing it throughout the world) to the *decrees* of *Election* and *Reprobation*: which ſeems to me to be expreſly ſet down from Chriſts words *Mar.* xvi. 15, 16. *And he ſaid unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Goſpel to every creature, he that believeth and is baptized, ſhall be ſaved, he that believeth not, ſhal be damned.*] which evidently founds thoſe two decrees in the precedaneous preaching, and mens receiving or rejecting of the Goſpel.

The Decree of publiſhing the Goſpel to all the world,

§. 32. And when the Goſpels are all ſo expreſs in ſetting down that command of Chriſt to his Apoſtles of *preaching the Goſpel* to all the *world*, to the *whole Creation*, i. e, the *whole Gentile*, as well as *Jewiſh world*, (and the travels of the Apoſtles witneſs their obedience to it) and when the command of Chriſt is equivalent with a *decree*, and his giving of that in time an evidence of its being by him predeſtin'd from all eternity, it is very ſtrange that this ſhould be denyed or queſtioned by the Calviniſts, or the Arminians rejected by them, when in effect they do but repeat Chriſts own words, who if he gave command to publiſh the Goſpel to all, then muſt the publiſhing of the Goſpel be matter of a general decree, there being no other ſo ſure a way of diſcerning what was *ab æterno* predeſtined by God in his ſecret counſel, as the Scriptures telling us what was by the Father, or Chriſt in time actually commanded.

§. 33. Thus far and no farther reach thoſe which you own to be your *preſent opinions*, and pronounce of them, that you are ſo *far convinced from the phraſes and expreſſions frequent in Scripture, that you cannot but own them as ſuch*, And then let

me

me tell you, it were very happy that all men would agree in theſe, and yet more happy, if inſtead of more curious enquiries, they would ſit down, and betake themſelves unitormly and vigorouſly to that taſk, which theſe *data* bind indiſpenſably upon them, and which is of that weight, that it may well imploy the remainder of their lives to perform it to purpoſe, I mean the work of *Evangelical obedience*, the condition of the new Covenant, without which the capability of pardon and ſalvation, which was purchaſed for mankind in general and for every man, ſhall never be actuated to any. *Evangelical Obedience.*

§. 34. Beyond theſe therefore what you add, you acknowledge to be but *conjectures*, which though to you they ſeem *not improbable*, yet you profeſs to maintain your ἐποχὴ or *Scepticiſme* in them. And if in any of theſe I ſhould, on the ſame terms of *conjecture*, or *ſeeming probability*, differ from you, this ſtill were fully to accord with you in the *general*, viz. the *ſuſpenſion of belief*, and proceeding *no farther then conjectures* in theſe things. *Matters of Conjecture.*

What the iſſue will be, ſhall now be ſpeedily experimented, by proceeding to a view of them, remembring ſtill that you propoſe them but as *conjectures*.

§. 35. The firſt is, *That the object of the decrees of Election and Reprobation, as they are ſet forth in the Scripture, ſeemeth to you to be man preached unto,* Thoſe *being elected to eternal life, who receive Chriſt, as he is offer'd to them in the Goſpel, viz. as their Lord and Saviour, and thoſe reprobated, who do not ſo receive him.*] Herein I not onely perfectly agree with you, but more then ſo, I do think it an unqueſtionable truth, which carries it's evidence *The firſt.*

along with it, and ſo will be acknowledged by any that obſerves the limitation by you affixt to the ſubject of the propoſition, the object of the decrees [*as they are ſet forth in the Scripture*] For he that ſhall but conſider, that the holy Scripture is a donative afforded us by God, and deſigned for our eternal advantages, not to enable us to judge of others, but our ſelves, not to diſcover all the unſearchable receſſes of his cloſet, or ſecret counſels (*abs condita Domino Deo noſtro*) but to reveal to men thoſe truths, which themſelves are concern'd in, would make no difficulty to conclude, that the Scripture ſpeaks onely of thoſe, to whom it ſpeaks, and as the Apoſtle ſaith, 1 *Cor.* v. 12. *What* hath he *to do to judge them that are without?* leaving them wholly to *Gods judgement*, ſo doth the Scripture declare Gods dealing onely with thoſe, to whom the Scripture comes, to whom ſome way or other (whether by writing or preaching it matters not) the Goſpel of Chriſt is revealed.

The object of Scripture Election.

§. 36. This as it appears by innumerable evidences in the Scripture, ſo it is put beyond all diſpute by that even now recited text, at Chriſts farewell, *Mar.* xvi. his commiſſion to his Apoſtles, and declaration of the fixed determin'd conſequences of it, an expreſs tranſcript of Gods eternal deſtinations or decrees in that matter, *Go into all the world, and preach the Goſpel to every creature, He that believeth and is baptized ſhall be ſaved, and he that believeth not ſhall be damned*] In which words what can be the meaning of [*ſhall be ſaved, and ſhall be damned*] but this, that *God hath decreed ſalvation and damnation to ſuch?* Thoſe therefore are the object of thoſe divine decrees, who are the ſubject of that propoſition, and thoſe are evidently men preached

preached to, of which ſome believe, and are baptized, and thoſe have their parts in the firſt *decree*, that of *election* to ſalvation, ſome reject the Goſpel, and believe not, and thoſe fall under the ſecond branch, that of rejection to Damnation.

§. 37. Againſt the evidence of this, no oppoſition can be made, and to this it is undeniably conſequent, that all the Decrees whereof Scripture treateth, are *conditionate*, receiving Chriſt as the Goſpel offers him, as *Lord*, and *Saviour*, the former as well as the latter being the condition of Scripture-election, and the rejecting or not receiving him thus, the condition of the Scripture-reprobation. *All Scripture decrees conditionate.*

§. 38. As for any other which can be phanſied diſtant from this (and ſo all abſolute Election or inconditionate Reprobation) it muſt needs be reſolved to be the meer invention and fabrick of mens brains, without the duct of Gods Spirit in Scripture, which if at leaſt it hold not a ſtrict analogy with that which the Scripture hath thus revealed to us, will never be excuſed from great temerity, and the ſin of dogmatizing, the rifling Gods ſecrets, and ſetting up our own imaginations, if not prejudices, for the oracles of God. If this were well thought of, it would infallibly ſet a period to all further diſputes, on this ſubject. And the Propoſition, which I have laſt ſet down from you, is ſo irrefragably convincing, that I hope it may be ſucceſsful to ſo good an end, and all men that read it, reſolve it their duty to preach no other Decrees of God from Scripture, but this, that all *that receive the Goſpel preached, and live according to the præſcript rule thereof*, (for that is to *receive Chriſt as there he is offered to them, as a Lord and Saviour*) *Temerity of introducing abſolute Decrees.*

Saviour) ſhall be ſaved, and all they that reject it, when it is thus revealed, or live in contradiction to the terms whereon it is eſtabliſhed, ſhall be damned. This would probably change curioſity into induſtry, unprofitable diſquiſitions into the *ſearch and trying of our own wayes*, and *working out our own ſalvation*.

§. 39. To this propoſition, if it ſhall be granted, you annex *two Corollaries*, and I that have not onely yielded but challenged the undoubted truth of the Propoſition, can make no queſtion of the Corollaries, The *firſt* is this,

§. 40. *That it will be impoſſible to maintain the Doctrine of Univerſal Grace in that manner as the Remonſtrants are ſaid to aſſert it, againſt the objection which is uſually made by their adverſaries, how evangelical Grace can be offer'd to ſuch nations or perſons, as never had the Goſpel preached unto them.*]

whether the heathens have Evangelical Grace.

§. 41. The truth of this Corollary (as of all other) muſt be judged of by the dependence from the *Principle*, the connexion it hath with the former propoſition; That ſpake of the *Decrees*, *as they are ſet forth in Scripture*, and of the *condition* required of them that are *elected to ſalvation*, *receiving Chriſt preached*, *as he is offered in the Goſpel*, and accordingly it is moſt evident, that they that will found their Doctrine on *Scripture*, muſt find not onely difficulty, but impoſſibility to maintain the gift of *evangelicall Grace* (which I ſuppoſe to be a ſupernaturall power to believe and obey the Goſpel) to thoſe, to whom the Goſpel hath never been revealed. What the *Remonſtrants* are ſaid to aſſert in this matter, I ſhall forbear to examine, becauſe I deſign not to engage in any controverſie at this

this time with any; onely as on one ſide it is evident, that their adverſaries can receive no benefit by the objection, the ſalvability of all to whom the Goſpel is preached, being as contrary to their Doctrine of *onely the Elect*, as it would be, if extended to the heathens alſo, all Chriſtians being not with them in the number of the Elect; ſo on the other ſide, I ſhould think it ſtrange, that in our preſent notion of *Evangelical grace*, for a *ſtrength* from *God to receive and obey the Goſpel* preached, it ſhould, by the Remonſtrants, or any other, be affirmed from Scripture, that it is given, or offered to thoſe to whom the Goſpel hath not been revealed: S. *Paul* ſtiles the *Goſpel*, *the power of God unto ſalvation*, *and* the preaching of it the διακονία πνεύματος *adminiſtration of the ſpirit*, and indeed the *ſpirit* is in Scripture promiſed onely to them who *believe in Chriſt*, and therefore ſpeaking of what may be maintained by Scripture, and confining the ſpeech to *evangelical Grace*, the Univerſality of it can no farther be by that maintained to extend, then to thoſe to whom the Goſpel is preached, for if *Faith cometh by hearing*, and *hearing by the word*, i. e. preaching the Goſpel, it muſt follow, *they cannot believe*, and ſo have not Evangelical Grace, or ſtrength to believe, *without a Preacher*.

§. 42. And therefore I remember the Learned Biſhop of *Sarisbury*, Doctor *Davenant* in his Lent Sermon (I think the laſt he preached before the King) declared his opinion to be (as for *Univerſal Redemption*, ſo) for *Univerſal Grace within the Church*; and as for this he was, I think, by none accounted an Arminian, ſo I never heard any that was of the Remonſtrant perſwaſions, unſatisfied

fied with the ſcantneſs of that declaration, but thought it as much, as, ſpeaking of Grace in the Scripture notion of it, *evangelical Grace*, could with any reaſon be required of him.

§. 43. As for the ſtate and condition of heathens, to whom the Goſpel is not revealed, and yet it is no fault of theirs that it is not, as all thoſe that lived before Chriſt and many ſince, as it is evident the Scripture was not delivered to them, nor conſequently gave to us Chriſtians rules for the judging of them, ſo it is moſt reaſonable which you add in your ſecond Corollary, which is this,

Of the condition of thoſe to whom the Goſpel is not revealed,

§. 44. That *into the conſideration of Gods Decrees ſuch nations or perſons are not at all to be taken, as never heard of the Goſpel, but they are to be left wholly to the judgement of God, ſince he hath not thought fit to reveal to us any certainty concerning their condition, but reſerved it to himſelf, amongſt his other ſecret counſels, the reaſons of his wonderful and unſearchable diſpenſations in that kind.*] To which I moſt willingly ſubſcribe in every tittle, and challenge it as the juſt debt to the force of that reaſon, that ſhines in it, that no man paſs fatall decretory ſentences on ſo great a part of mankind, by force of thoſe rules, which they never heard of, nor without hearing could poſſibly know that they were to be ſentenced by them. And this the rather upon four conſiderations which Scripture aſſures us of. Firſt, that as *all men* were *dead in Adam*, ſo *Chriſt died for all*, that were thus *dead*, for *every man*, even for thoſe that *deny him*, and finally *periſh*: which as it muſt needs extend and be intended by him, that thus *taſted death for* them, to the benefit of thoſe that knew him not (for if he *died for*

Four Conſiderations concerning them. The firſt.

them

them that deny him, why not for them that are leſs guilty, as having never heard of him, eſpecially when 'tis not the *Revelation* of Chriſt, to which the *Redemption* is affixt, but his *Death*) ſo the certain truth of this is moſt expreſly revealed and frequently inculcated in the Scripture (though nothing be there found of Gods decrees concerning them) upon this ground eſpecially, that no perſon of what nation ſoever ſhould have any prejudice to Chriſtian Religion, when it ſhould be firſt revealed to him, when he finds his intereſt ſo expreſly provided for by ſo gracious a Redeemer, who if he had not dyed for *every man*, 'twere impoſſible for any Preacher to aſſure an Infidel, that he dyed for him, or propoſe any conſtringent reaſon to him, why he ſhould believe on him for ſalvation. To this it is conſequent, that whatſoever Gods unrevealed wayes are, to deal with any heathen, what degree of *repentance from Dead works*, obedience, or performance ſoever he accept from them, this muſt needs be founded in the Covenant made with mankind in Chriſt, which you moſt truly have eſtabliſhed, there being *no other name under heaven*, no ſalvation poſſible to lapſed man by any other Covenant; Which, being ſet in oppoſition to the firſt Covenant of perfect unſinning obedience, and therefore called a ſecond and Evangelical Covenant, on condition onely of ſincere obedience, of doing what by Gods gift, purchaſed by Chriſt, men are enabled to do, it follows ſtill, that whatſoever acceptation or mercy they, who never heard of Chriſt, can be imagined to have afforded them by God, muſt be conformable to the tenure of the Evangelicall Covenant, and *ſo to the praiſe of the Glory of that Grace*, whereby whoſoever is accepted

cepted by God, is *accepted in the beloved.*

The ſecond, §. 45. The ſecond Conſideration is the analogy, which, in one reſpect, is obſervable between thoſe to whom the Goſpel is not revealed, and all children and Idiots within the pale of the Church, for although believing in Chriſt were ſuppoſed equally by the law of Scripture to be exacted of all, and ſo of both thoſe ſorts (nay by the intervention of the vow of Baptiſm to be more expreſſly the obligation of thoſe that are baptized, then thoſe that are not) yet there is no reaſon producible to free the Chriſtian children and idiots from the blame of not believing, which will not with equall force be producible for thoſe heathens, to whom the Goſpel was never revealed, it being as impoſſible to ſee without the preſence of the *object*, as without the *faculty* of ſight, without the *Sun*, as without eyes, without the revelation of Chriſt, as without the intellective faculty; which if it be not part of the importance of that decree of heaven, *Go and preach, and then he that believeth not ſhall be damned*, yet it is fully accordant to it, and ſhews that that Text was not deſigned to give ſuffrage to the damnation of all but Chriſtians, which is all that your Corollary, or my obſervations have aſpired unto; to which it is yet farther neceſſarily conſequent, that theſe *Scripture Decrees* which you ſpeak of (and whoſoever ſpeaks of any other muſt be reſolved to ſpeak from ſome other dictate, then that of Scripture) comprize not all men, no nor all baptized Chriſtians under them, being terminated onely in thoſe to whom the Goſpel is revealed, and thoſe certainly are not all that are brought into the world, or even to *Baptiſmal* new birth.

The third. §. 46. The third conſideration is, that ſeeing the

the Scripture assures us, that they which have *received more, of them more shall be required,* and that *he that knoweth and doeth not, shall be beaten with many stripes*, this must needs advertise us, that whatever priviledges Christians may have beyond heathens, this is not one, that a smaller degree of obedience and performances shall be accepted of them, then of heathens would be, but the contrary, that to whom *less is given, less will be required*, according to that of S. *Augustine, Ex eo quod non accepit, nullus reus est, No man is guilty from that which he hath not received.* De lib. Arbit. l. 3. c. 18.

§. 47. The fourth Consideration is, that God rewards those that have made use of the single talent, that lowest proportion of Grace, which he is pleased to give; and the method of his rewarding is by giving them more grace, which as it is in some degree applicable to heathens, who have certainly the talent of naturall knowledge, and are strictly responsible for it, so if they use not that, but *retain the truth in unrighteousness, Rom.* 1.18. that makes their condition but the same with ours, (who are finally lost also, and at the present have our talent taken away from us) if we make not the due use of it. The fourth.

§. 48. This, 'tis visible, hath befaln those Nations who once had the Gospel preacht to them, and after the knowledge of the truth, return'd to their heathen sins, and so had their candlestick taken from them (to which and not to Gods primary denying them Evangelical Grace, their present Barbarity is to be imputed) And the onely conclusion which we can hence duely make, is the acknowledgement of Gods just judgements on them, and reasonable fear lest he deal in like manner with us,

if

if we tranſcribe their copy, imitate them in their demerits. Should God moſt juſtly thus puniſh this nation at this time, could it either now or in future ages be reaſonable hence to argue againſt the Doctrine of *Univerſal Grace*, in caſe there were a concurrence of all other evidences for the truth of the Doctrine? Certainly it could not. In like manner then it cannot be reaſonable to argue thus from the like fate, and effects on other Nations.

§. 49. To which I may add, that Chriſt being, we know, in Gods decree and promiſe, *the Lamb ſlain from the beginning of the world*, if this argument be now of force againſt the heathens, it muſt equally hold againſt all that underſtood no more of the *Predictions* of Chriſt, then the Pagans do now of the *Hiſtory*.

§. 50. And then it muſt, ſhould it have force, follow, not onely that the Sacrifice of Chriſt was intended to be of avail to none but the Jews, to whom onely the Oracles of God were committed, (which yet you acknowledge was intended to all) but alſo that as far as we have wayes of judging, a very ſmall part of thoſe Jews received the ſalvifick Grace of Chriſt, if it were confined and annext to the revelation and belief of him; For if we may judge of other ages by that wherein Chriſt appeared, the Prophecies of the Crucified Meſſias were very little underſtood by that people. All this makes it more prudent, and rationall, and pious to ſearch our own wayes, then to paſs ſentence on other men, which is the onely thing I have aimed at in theſe four Conſiderations.

§. 51. Your ſecond Propoſition, which you tender

tender as a *Conjecture*, I cannot but own under an higher ſtyle of an evident truth of Scripture, It is this, *That there is to the outward tender of Grace in the miniſtry of the Goſpel annexed an inward offer alſo of the ſame to the heart, by the ſpirit of God going along with his word, which ſome of the Schoolmen call* auxilium Gratiæ generale, *ſufficient in it ſelf to convert the ſoul of the hearer, if he do not reſiſt the Holy Ghoſt, and reject the Grace offer'd: which as it is grounded upon theſe words, Behold I ſtand at the door and knock, and upon very many other paſſages of Scripture beſide, ſo it ſtandeth with reaſon, that the offer, if it were accepted, ſhould be ſufficient* ex parte ſui *to do the work, which if not accepted, is ſufficient to leave the perſon, not accepting the ſame, unexcuſable.*] This I ſay I am obliged to aſſent to in the terms, and upon the double ground both of *Scripture* and *reaſon*, whereon you induce it. If there were but one text of *Scripture* ſo convincingly inferring it, that ſure would advance it above a barely probable *Conjecture*. But I think the whole tenure of the new Teſtament inforceth the ſame, and though you name but one, you ſay there are *many other paſſages of Scripture*, on which 'tis founded. I ſhall mention but two, 1. that of the Apoſtle who cals preaching the word, διακονίαν πνεύματος *the adminiſtration of the Spirit*, which the Father expreſſes by *verbum vehiculum Spiritus*, the *word is the chariot in which the Spirit deſcends to us*, 2. that deſcription of *reſiſting the holy ſpirit*, which S. *Stephen* gives us, *Act.* vii. 51. by their being like the Jews, *which perſecuted the Prophets which ſpake unto them*, which concludes the *holy ſpirit to be given with the preaching* of the *Goſpel*, elſe how

The ſecond Conjecture an undoubted truth.

Inward grace annexed to the Miniſtry of the Goſpel.

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could the rejecting and perſecuting the one be the *reſiſting* of the other? So likewiſe though you mention but one *reaſon*, yet that is as conſtringent as many, nothing but ſufficiency of ſupernaturall Grace being competent to render him, that is acknowledged naturally impotent, *unexcuſable*. And therefore deeming that abundantly confirmed to advance it above a diſputable probleme, I proceed to the next Propoſition, the third, which you rank under the ſtyle of Conjectures, It is this,

The third Conjecture of effectual Grace and Scripture-Election and Reprobation.

§ 52. That *becauſe the ſufficiency of this General Grace notwithſtanding, through the ſtrength of naturall corruption it might happen to prove uneffectuall to all perſons, God vouchſafed out of the ſupereffluence of his goodneſs, yet* ex mero beneplacito, *without any thing on their part to deſerve it, to confer upon ſuch perſons as it pleaſed him to fix upon, (without inquiring into under what qualifications, preparations or diſpoſitions conſidered,) a more ſpeciall meaſure of Grace which ſhould effectually work in them faith and perſeverance unto ſalvation*] This (you ſay) you take to be *the election eſpecially ſpoken of in the Scriptures*, and if ſo, then the *Decree of Reprobation muſt be nothing els but the dereliction or preterition of the reſt, as to that ſpecial favour of conferring upon them this higher degree of effectuall Grace. Againſt this*, you ſay, *you know enough may be objected, and much more then you eſteem your ſelf able to anſwer, yet to your apprehenſion ſomewhat leſs then may be objected againſt either of the extreme opinions.*]

Animadverſions on this Conjecture.

§. 53. Of this Propoſition, as being the firſt by you produced, to which your caution ſeems to be due, ſome things may in paſſing be fitly noted.

The firſt.

Firſt, that for the ſtating of that community which

which is here ſet down as the object of Election and reprobation, and expreſt by a generall ſtyle [*all perſons*] this Caution is neceſſarily to be taken in, that the propoſition is not to be interpreted in the *utmoſt* latitude, that the ſtyle [*all perſons*] is capable of, but as analogy with your former doctrine ſtrictly requires, for the *generality of men preach'd to: and ſo neither belongs to heathens, nor to the Infants or Idiots, or uninſtructed among Chriſtians, but to thoſe that having the Goſpel revealed to them, and ſufficient grace to enable them to receive it, are yet left in the hand of their own counſell, whether they will actually receive it, or no.*

§. 54. Now of theſe (which is the ſecond thing to be obſerved in your propoſition) it is manifeſt, that if (as you ſuppoſe both in the former, and in this Propoſition,) they have *grace* truly *ſufficient* afforded them, then they want nothing neceſſary to a faln weak ſinful creature, to converſion, perſeverance and ſalvation, and if ſo, then by the ſtrength of this Grace, without addition of any more, they may effectually convert, perſevere and be ſaved; and then though what may be, may alſo not be, and ſo it be alſo poſſible that of all that are thus preach'd to, and made partakers of this Grace, no one ſhall make uſe of it to theſe effects, yet this is but barely poſſible, and not rendred ſo much as probable, either upon any grounds of Scripture or Reaſon. In the Scripture there is no word revealed to that ſenſe, or, that I ever heard of, produced or applyed to it, but on the contrary, in the Parable of the Talents (which ſeems to reſpect this matter particularly) they that received the Talents to negotiate with, did all of them, except one, make profit of them, and bring in that account to their *The ſecond from Scripture.*

Maſter, which received a reward, which is utterly unreconcileable with the hypotheſis of Gods foreſeeing that the talent of ſufficient Grace would be made uſe of by none that received no more then ſo. As for that one that made not uſe of it, all that is intimated concerning him, is, that if his ſhare comparatively was mean, yet by the Lord he is charged as guilty for not *putting it into the bank, that at his coming he might receive his own with uſury*, which certainly evinces, that that lazy ſervant is there conſidered as one that might have managed his ſtock as well as the reſt, and that that ſtock was improvable no leſs then the other, according to their ſeverall proportions, and ſo herein there is no difference taken notice of in favour to your Conjecture.

And Reaſon. And in *Reaſon* it hath no ſound of probability, that of ſo great a number of Chriſtians, ſufficiently furniſhed by God, no one ſhould make uſe of it to their ſouls health; 'tis evident in the Apoſtles preaching at Jeruſalem and elſwhere, that at the firſt propoſal of the truth of Chriſt to them, and the Doctrine of Repentance, whole multitudes received the Faith, and came in, and no doubt many of them proved true, and conſtant Chriſtians, and it is not amiſs to obſerve of the heads of Doctrine, which the Apoſtles agreed to publiſh in all their peregrinations, that they are of ſuch force (and were on that account pitcht on by them) as might reaſonably and probably, with the ſuppoſed concurrence of Gods Grace, beget repentance, and new life in all, to whom they were preach'd over the whole world, (and then what the Apoſtles deemed a rationall and probable means to that end, there is no reaſon or probability to think ſhould never

never in any produce this effect) according to that of *Athanasius*, that the *Faith confest by the Fathers of Nice, according to holy Writ*, is αὐτάρκης πρὸς ἀναίρεσιν πάσης ἀσεβείας, συστασιν δὲ εὐσεβείας ἐν Χριστῷ, *sufficient for the averting of all impiety, and the establishment of all piety in Christ.* To which may be applyed that of S. *Augustine* of the Creed, *Quæ pauca verba fidelibus nota sunt, ut credendo subjugentur Deo, ut subjugati recte vivant, recte vivendo, cor mundent, corde mundo, quod credant, intelligant. These few words are known to believers, that by believing, they may be subjugated to God, that by being subjugated, they may live well, that by living well they may cleanse their hearts, that by cleansing their hearts they may understand what they believe.* And herein the allwise providence and infinite mercy of God seems to be engaged, who in the Parable of his dealing with his Vineyard, *Isa.* v. not onely expostulates, *What could I have done more to my vineyard which I have not done*] but also affirmeth that he *looked it should bring forth grapes*, and as a farther evidence of that, *built a Wine-press*, in expectation of its bearing fruit by strength of what he had done to it, which could not well be affirmed by, or of God, if it were not probable and rational, that in some it should have the desired effect.

In Ep. ad Epictet.

In libel. de fide & symbolo, in Tom. iii.

§. 55. And if what, on account both of Scripture and reason (the onely wayes left us to judge by in this matter) is thus far removed from improbable, may be supposed to have any truth in it, i.e. if the sufficient Grace annexed to the authorized sufficient means, have without farther addition, ever converted any, it then follows necessarily in the third place, that the Election and Dereliction

And the unreconcileableness of this conjecture with making man preach'd to, the object of the Decrees.

now propoſed by you muſt have for its object not indefinitely (as before you ſet it) *man preach'd unto*, or all that part of mankind to whom the Goſpel is offered, and that Grace annexed thereto, but onely that portion of ſuch, as are not wrought upon, or who God in his infinite preſcience diſcerns would not be wrought upon effectually, and converted by that meaſure of ſufficient Grace, which he hath annext to the word preach'd. For without enquiring what proportion of the number of men preach'd unto may probably be placed in that rank (or without aſſuming any more, then that it is neither impoſſible nor improbable that there ſhould be ſuch a rank) of men converted, and perſevering by the ſtrength of that foreſaid *ſufficient Grace*, annexed to the *word*, the inference is undeniable, that all, whether few or many, that are of this rank (it being no way probable there ſhould be none) ſhall certainly be ſaved by force of the *ſecond Covenant, Which decreed eternall life to all that ſhould believe on him and receive him, as the Goſpel tenders him, as their Lord and Saviour*, and ſo cannot be compriſed in the number of them to whom this *ſupereffluence* of goodneſs is ſuppoſed to be vouchſafed, in the *granting of which ex mero beneplacito* your conjecture makes the *Scripture-Election* to conſiſt, and in the *Derelict ion and Preterition* of the reſt (in reſpect of that ſpeciall favour) the Decree of Reprobation.

§. 56. The plain iſſue whereof is but this, that if this conjecture, thus explicated, be adhered to, then many not onely of Children, Idiots, heathen (formerly reſerved to Gods ſecret judgements) but of adult baptized Chriſtians alſo, either are or may be ſaved, who are not of the number of the

Scripture-

Scripture-Elect. Which whether it be reconcileable with the purport of those places, which in Scripture seem to you to respect Election, or to favour this opinion, I must leave to farther consideration, being as yet incompetent to interpose any judgement of it, because I know not what those places are which most seem to favour it.

§. 57. As for the Doctrine it self, of *superefluence of Grace* to some, (abstracted from making it any account of Gods *Decrees of Election and Reprobation*) It is such as I can no way question, for certainly God being granted to give sufficient Grace to all, there is no objection imaginable against this *superabounding to some ex mero beneplacito*; Nothing more agreeable to an infinite abyss and unexhaustible fountain of goodness, then such superefluence, and he that hath not his part in it, yet having his portion, and that supposed sufficient, ought not to have *an evil eye*, to complain and murmure at this partiality, and inequality of distribution of Gods *goodness*, or if he do, the words of the parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard must here have place, *Friend, I do thee no wrong, did not I agree with thee for a penny, take that is thine, and go thy way, is it not lawful for me to do what I will with my own?* *Mat.* xx. 13, 14, 15. And it is there observable, that all the occasion of murmuring arose from the order there observed in accounting with, and paying the Labourers, *beginning* with them that came *last into the vineyard*, for by that means they being allowed a dayes wages for an hours labour, the others expectation was raised to an higher pitch, then probably it would, if they had been paid, and discharged first, for then not seeing the liberality that others tasted of, they

The Doctrine of superefluence of Grace to some, acknowledged.

would in all probability have expected no more, then the hire for which they agreed; And then why ſhould ſo caſual a circumſtance, as the being paid laſt or firſt, have any influence on their minds, or tempt them to murmure at Gods goodneſs, who from the nature of the thing had no leaſt temptation to it?

But this of ſupereſſluens no part of the covenant of grace.

§. 58. Onely by the way it muſt be yielded to the force of that parable, that that *ſupereffluence* of which ſome are there ſuppoſed to taſt, was no part of the *Covenant of Grace*, (his agreement with them being but in theſe words, *Go into the vineyard, and what is right you ſhall receive*, v. 7.) but, above what his bargain or covenant obligeth, *of his good pleaſure*, though, on the other ſide, it be obſervable, 1. That an allowable account is there given by thoſe men of their not coming ſooner into the Vineyard, and conſequently of their not *bearing the heat of the day*, in which all the diſproportion between them and others, all the ſeeming ſupereffluence is founded, *viz.* they were no ſooner *called*, or hired by any man; and 2. that by the application of the parable to the ἔσχατοι and πρῶτοι, to thoſe that came *firſt*, and thoſe that came *later* into the Apoſtleſhip, to *Peter*, and *Paul*, there might ſtill be place for more *abundant labouring* in thoſe that came laſt, and ſo for reward, in proportion (though through mercy) to that more *abundant labouring*, according to the way of ſetting down the ſame parable among the Jews, in * *Gemara Hieroſol.* where the Kings anſwer to the murmurers is, *He in thoſe two hours hath laboured as much as you have done all the day.*

* God, Ecclamb.

§. 59. But without examining the Acts of Gods munificence, according to any rules but thoſe of

munifi-

munificence, and again without insisting on the method which God himself seems to direct us to in this matter, in the parable of the Talents, where the Rule is generall, that *to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance*, i.e. that the superefluence of Grace is ordinarily proportioned to the faithful discharge of former trusts, making use of the foregoing *sufficient Grace*, there will be little reason to doubt, but that God out of *his meer good pleasure*, without any desert on our part, doth thus dispense his favours to one, more then to another, to *one* servant *five talents*, to *another ten*, *but to all some*, onely the difficulties will be, 1. whether it be not as possible, though not as probable, that the *superefluence of Grace* may be resisted, as the lower, but sufficient degree, and then, whether the condemnation be not the greater, there will be no doubt; *Paul* that is the most pregnant example of the superefluence, is still, under a *woe*, obliged to *preach the Gospel*, and *whilest he preacheth to others*, supposes it possible, that himself, if he do not *bring his body in subjection*, may *become a castaway*, and till he hath *fought his good fight*, and *finish'd his course*, *and* constantly *kept the faith*, we never find him confident of *receiving his crown*, which then he challenges from *Gods righteousness*, or fidelity; 2. whether the extraordinary favour of God, which some men receive, and by vertue of which, over and above the sufficient Grace, they may be thought to be wrought on effectually, may not rather be imputed to *Gods special providence*, then his *special Grace*? so in Bishop *Overals* way it seems affirmable, for in his Scheme the effectualness seems to be attributed to the giving what is given, *tempore congruo*, at a time when (whether by

Difficulties concerning superefluence.

I. Whether it be not Resistible.

II. Whether it belong not rather to providence then Grace.

by ſickneſs, or by any other circumſtance of their ſtate) they are foreſeen by God to be ſo qualified and diſpoſed, that they ſhall infallibly accept Chriſt offered, on his own conditions, and ſo convert, and receive *the ſeed into good ground*, and ſo perſevere and be ſaved, when the ſame man, out of thoſe circumſtances, would not have been wrought on by the ſame means. And if this be it which you mean (as I doubt not but it is, and that herein you perfectly agree with Biſhop *Overall*) then I ſay the queſtion is, whether the ſeaſonable application or timeing be not rather to be imputed to *ſpeciall Providence*, the mercy of Gods wiſe and gracious diſpoſal to thoſe men that are thus favoured, then to *ſpecial Grace*, as that ſignifies an higher degree of Gods grace, then is that *ſufficient meaſure*, which is afforded to others; it being poſſible that an equall, nay a lower degree of Grace, being congruouſly timed and tendred, may prove effectual, when the like, nay an higher, at another time, proves uneffectual. And though all acts of Gods good *providence* may in ſome ſenſe be ſtyled acts of his *Grace*, and ſo extraordinary providences may be ſtyled ſpecial Graces, in which ſenſe, the ſtriking *Paul* in his journey to *Damaſcus*, and calling to him out of heaven with grace proportionable to that call, may fitly be called a work of Gods *ſpecial Grace*; and ſo is every ſickneſs or other judgement, that is ſent to melt any, ſuppoſeable to have a proportionable, and that is an extraordinary and ſpecial Grace annext to it; and the providence, and ſo the grace is the greater, if it be applyed *tempore congruo*, when there is no potent obſtacle or principle for reſiſtance; yet ſtill the queſtion is ſeaſonable, whether this

be

be all that is meant by this ſpeciall meaſure of Grace, which ſhall work effectually, or if more be meant, what ground there is for it in the Scripture.

§. 60. To this ſecond queſtion your advertiſement by letter hath given the ſatisfaction I expected, *that you were not curious to conſider the diſtinction between the Grace and the Providence of God, there being no neceſſity for ſo doing, as to your purpoſe, which was onely to expreſs your ſenſe, that it muſt be the work of God (whether of Grace or Providence it matters not) that muſt do the deed, and make the ſufficient Grace effectuall.* This anſwer I accept, and make no farther return to it, onely from the uncertainty of the former, as to any eſtabliſhment from Scripture-grounds, and ſo likewiſe of this latter, till it ſhall appear by any ſure word of promiſe to have any reall influence on the matter in hand, there is way made for a third queſtion,

III. Whether this be it to which Election is determined.

§. 61. Whether granting the truth of all that is pretended for the ſupereffluence of Gods goodneſs to ſome, this can fitly de defined the thing, whereto *Election* is determined, and whether all that have not their part in this, are in Scripture-ſtyle ſaid to be *Reprobated.* This I ſay, not to propoſe any new matter of diſpute, or to require anſwer to all that may be objected againſt this notion of Decrees, which you (and other very Learned and ſober men) have propoſed by way of *conjecture* onely, but rather to demonſtrate my concurrence with you, that this can amount no higher at moſt, then to a matter of *conjecture.*

Conſiderations from Scripture oppoſed to the former conjecture.

§. 62. And having ſaid this, I ſhall propoſe it to your impartial conſideration, I. Whether the Scripture ought not to be our guide in all even opining

pining and conjecturing in ſuch matters, which are ſo much above our reaſon? II. Whether the Scripture do not furniſh us with theſe expreſs grounds, 1. that there are ſome ſort of auditors that come to Chriſt, become his Proſelytes, embrace the Goſpel, when 'tis preach'd unto them, that are εὐθέτοι εἰς βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, *fit*, or prepared, or diſpoſed *for the kingdome of God*, obedience to the Goſpel, τεταγμένοι, *diſpoſed for eternall life*, on *file* for it (in oppoſition to others who are οὐκ ἄξιοι ζωῆς v. 46. *not worthy of*, meet, or qualified for the Evangelical ſtate) 2. that *probity* of mind is ſpecified to be this temper, a *willingneſs to do Gods will*, that (in the parable) of the *good ground*, and the *honeſt heart* meant by it. 3. that the Evangelical diſpenſations are governed by the maxime of *habenti dabitur*, *to the humble he gives more grace*, the *poor are Evangelized*, the *children*, and *poor in ſpirit*, of *ſuch*, and *of them is the kingdome of heaven*; and laſtly, that *God hath choſen the fooliſh things of the world*, *the weak*, *the degenerous*, *the vilified*, *thoſe that are not*, in oppoſition to the *mighty*, *powerful*, *noble and wiſe*. III. Whether on theſe and many other the like fundamentall Truths of the Goſpel, it be not more reaſonable to fetch the ground of the effectualneſs of that ſufficient Grace to one, which is not effectuall to another, from the temper and diſpoſition of the heart, to which the Goſpel is preached, then from any other circumſtance (eſpecially when this doth not deny, or exclude the proper efficacy of thoſe circumſtances, whatſoever they or it ſhall any way appear to be) God having made the Baptiſt the forerunner to Chriſt, repentance to Faith, the * *breaking up our fallow grounds*,

Luk. ix. 62

Act. xiii. 48.

Jo. vii. 17.

Mat. xiii. 8.

Luc. viii. 15. Mat. xiii. 15. Jam. ii. 6. Mat. xi. 5. Mat. xix. 14. and v. 3. Luc. vi. 22. 1 Cor. i. 27.

The ground of Effectualneſs of grace more probably deduced from probity of heart.

Jer. iv. 3.

grounds, to his *not ſowing among thorns*, and the very nature of the Goſpel being ſuch, that all that are truly ſenſible of their ſins, the odiouſneſs and danger of them, and heartily deſirous to get out of that ſtate, the *weary and heavy laden*, the *humble*, docile, tractable, *honeſt heart*, willing to *take* Chriſts *yoke upon* them, are conſtantly wrought on, and converted, when the promulgate mercies, or promiſes of the Goſpel, and the Grace annext to it, are addreſt to them, whereas the very ſame, nay perhaps a greater degree of light and Grace, meeting with a proud, refractary, pleaſurable, or any way hypocritical, and deceitful heart, either is not at all heeded and received, or takes no firm root in it.

§. 63. And if now (the onely objection I can foreſee) it be demanded, whether this of *probity*, *humility*, &c. the *ſubactum ſolum*, *ſoyl mellow'd*, *and prepared* for this effectuall work of Grace, be not ſome natural quality, of the man, for if ſo, then the efficacy of grace will be imputed to theſe *natural*, or *moral preparations*, which is groſly prejudicial to the grace of God, and to the owing of all our good to his ſupernatural operations, the anſwer is obvious and unqueſtionable, that this (I ſhall call it Evangelical) temper is far from being natural to any corrupt child of *Adam*, where ever 'tis met with, 'tis a ſpecial plant of Gods planting, a work of his preparing, ſoftning, preventing Grace, and as much imputable to the operation of his holy Spirit, as any effect of his ſubſequent or cooperating Grace is, which I challenge to be the meaning of thoſe words of Chriſt, *Joh.* vi. 37. *All that my Father giveth me, ſhall come to me*; where ſuch as theſe, are firſt fitted by God, and then by him

This probity no natural preparation, but of Gods planting by preventing grace.

him are ſaid to be *given to Chriſt*, works of his finger, his ſpirit, and then by the authour of them preſented to Chriſt, as the perſons rightly diſpoſed for his diſcipleſhip, and his kingdome in mens hearts, and this work of Gods in fitting them, is there called his *drawing* of them to *Chriſt*, v. 44. and as there it is ſaid that *none but ſuch can come to Chriſt*, ſo verſ. 37. *all ſuch ſhall come to him*, which is an evidence that the *coming*, wherein the effectualneſs of the grace conſiſts, is imputable to this temper wrought in them by God. And if ſtill it be demanded why this is not wrought in all Chriſtians hearts, I anſwer finally, that the onely reaſon the Scripture teaches us is, becauſe ſome *reſiſt* that *ſpirit*, that is graciouſly given by God, and purpoſely deſigned to work it in them.

The one objection againſt this ſatisfied.

§. 64. And if it ſtill be ſuggeſted, that ſome are *naturally* more proud and refractary, and voluptuouſly diſpoſed then others, (an effect of their temper, owing oft to their immediate parents, who may transfuſe their depravations and corruptions immediately to their children, as well as *Adam* hath done to us all mediately) and ſo a greater degree of grace will be neceſſary to the humbling and mollifying them, and a lower, which might be ſufficient for meeker tempers, will be unſufficient for them, and ſo ſtill theſe are as *infallibly* excluded, and barred out, as if it were by a fatal decree paſſing them by in *Maſſa*, this will be alſo ſatisfied, by reſolving, that God in his wiſe diſpoſals and abundant mercies, proportioned according to mens wants, gives a greater degree of preventing Grace to ſuch as he ſees to be naturally in greateſt need of it, or els applies it ſo advantageouſly by congruous timing, as he knows is ſufficient

even

even to them, to remove theſe naturall obſtacles, but all this (to them, as to others) *reſiſtibly* ſtill, and ſo, as though it ſucceed ſometimes, yet is frequently reſiſted.

§. 65. By this means he that is proud and obſtinate, and continues, and holds out ſuch againſt all the ſoftning preparations of heaven, (ſufficient to have wrought a kindlier temper in him) being ſo ill qualified for the *holy ſpirit of diſcipline*, is not converted, but hardened by the ſame or equall means of the word and grace, by which the humble is converted, and then repleniſhed with higher degrees; And when the Scripture is ſo favourable to this notion, ſaying expreſly that *God chooſes one* and not the other, *gives more grace* to one, and from the other *takes away that which he hath*, *reſiſts the proud* (when they refuſe diſcipline) * *ſpeaks to them onely in parables, becauſe ſeeing they ſee not*, i e. reſiſt and fruſtrate Gods preventing graces, and infinite the like, why may not this rather be the Scripture-election, then that other which ſeems not to have any, at leaſt not ſo viſible grounds in it? * *Mat. xiii.* 13.

§. 66. Should this be but a *Conjecture* too, it is not the leſs fit for this place, where our diſcourſe hath been of ſuch, and the onely ſeaſonable inquiry is, either 1. which is of probables the moſt, or of improbables the leaſt ſuch, (and that I ſuppoſe is competently ſhew'd already) or 2. which may be moſt ſafe, and leaſt noxious, in caſe it ſhould fail of exact truth.

§. 67. On which occaſion I ſhall add but this, that the onely conſequence naturally ariſing from this Scheme is, that we make our *elections* after the *pattern* of *God*, chooſe *humility* and *probity*, and avert *The ſafeneſs of this ſtating.*

avert *pride* and *hypocriſie*, that before all things in the world, every man think himſelf highly concerned 1. not to reſiſt or fruſtrate Gods preventing Graces, but chearfully to receive, cooperate, and improve them, to pray, and labour, and attend and watch all opportunities of Grace and Providence, to work humility and probity in his heart, impatience of ſin, and *hungring and thirſting after righteouſneſs*, as the onely ſoyle, wherein the Goſpel will ever thrive, to begin his diſcipleſhip with *repentance from dead works*, and not with aſſurance of his election and ſalvation, to ſet out early, and reſolutely, without procraſtinating, or * *looking back*, *Luk.* ix. 62. and 2. if he hath overſlipt ſuch opportunities, to bewail and retrive them betimes, leſt he be hardened by the deceitfulneſs of ſin. and 3. whatſoever good he ſhal ever advance to, by the ſtrength of Gods ſanctifying and aſſiſting grace, to remember with the utmoſt gratitude, how nothing hath been imputable to himſelf in the whole work, but from the beginning to the end, all due to ſupernatural Grace, the foundation particularly (that which if it be the moſt imperfect, is yet the moſt neceſſary part of the building, and the ſure laying of which tends extremely to the ſtability of the whole) laid in Gods preventions, cultivating our nature, and fitting us with capacities of his higher donatives; And what can leſs prejudice, nay more tend to the glory of his grace, then this?

* Μελλήσεως ἢ ἀναβολῆς πεῖρασις, *Tit. Boſtr.*

Compared with the other.

§. 68. Whereas the other Scheme, as it takes ſpecial care to attribute all the work of converſion to Grace, and withall not ſo to limit that communicative ſpring, as to leave any deſtitute of a ſufficient portion of it (in which reſpect I have no-

nothing really to object againſt it, if it could but approve it ſelf by Gods word to be the Truth) ſo when it bears not any ſuch impreſs of Divine Character upon it, it may not be amiſs to conſider, Whether he that is perſwaded that the ſufficient Grace is ſuch as may, and (as ſome ſet it) God ſees will never do any man good, without the addition of his ſupereffluence, which he affords to few, (and that if that come, it will infallibly do the work, if it come not, he is ſo paſt by, as to be reprobated by God) may not have ſome temptations to deſpair on one ſide, and not do his utmoſt to cooperate with that ſufficient Grace, which is allowed him, and ſo with the fool in *Eccleſiaſtes* * *fold his hands together* till he comes to *eat his own fleſh*, or els to preſume on the other ſide, and expect ſecurely till the coming of the congruous good time of Gods choice, which ſhall give the effectualneſs to his Grace, and ſo be ſlothfull and periſh by that preſumption?

* *Cap.* iv. 5.

§. 69. Whether the Scheme, as it is ſet by learned men, (abſtracting now from the truth of it) be in any conſiderable degree lyable to this danger, I leave thoſe, that are favourable to it, to conſider, preſuming that if it be, it will not be thought fit to be pitcht upon, as the moſt commodious, without either the authority of Scripture, or ſome other preponderating advantages tendred by it, which to me are yet inviſible. And thus much may ſerve for the doctrine of Gods Decrees, which if I miſtake not, leaves them in relation to man, in this poſture, (as far as the Scripture-light leads us)

An Anacephalæoſis of the Doctrine of Gods Decrees.

§. 70. 1. That God decreed to create man after his own image, a free and rationall agent, to

give him a Law of perfect unſinning obedience, and conferr on him grace and faculties to perform it, and to reward that obedience with eternal bliſs, and proportionably to puniſh diſobedience.

Of Election. 2. That foreſeeing the willfull fall of the firſt Man, with whom, and with all mankind, in him, this Covenant was made, and conſequent to that, the depravation of that image, and that Grace, (the image of Satan, corruption of the will, and all the faculties, taking the place of it) he decreed to give his Son to *ſeek and to ſave that which was loſt*, making in him, and ſealing in his blood a new Covenant, conſiſting of a promiſe of pardon and ſufficient Grace, and requiring of all the condition of uniform ſincere obedience.

3. That he decreed to commiſſionate meſſengers to preach this Covenant to all mankind, promiſed to accompany the preaching of it to all hearts with his inward ſufficient grace, enabling men to perform it in ſuch a degree, as he in this ſecond covenant had promiſed to accept of.

4. That the method which he hath decreed to uſe in diſpenſing this ſufficient Grace, is, 1. to prevent and prepare mens hearts by giving them the grace of humility, repentance and probity of heart, i. e. by awaking and convincing men of ſin, and giving them (in anſwer to their diligent prayers) grace ſufficient to produce this in their hearts, and then upon their making uſe of this Grace to the deſigned end, to add more powerfull aſſiſtances and excitations, enabling them both to will and to do, and upon their conſtant right uſe of theſe, ſtill to advance them to an higher degree of ſanctification, and perſeverance, till at length he accompliſh and reward them with a crown of Glory.

§. 71.

§. 71. On the other side, to forsake them in justice, that obstinately resist and frustrate all these wise and gracious methods of his, and having most affectionately set *life and death* before them, and conjured them to *choose* one, and avoid the other, still to leave unto them, as to free and rationall Agents, a liberty to refuse all his calls, to let his talents lye by them unprofitably; which if out of their own perverse choices they continue to do, he decrees to punish the contumacy finally, by assigning them their own options, to take their talents from them, and *cast them into outer darkness, where shall be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth.* *Of Reprobation.*

§. 72. How clearly every part of this Scheme is agreeable to the several parables, whereby Christ was pleased to adumbrate the kingdome of heaven, and innumerable other passages in the Gospel, and the whole purport of the new Covenant, I leave to every man to consider, and then to judge for himself, whether it be not safer and more Christian to content our selves with this portion, which Christ hath thought fit to reveal to us, then to permit our curiosities to deeper and more pragmatick searches, especially if those shall either directly, or but consequentially undo, or but darken what is thus explicitly settled. *The Conclusion.*

§. 73. I proceed now to your second head of Discourse, (which also I suppose, is, by what hath been already considered, competently established) concerning the *efficacy of Grace*, &c. where your Proposition is thus set down. *Of the Efficacy of Grace.*

§. 74. *That in the conversion of a sinner, and the begetting of Faith in the heart of man, the Grace of God hath the main stroke, chiefest operation, yet so, that the free will of man doth in some sort cooperate*

therewith (for no man is converted or believeth without his own conſent) all parties pretend to agree. The point of difference is, how to ſtate the manner and degree of the cooperation, as well of the one, as of the other, ſo as neither the glory of Gods Grace be eclipſed, nor the freedome of mans will deſtroyed. In which difficult point, you ſay, *you think it fitter to acquieſce in thoſe aforeſaid acknowledged truths, in which both ſides agree, then to hold cloſe to either opinion*]

The Power of Grace in converſion, &c

§ 75. In this propoſition, it being by you in the Concluſion moſt undeniably and Chriſtianly reſolved, that the one care ought to be, that *neither the glory of Gods Grace be eclipſed, nor the freedome of man's will deſtroyed*, It would not be amiſs a little to reflect on the former part, and demand whether your expreſſion were not a little too cautious, in ſaying, *the grace of God hath the main ſtroke and chiefeſt operation*] did I not diſcern the ground of that caution, becauſe you were to expreſs that whereunto *all parties* muſt be ſuppoſed to *conſent*. This being abundantly ſufficient to account for your caution, I ſhall not doubt of your concurrence with me, that it may with truth be ſaid, and I ſuppoſe alſo by the agreement, if not of all Chriſtians, yet of both parties in this debate, particularly of the Remonſtrants, that the Grace of God is in lapſed man the *one ſole principle of ſpirituall life, Converſion, Regeneration, Repentance, Faith and all other Evangelical vertues*, and that all that can juſtly be attributed to our will in any of theſe, is the obeying the motions, and making uſe of the powers, which are thus beſtowed upon us, by that ſupernatural principle; To *work* and *work out our own ſalvation*, upon the ſtrength of

Gods

Gods *giving us to will and to do*; by [*giving us to will and to do*] meaning his giving us *power* to each, as δῦναι λατρεύειν, *Luke* 1. is *giving* us power to *ſerve him in holineſs and righteouſneſs all the dayes of our lives*, every initiall and more perfect act of holineſs, eſpecially perſevering in it all our dayes, being wholly imputable to that power, which is given by Gods Spirit. For indeed when it is conſidered, what the ſtate of our corrupt will is, being naturally averted from God, and ſtrongly inclined to evil, it ſeems to me ſcarce proper to call this, in relation to ſupernatural vertues, a *free will*, till God by his preventing Grace hath in ſome degree manumitted it, till Chriſt hath made it free; Being then what it is, i. e. in ſome degree emancipated by Gods Grace, and by Grace onely, (this act of Chriſts love, and Grace being reached out to enemies, to men in their corrupt ſtate of averſion and oppoſition to God) the will is then enabled (ſtill by the ſame principle of Grace) to *chooſe life*, when it is propoſed, and the wayes and means to it, and though it be left free to act or not to act, to chooſe or not to chooſe, yet when it doth act and chooſe life, it doth it no otherwiſe (to my underſtanding) then the body doth perform all the actions of life, meerly by the ſtrength of the ſoul, and that continuall animation it hath, it receives from it; which makes the parallel compleat, and gave ground to the expreſſion and compariſon betwixt giving of natural life, and regeneration.

what the freedome of will now is.

§. 76. What freedome the will naturally (under this corrupt ſtate) hath to other things, of all ſorts, I do not now conſider any farther, then that it is fully furniſhed with ability to ſin, and

Ability to ſin.

ſo to refuſe and contemn, and to receive in vain the Grace of God, and Grace it ſelf doth not deprive it of that part of its corrupt patrimony: As for an uniform conſtant choice of thoſe things that belong to our peace and ſpiritual end, for the beginning of that, and every ſtep of motion through, and perſeverance in it, Its freedome, and ſtrength, and every degree of life, or action, is wholly and entirely from Grace, and then he that without him *can do nothing*, *can do all things through Chriſt that ſtrengthens him.* And ſo the onely remaining queſtion is (which to me, I confeſs, is a poſing one) What exception can poſſibly be ſtarted againſt this ſtating, and conſequently what farther doubt there can be in this matter.

All good due to Grace.

§. 77. I have of my ſelf by my natural Generation, (but this is alſo from God) power for natural, nay ſinful actings, for this I need no farther principle, and the ſupervenience of a ſupernatural takes it not from me; Our experience aſſures us, what the Scripture ſo oft mentions, that we often *reſiſt the Holy Ghoſt*, which we could not do, if at leaſt it were not tendred to us: But for all degrees of good, from the firſt good motion toward converſion, to the enſtating us in glory, it is wholly received from the Spirit of God, and the glory of it cannot in any degree, without the utmoſt ſacriledge, be arrogated or aſſumed to our ſelves, as the work of our free will; and ſeeing it is one act of ſuperabundant grace to enable us to do any thing, and another to reward us for doing it in ſo imperfect a manner, (and with ſuch mixtures of manifold pollutions) and a third to exerciſe us in, and reward us for thoſe things, which are ſo agreeable and gratefull to our reaſonable nature,

Com-

Commandments far from *grievous*, a *gracious yoke*, as well as a *light burthen*, *Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but to thy Name, give we the praiſe. Praiſe the Lord, O my ſoul, and all that is within me, praiſe his holy Name.*

§. 78. What you add on this theme, is by way of reflexion, on the inconvenient opinions of the oppoſite parties in this matter.

I. *That on the Calviniſts part theſe two things, viz. the phyſical predetermination, and (which muſt neceſſarily follow thereupon) the Irreſiſtibility of the work of Grace, ſeem to you to be ſo inconſiſtent with the natural liberty of the will, and ſo impoſſible to be reconciled therewith, that you can not yet by any means fully aſſent thereto*] The ſtyle wherein this concludes [*cannot yet fully*] ſignifies to me, that you have, with great impartiality (if not with favour and prepoſſeſſion of kindneſs to the Antiremonſtrant ſide) endeavoured your utmoſt to reconcile theſe two Doctrines of *Predetermination and Irreſiſtibility*, with the common notions of Morality and Chriſtianity, and you cannot find any means to do it; and I fully conſent to you in it, and cannot but add, that the very being of all future *judgement*, and ſo of heaven and hell, conſidered as rewards of what is here *done in our bodies, whether good or bad*, nay the whole œconomy of the Goſpel, of *giving*, and *giving more*, and withholding and withdrawing Grace, and the difference betwixt the Grace of *Converſion* and *Perſeverance*, and the force of exhortations, promiſes, threats, commands (and what not?) depends immediately and unavoidably on the truth of the Catholick Doctrine of all ages, as in theſe points of Predetermination and Irreſiſtibility, it ſtands in oppoſi-

Predetermination and irreſiſtibility.

How irreconcileable with Chriſtian principles.

tion to the Calviniſts. The ſhewing this diffuſedly, according to the merit of the matter, through the ſeverall ſteps, were the work of a volume, of which I ſhall hope there can be no need, after ſo many have been written on the ſubject.

§. 79. Your next reflexion is on the Arminians, of whom you ſay,

Of Arminians attributing too little to Grace.

On the other ſide, me thinks, the Arminians aſcribe leſs to the grace of God, and more to the free will of man, then they ought, in this, That according to their Doctrine, why of two perſons (as Peter *and* Judas*) ſuppoſed to have all outward means of converſion equally applyed, yet one ſhould be effectually converted, the other not, the diſcriminating power is by them placed in the will of man, which (*you ſay*) you ſhould rather aſcribe to the work of Grace*] If this be the right ſtating of the caſe between the Arminians and their oppoſites, I am then without conſulting the Authors, aſſured by you that I am no Arminian, for I deem it impoſſible (I ſay not for any man, not knowing what miracles the magick of ſome mens paſſions may enable them to work, but) for you that have written what I have now ſet down from you, to imagine you aſcribe more to the Grace of God, and leſs to the will of man, then I have thought my ſelf obliged to do, making it my challenge and intereſt, and requiring it to be granted me (and not my conceſſion onely) that all that any man is enabled to do, is by *Chriſts ſtrengthening* him.

§. 80. But not to queſtion what others do, or to accuſe or apologize for any, let us conſider the caſe you ſet, and allow the truth to be judged of, in this whole queſtion, by what this particular caſe ſhall exact.

§. 81.

§. 81. But 1. in the ſetting of it, I cannot but mark two things, 1. That the perſons made uſe of to ſet the caſe in, are *Judas* and *Peter*. 2. That to the word [*converted*] is prefixed [*effectually.*] This would make it probable that you think a man may be converted, and yet not *effectually converted*, or however that *Judas* was not effectually converted. That *Judas* was converted, and, as far as concerned the preſent ſtate, abſtracted from perſeverance, effectually converted, I offer but this one teſtimony, the words of Chriſt to his Father, *[*Of thoſe whom thou gaveſt me I have loſt none, ſave onely the ſon of perdition*] That whoſoever is by the Father *given to Chriſt*, is converted, and that effectually, is concluded from Chriſts univerſal propoſition, *All that my Father giveth me, ſhall come to me*, *Joh.* vi. 37. and here it is expreſly ſaid that *Judas* (though by his apoſtacy now become the *ſon of perdition*) was by *God given to Chriſt*, and *therefore he came to Chriſt*, i. e. was converted, which alſo his being *loſt*, his very *Apoſtacy* teſtifies, for how could he Apoſtatize from Chriſt, that was never come to him? From hence it ſeems to me neceſſary either to interpret your ſpeech of final perſeverance, as if none were *effectually converted*, but ſuch who perſevere, (which as it belongs to another queſtion, that of perſeverance, to which you after proceed, and not to this of reconciling *irreſiſtibility* and *free will*, ſo it would ſeem to ſtate it otherwiſe, then I perceive you afterwards do) or, to avoid that, to underſtand no more by *Judas* and *Peter* then any other two names, ſuppoſe *Robert* and *Richard*, *John at Noke and John at Stile*, (as you ſince tell me your meaning was) the one converted effectually, i. e. really,

Of Judas whether he were not converted.

* *Joh.* xvii. 12.

really, the other not, when both are ſuppoſed to have the ſame outward means of converſion equally applied to them.

§. 82. Now to the queſtion thus ſet of any two, and ſuppoſing what hath been granted between you and me, that the outward means are accompanyed to both with a ſufficient meaſure of inward Grace, My anſwer you diſcern already, that the Diſcrimination comes immediately from one mans reſiſting ſufficient Grace, which the other doth not reſiſt, but makes uſe of: In this ſhould I add no more, there could be no difficulty, becauſe as it is from corruption, and liberty to do evil, (that meeting with the reſiſtibility of this ſufficient grace) that one reſiſts it, ſo it is wholly from the work of Grace upon an obedient heart, that the other is converted; And ſo this ſtating aſcribes all the good to the work of Grace, i. e. to that power, which by ſupernatural Grace is given him, and all the ill to man and his liberty, or ability to reſiſt.

Whence diſcrimination comes.

From mans liberty to reſiſt.

§. 83. But from what hath been ſaid, there is yet more to be added, viz. that the obedience of the one to the call of Grace, when the other, ſuppoſed to have ſufficient, if not an equal meaſure, obeyes not, may reaſonably be imputed to the humble, malleable, melting temper, (which the other wanted) and that again owing to the preventing Graces of God, and not to the naturall probity, or free will of Man, whereas the other, having reſiſted thoſe preparing Graces, or not made uſe of them, lyeth under ſome degree of obduration, pride, ſloth, voluptuouſneſs, &c. and that makes the diſcrimination on his ſide, i. e. renders him unqualified and uncapable to be wrought on by ſufficient Grace, and ſo ſtill, if it be attentively

From Gods Trevention.

tively weighed, this attributes nothing to free will, considered by it self, but the power of resisting and frustrating Gods methods (which I should think, they that are such assertors of the corruption of our nature, should make no difficulty to yield him, but that they also assert the irresistibility of Grace, and that is not reconcileable with it) yielding the glory of all the work of conversion, and all the first preparations to it, to his sole Grace, by which the will is first set free, then fitted and cultivated, and then the seed of eternal life successfully sowed in it.

Nothing imputed to man but power of resisting.

The whole work of conversion to Grace.

§. 84. If the Remonstrants yield not this, you see my profession of dissent from them, if they do, as for ought I ever heard or read (which indeed hath been but little in their works, that I might reserve my self to judge of these things, without prepossession) they doubt not to do, you see you have had them misrepresented to you. But this either way is extrinsecall and unconcernant to the merit of the cause, which is not to be defended or patronized by names (but arguments) much less to be prejudged or blasted by them.

§. 85. You now add, as a reason to inforce your last proposition, *That although the Grace of God work not by any physical determination of the will, but by way of moral suasion onely, and therefore in what degree soever supposed, must needs be granted* ex natura rei *possible to be resisted, yet God by his infinite wisdome can so sweetly order and attemper the outward means in such a congruous manner, and make such gracious inward applications and insinuations, by the secret imperceptible operation of his holy Spirit, into the hearts of his chosen, as that* de facto *the will shall not finally resist. That* (you say)

Of the congruous manner &c. making Grace effectuall.

of

of the ſon of Syrach, Fortiter & Suaviter, *is an excellent Motto, and fit to be affixed, as to all the wayes of Gods providence in generall, ſo to this of the effectuall working of his Grace in particular.*]

This a member of the former Conjecture.

§. 86. This for the ſubſtance falls in with the laſt of thoſe which you ſo cautiouſly ſet down for meer conjectures, ſeeming to you not improbable. And ſo here you continue to propoſe it, 1, as that, *which God can do*, (and thus no Chriſtian can doubt of it) 2. by the one teſtimony which you tender for the proof of it, the words of *Eccleſiaſticus* [*ſtrongly but ſweetly*;] which though it be there moſt probably interpreted of the works of Gods providence, not particularly of his Grace, ſo if it were, moſt fully expreſſes their thoughts, who building on the promiſe of ſufficient Grace, and the way of the working of that by moral ſuaſion, will apply the *fortiter* to the ſufficiency, and the *ſuaviter* to the ſuaſion, and yet reſolve (what frequent experience tells us) that thoſe that are thus wrought on, *ſtrongly* and *ſweetly* too, and as *ſtrongly* and *ſweetly* (if not ſometimes more ſo) as they that are converted by it, are yet very (very) many times, not converted.

Fortiter & ſuaviter.

§. 87. Here therefore the point lyes, not whether God *can* thus effectually work upon all that he tenders ſufficient grace unto, nor again, whether ſometimes (and whenſoever he pleaſeth) he doth thus work, (for as this is the moſt that you demand, ſo this is moſt evident, and readily granted) but 1. whether all are effectually converted and perſevere, and ſo are finally ſaved, on whom God doth work thus ſweetly and powerfully, attempering the outward and inward means, applications and inſinuations, by the ſecret imperceptible operations

What is the onely queſtion here.

rations of his ſpirit, and that in a congruous manner (I add time alſo) 2. Whether his doing thus is ſuch an act of his Election, as that all to whom this is not done, ſhall be ſaid in Scripture to be left, paſt by, and reprobated.

§. 88. If thus it is, (not onely can be) and if it may be convincingly teſtified by any text of Scripture, that this really is the *Scripture Election*, it ſhall be moſt willingly and gladly yielded to: But till this be done, 1. that other Scheme, which I ſo lately ſet down, may be allowed to maintain it's competition againſt this, and 2. it is to be remembred from the premiſes, that the glory of Gods Grace in every one's converſion is abundantly taken care of, and ſecured, without the aſſiſtance of this: 3. that the ground of the Antiremonſtrants exception to the Arminian occurrs in this way of ſtating too, for ſince 'tis here affirmed, that Grace even thus applyed is poſſible to be reſiſted, why may not the accepting this higher degree be as imputable to mans wil, as of the other barely ſufficient Grace the objecter ſuppoſes it to be?

§. 89. Laſtly, the ſaying of our Saviour *Mat.* xi. 21. is of no ſmall moment in the caſe, and yields a ſubſtantial prejudice to this way. For 1. it is expreſly affirmed verſ. 20. of thoſe Cities wherein were *wrought* αἱ πλεῖσαι δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ *his moſt abundant powers* or *miracles*, that ὐ μετενόησαν *they repented not*; His miracles I ſuppoſe had his grace annexed to them, and it is hard to believe that where his moſt numerous miracles were afforded, they ſhould all want the advantage of the *congruous* timings to give them their due weight of efficacy: However there is no pretence of-

Mat.xi.21. a ſpecial prejudice to the Conjecture.

of believing it here, where it is ſaid, Chriſt ἤρξατο ὀνειδίζειν *began to reproach and upbraid them*, that the miracles had been ſo ſucceſsleſs among them, which he could with no propriety do, if any circumſtance needfull to their efficacy had been wanting to them: and v. 22. the more intolerable meaſure of damnation, which is denounced againſt them, puts this beyond queſtion, that theſe wanted not the more *ſuperabundant* advantages of Grace. Secondly, it is alſo as explicitly pronounced by Chriſt, that thoſe miracles and that Grace which were not effectuall to the converſion of thoſe Jewiſh cities, *Chorazin* and *Bethſaida*, would have been ſucceſsful to the converſion of others, and made them Proſelytes and penitents of the ſevereſt kind, *in ſackcloth and aſhes*. Whereupon I demand, Had thoſe means, thoſe *miracles* (the inſtruments and vehicles of Grace, that were then uſed to *Chorazin* and *Bethſaida*) the timings and other advantageous circumſtances, which the opinion, now under conſideration, pretends to be the infallible means of the ſalvation of the elect, or had they not? If they had, then it ſeems theſe may fail of converting, and ſo have not that ſpeciall *efficacy*, which is pretended, it being expreſly affirmed, that here they ſucceeded not to converſion. But if they had not the timings &c. then it remains as undeniable, as the affirmation of Chriſt can render it, that thoſe means, that Grace, which hath not thoſe advantageous circumſtances, may be, nay, if granted to *Tyre and Sidon*, heathen cities, would actually have been ſucceſsfull to them. And what can be more effectuall to the prejudice of a conjecture, then this double force of the words of Chriſt confronted expreſly to both branches of it?

And

And then I hope I may with modeſty conclude, that there remains no viſible advantage of this way, to recommend it, in caſe the Scripture be not found to own, and more then favour it in ſome other paſſages.

§. 90. Your laſt Propoſition on this Theme is, that *Sith the Conſiſtence of Grace and free will is a Myſtery ſo tranſcending our weak underſtandings, that it hath for many years exerciſed and puzzled the Wits of the acuteſt Schoolmen to find it out, inſomuch as hundreds of volumes have been written and daily are* de concurſu Gratiæ & liberi arbitrii, *and yet no accord hath hitherto followed,* you ſay, *you have ever held, and ſtill do hold it the more pious and ſafe way, to place the Grace of God in the throne, where we think it ſhould ſtand, and ſo to leave the will of man to ſhift for the maintenance of its own freedome, as well as it can, then to eſtabliſh the power and liberty of free will at the height, and then to be at a loſs how to maintain the power and efficacy of Gods Grace,*]

§. 91. But if what hath been clearly laid down, for the attributing all our ſpirituall good to the work of Grace, and aſſuming nothing of this kind to the innate power of free will, but a liberty to reſiſt Grace, the reſt being humbly acknowledged to be due to a ſupernaturally conferred freedome, or emancipation, whereby we are enabled to make uſe of Grace, and by the power thereof to cooperate with it; Then 1. the *conſiſtence of grace and free will* in this ſenſe, is no ſuch tranſcending Myſtery, and I think there is no text in Scripture that founds any thing towards the making it ſo. 2. 'Tis evident, that the difficulties that have exerciſed the *Schools* in this matter ariſe from their

Conſiſtance of Grace and free will.

The difficulties in the Schoolmens way whence.

their endeavouring to ſtate it otherwiſe, ſome by maintaining *Predetermination and irreſiſtibility*, which all the powers of nature cannot reconcile with *Man's free wil ad oppoſitum*; And ſome few that go another milder way, are yet afraid of departing too far from the former, and inſtead of *irreſiſtibility* ſubſtitute *efficacy*, as that ſignifies *infallibility* of the event to the Elect, and ſo find difficulty to extricate themſelves; whereas *Grace ſufficient*, but *reſiſtible*, given together with the word to all, to whom Chriſt is revealed, hath 1. it ſelf nothing of difficulty in the conception, and 2. being underſtood, utterly removes all farther difficulty in this matter. For hereby we *place the Grace of God in the throne*, to rule and reign in the whole work of converſion, perſeverance, and ſalvation, (and what can be more demanded, that we have not aſſerted? certainly nothing by you, who in ſetting down the conſent of all parties, expreſt it by no more then its having the main ſtroke and chiefeſt operation) and need not put the *will of man to ſhift for the maintenance of its own freedome*, as long as we can do it with much more ſafety and temper, then either by ſetting it at the height with the *Pelagians*, or endangering to convert it into a meer trunk, or leaving men to the duct of their own humours, either to advance it above its due, and grow inſolent, or depreſſe it below what is meet, and ſo give up themſelves to ſloth, and indifferency.

How eaſily ſuperſeded.

§. 92. On the third or laſt head concerning *Grace* and *perſeverance*, your propoſitions are three, the two former I ſhall ſet down together, becauſe the firſt is but a preparative to, or one way of proof of the ſecond, which onely concerns our purpoſe.

1. That

I. *That Faith and all holy Graces inherent in us, Love, Patience, and Humility, &c. are the gifts of God wrought in us by his Grace and holy Spirit, none will deny; But that they are wrought in us by infusion and* in instanti *(as Philosophers teach forms to be introduced into the matter by naturall generation* in instanti,*) at least that they are alwayes or ordinarily so infused, you see no necessity of believing, or why it may not be said of these* χαρίτες *(spiritu-all Graces) notwithstanding they be acknowledged the gifts of God, as well as of those* χαρίσματα *(spiritu-all gifts, as we translate them) which are certainly the gifts of God as well as the other, and so acknowledged; that they are (after the manner of other habits) ordinarily acquirable by industry and frequented acts, and the blessing of God upon our prayers and endeavours. To what purpose els were it for Ministers in their Sermons usually to press motives to stir up men to labour to get Faith, Love, &c. and to propose means for their better direction, how to get them?*

Of falling from Grace.

II. *Whence (*you say*) it seemeth to you further probable, that Faith and all other inherent Graces, as they may be with Gods blessing attain'd, may be also lost again by sloth, negligence, and carnall security, and therefore you cannot but doubt of the truth of that assertion which the Contra-remonstrants do yet averre with great confidence, That Faith once had, cannot be lost, and other the like. The distinction that they use, as a salvo in this Question, of a true and temporary Faith, signifieth (*say you*) little or nothing, for it at once both beggeth and yieldeth the whole Question: It* 1. *beggeth the question, when it denyeth that Faith that may be lost, to be true Faith, and withall* 2. *yieldeth the question, when it granteth*

a temporary Faith, which term is capable of no other conſtruction, then of ſuch a Faith, as being once had is afterwards loſt. It is one of the Articles of our Church, that after we have received the holy Ghoſt, we may depart from Grace given.]

Our Article.

§. 93. In theſe two there is nothing for me to queſtion, and as little to add to them, unleſs I annex, what I ſuppoſe you did not think needfull, the expreſs conſent of Scriptures and Fathers, whereon our Churches Article muſt be reſolved to have been founded. In the old Teſtament the examples of the *Angels* in Heaven, of *Adam* in Paradiſe, and in a remarkable manner of two to whom God had given eminent teſtimony, 1. *David*, in the matter of *Uriah*, an odious murther added to adultery, and continued in impenitently, till after the birth of the child, the blemiſh whereof ſtill ſticks to him, and remains upon record, as an allay to all his excellencies, now that he is in heaven. 2. *Solomon*, whoſe heart was by his multitude of wives and concubines taken off from God, and debauched to Idols, no way being left us to diſcern whether ever he returned or no, unleſs his *Eccleſiaſtes* be a declaration and fruit of his Repentance; And as theſe and many other examples, even of that whole Old-Teſtament-church, the *Jews*, make this evident, ſo the words of *Ezekiel* are expreſs both for *totall and finall falling away. If the righteous turn from his righteouſneſs, in his unrighteouſneſs ſhall he die.*

Grounds of it in Scripture.
In the old Teſtament.
Ch. iii. 20. & xviii. 24.

§. 94. The new alſo is parallel, in the example of *Peter*, thrice, with time of deliberation between, and after expreſs warning from Chriſt, and his reſolute promiſe to the contrary, denying and abjuring of Chriſt, whoſe return from this fall with bitter

In the new.

bitter tears, is called by Christ *Conversion*, and the sin upbraided to him thrice after his resurrection, *Simon, son of Jonas lovest thou me more then these?* in reference to his confident undertaking, *though all men should deny thee, or be offended, yet will not I.* And if the argument from Christs expres words, formerly produced, be of force, then is *Judas* (one of those that was *by God given to Christ, and came unto*, and *believed* on *him*) an example of the blackest sort, testifying to this sad truth, That a believer and Disciple of Christ may betray him to his Crucifixion, and die in desperation,

Luk. xxii. 32. Joh. xxi. 25. Mar. xiv. 29, 31. Joh. xvii. 12. & vi. 37.

§. 95. To these two instances, the former greatly aggravated with circumstances, the latter *finall*, and of the highest degree imaginable, It is not needfull to add more, els it is obvious to increase the catalogue with those that were polluted by the Gnosticks, by name, *Hymenæus* and *Alexander*, who *putting away a good conscience, concerning Faith made shipwrack*, and again *Hymenæus* and *Philetus*, who fell off so far, as to the *denyall* of any future *Resurrection*, of whom the Apostle there speaking, saith, *if God peradventure will give them repentance, and they may recover themselves out of the snare of the Devil*] looking on their estate as that of lapsed believers, and though not utterly hopeless, yet extremely dangerous, And this exemplified in whole Churches, *Apoc.* ii. and iii. which are therefore threatned present destruction, if they do not speedily return.

1 Tim. i. 20. 2 Tim. ii. 17.

§. 96. To which purpose the Texts in the sixth and tenth to the *Hebrews* are unanswerable, In the sixth, that it is *impossible*, i. e. extremely difficult, for those that were *once enlightned, &c. if they fall away, to renew them again unto repentance*, adding

the ſimilitude of the *reprobate* earth, *whoſe end is to be burned.* From which how diſtant is the Doctrine of thoſe, that either imagine it impoſſible for ſuch to *fall away totally*, or if they are fallen away, not to be *renewed again to repentance?* In the *tenth* alſo, twere vain to make ſo fevere interminations againſt thoſe who *ſin willfully after receiving the knowledge of the truth*, (as we read v. 26.) if there were no poſſibility of ſo ſinning, but eſpecially the 38. verſe is remarkable, *The juſt ſhall live by faith*, καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται, *And if he* (the juſt) *ſhall draw back, my ſoul hath no pleaſure in him*] explicating v. 39. what *drawing back* he ſpeaks of, even *drawing back unto perdition*, and that is finall, as well as totall, and both, it ſeems, very poſſible, as every where appears by the exhortations to *him that thinketh he ſtandeth, to take heed leſt he fall*, when if he do, *It had been better never to have known the way of righteouſneſs, then after he hath known it, to turn from the holy Commandment*, and this in ſuch a degree, as is expreſt by *returning to the vomit*, and *wallowing in the mire*, the acts and habits of the fouleſt ſins, in forſaking of which their converſion conſiſted.

1 *Cor.* x. 12. 2 *Pet.* ii. 21.

§. 97. The Teſtimonies of the Fathers are too long to be ſet down, and indeed unneceſſary to the confirmation of that, to which the Scripture hath teſtified ſo plentifully, eſpecially ſince it is not (it cannot be) denyed by the contrary-minded, that Saint *Auguſtine*, the onely fautor of their cauſe, in the point of decrees, and effectuall Grace, granteth poſſibility of falling, both totally and finally, from a juſtified eſtate, and uſeth it as a means to prove his *abſolute Decrees.*

S. Auguſtin.

I now proceed to your third and laſt propoſition in theſe words,

Yet

§. 98. *Yet I believe wee may ſecurely admit the doctrine of perſeverance of Gods elect, and the certainty thereof, ſo as it be underſtood.* 1. *Of their finall perſeverance onely, leaving roome for great (perhaps total!) interruptions and intercisions in the meane time.* 2. *Of the certainty of the thing,* (certitudo objecti,) *in regard of the knowledge, and purpoſe of God, but, not of any undoubted aſſurance, that the elect themſelves have thereof,* (certitudo ſubjecti, *as wee uſe to diſtinguiſh them,*) *there being a great deale of difference between theſe two propoſitions, it is certain that the elect ſhall not fall away finally, and the elect are certain that they ſhall not fall away finally.*] Of perſeverance of the elect.

§. 99. In this propoſition I can fully yeild my concurrence, if by rendering my reaſons for my conſent, I may be allowed to expreſſe what I mean by it. This I ſhall do through the ſeverall branches of it.

1. I believe not onely that ſecurely we may, but that of neceſſity (and under the pain of contradiction *in adjecto,*) we muſt admit the doctrine of *Perſeverance of Gods Elect*, and the certainty, (moſt unqueſtionable certainty) thereof, Gods Election of any perſon to the reward of the covenant, being undoubtedly founded in the *perſeverance* of that perſon in the faith, this perſeverance being the expreſſe condition of the covenant, *He that endureth to the end, the ſame ſhall be ſaved*, he and none but he, but *if he draw back, Gods ſoule hath no pleaſure in him.* *Mat.* 24. 13. *Heb.* 10. 38.

§. 100. Which that it is nothing available toward concluding that they which can fall totally from their juſtified ſtate, may not yet fall finally alſo, I infer to be your ſence from your great diſſike

Temporary faith may be true.

diſlike to the *Calviniſts Salvo*, taken from the *diſtinction of a true and temporary faith*, which aſſures me, you take that faith for *true*, which yet is but *temporary*, then which nothing is more contrary to the eſtabliſhing the perſeverance of all the faithfull, unleſſe there be ſome promiſe that all temporaries ſhall ſo recover again before their death, as finally to perſevere, (which as I think, 'twill not be pretended, ſo if it be, they are no longer temporaries,) or unleſſe it ceaſe to be in their power to continue in their ſins, into which they are fallen, which ſure it cannot, unleſſe the grace of *perſeverance* be *irreſiſtible*, which if it were, there is no reaſon, why that of *converſion*, to all that are converted, ſhould not be irreſiſtible alſo.

The elect ſubject to interciſions.

§. 101. 2. For their great, (perhaps totall) interruptions and interciſions in the meane time, I can no way doubt, but thoſe are ſubject to them, who yet upon Gods foreſight of their returne, and perſevering conſtancy at length, are elected to ſalvation. It is certain, which the *Article* of our Church ſaith, that as they *which have received the holy Ghoſt may depart from grace given and fall away*, ſo by the *ſame grace of God they may returne again*, and then returning they may no doubt perſevere, and then 'tis certain they are elected to ſalvation, the mercy and pardon in Chriſt extending not onely to the ſins of an unregenerate ſtate, and the infirmities and frailties of the regenerate; but alſo to all the willfull ſins and falls of thoſe that do timely returne again by repentance, as *David* and *Peter* did (but *Judas* certainly, *Solomon* poſſibly did not,) and then continue ſtedfaſt unto the end. And ſo 'tis onely the finall perſeverance that

that is required indiſpenſably of the elect, which is reconcileable with their great, perhaps totall interciſions.

§. 102. But 'tis not amiſs here to advert, that this doth no more ſuppoſe or include the reconciliation or favour of God, to thoſe that have been once regenerate, when they are fallen into groſſe ſins, then to the unregenerate remaining in the ſame or greater ſinns, it being as poſſible in reſpect of us, (perhaps more probable in reſpect of God,) that the unregenerate may convert and perſevere, (and then they are approved to be the elect,) as that they that were once regenerate, but now fallen, may return again. It is as certain from before *Paul's* birth, and from all eternity, that he was elected, as that *David* or *Peter* was, and then either his blaſphemous perſecuting the name of Chriſt muſt have been at the time when he was guilty of that, reconcileable with Gods favour, *viz.* before his converſion, (and then for the gaining of Gods favour what needed his converſion?) or elſe *Peter's* denying and abjuring of Chriſt, *Davids* adultery and murther muſt not be reconcileable, notwithſtanding their ſuppoſed *Election*. For as to the ſonſhip of *their* former life, that will no more excuſe their contrary waſting ſins, then the future ſonſhip of the other, nay it will ſet the advantage on the other ſide, the unconverted *Saul obtaines mercy, becauſe he did it ignorantly, in unbelief*, Whilſt their ſins have the aggravation of being ſins againſt grace, and *forſaking*, and *departing* from God, which reſpect makes the ſtate of Apoſtates as the moſt unexcuſable, ſo the moſt deſperately dangerous ſtate.

The falls of thoſe that have been once regenerate no more reconcileable with Gods favour then of the unregenerate.

Nay the advantage is on the unregenerates part. 1 Tim. 1. 13.

Certainty of the object.

§. 103. 3. That there is a *Certitudo Objecti* to all the *Elect*, cannot be doubted, for if they be elected to ſalvation, they will finally perſevere, if they perſevere not, they were not elected. Again this certainty of the object, is a certainty in regard of the knowledge and purpoſe of God, 1. Of his knowledge that either they will not fall, or if they do, that they will riſe again, and then finally perſevere. 2. Of his purpoſe or decree of election, that every ſuch, finally perſevering, though formerly lapſed Chriſtian, ſhall be ſaved.

Certainty of the ſubject.

§. 104. 4. For the *Certitudo ſubjecti*; as I conſent to you fully in diſclaiming any neceſſity of that, ſo I ſuppoſe it is wholly extrinſecall to this ſubject, devolving to this other queſtion, not whether every one that is elect, be ſure he ſhall not fall away, but whether every believer be or ought to be ſure of his election? Of which if he were ſure, I could not reſiſt his being obliged to believe himſelf certain of his finall *Perſeverance*; Election and finall failing being incompetible.

§. 105. Having given you this interpretation of my ſence, and to conſent to each branch of your propoſition, I have no more to add, but that if you mean it in a farther ſence, proportionable to your former conjecture on the head of decrees, or Biſhop *Overall*'s opinion, I ſhall no otherwiſe debate or queſtion it, then I did that, and ſo the face of this and that, are folded up the one in the other, and if the Scripture ſhall be found favourable to the one, it ſhall be yeilded, and then there will be no controverſy of the other.

The great need of caution in handling this ſubject of perſeverance.

§. 106. Onely I deſire to add, that it will deſerve our ſpeciall care and warineſſe, ſo to deliver our thoughts in this matter, that we leave no man any ground

ground of hope, that in caſe he depart from his duty, and ſo fall from Grace, or into any willful act or habit of ſin, he ſhall yet be ſo preſerved, whether by Gods Grace, or by his power, and providence, that he ſhall not finally dye without repentance: for as there is no promiſe of God to found that hope, ſo in time of temptation to any pleaſurable, tranſporting ſin, &c. it will be in danger to betray and ruine him, that hath a good opinion of himſelf, eſpecially if he hath been taught, that faith is a *full aſſurance* of his *Election*.

§. 107. The ſame I ſay of *Grace*, as it ſignifies the paternall favour of God to his Elect children, which is thought by ſome to be onely *clouded*, and, as to their ſenſe and preſent experience and comfort, darkned by their moſt willfull ſins, ſo as God may be highly diſpleaſed with them, as *David* with his ſon *Abſolom*, and yet continue his paternall Love and favour to them, as *David* did his to that ungracious ſon, in the height of his Rebellion. *Of Gods favour to rebellious children* 31

§. 108. 'Tis poſſible this Example of *David* may have ſome Rhetoricall Energy in it, to perſwade and deceive ſome. If it have, then 1. I may not unfitly ask this queſtion, whether they think God had then that kindneſs to *Abſolom* that *David* had? If he had not, how can it be drawn into example to God? If he had, how then can it agree with it, to cut him off in the midſt of his Rebellion, which 'tis manifeſt *David* would not have done. But omitting that, I anſwer 2. that 'tis viſible, that this in *David* was paſſionate indulgence, ſuch as men (as *Joab* tells him) diſliked, and to this kind of humane paſſionate, I oppoſe that other kind of Divine diſpaſſionate love, producing in God bowels of pity, frequent admonitions and warnings, powerfull

erfull Meſſages, ſtrong and earneſt calls, and propoſition of all rationall motives to repentance. But if thoſe prevail not, the *juſt* ſtill continuing to *draw back*, *Gods ſoul hath no pleaſure in him*, and the greater obligations of Love and Grace they are, againſt which he hath ſinn'd, the greater the provocations are in the ſight of God, and nothing conſequently but the greater degree of puniſhment to be expected. How God is affected toward *rebellious* ſons is ſet down *Iſ.* 1. 2, 10, 11, 12, &c.

§. 109. And then to put any man in hope, that what is not ordinarily revealed in the Goſpel, may yet be laid up for him in the cabinet of Gods ſecret counſels with this ſeal upon it, *The Lord knoweth thoſe that are his*, as if they might be his ſtill in Gods acceptation, which walk moſt contrarily to him, this may prove a moſt dangerous ſnare of ſouls, and it is ſtrange it ſhould ſeek ſhelter in that Text 2. *Tim.* 2. 19. which was moſt expreſly deſigned to the contrary, as is evident both by the notation of the θεμέλιον in the beginning of the verſe, which in all probability ſignifies the *Covenant* of God, the βεβαιότης *ſtability* whereof, there preſt, muſt aſſure us that there is no ſalvation to be expected, but according to the contents of that great indenture, once for all ſealed in the blood of Chriſt, of which as that indeed is one part, which is inſcribed on one ſide of the ſeal [*The Lord knoweth thoſe that are his*] i. e. he will never fail to own thoſe that continue faithfull to him; ſo the other, on the other ſide, is moſt emphatical, [*Let every man that nameth the name of Chriſt, depart from iniquity*] which if he do not, he hath forfeited all the Priviledges of his Chriſtianity.

No comfort for ſuch from 2 Tim. ii. 19.

§. 110. The *Gnoſtick* hereſie, one branch of it eſpecially,

especially, noted in *Marcus*'s Scholars, in *Irenaeus*, is a seasonable warning to all sober Christians in this matter, He told them of an ἀπολύτρωσις, a *redemption*, or kind of Baptism, which rendered them φύσει πνευματικὰς, *naturally* and immutably *spirituall*, no more to be *polluted by sin*, then *gold by lying in the mire*, or the *Sun beams* by lighting on a *dunghill*, and that whatever they did, they should (as with the helmet of the mother of the Gods) be rendred ἀόρατοι τῷ κρίτῃ, *invisible to the Judge*, The effects whereof, as to all carnality, &c. were so detestable, that it becomes every man most sollicitously to guard and secure his Schemes of *Election* and Doctrine of *Perseverance of the Elect*, from all probability, if not possibility, of ministring to the like, and that cannot well be by any other method of resolution, but this, that those *that persevere unto the end shall be saved*, and none els; our tenure in all the Priviledges of Election, 1. Gods favour, 2. the continuall assistance of his Grace, and 3. the inheritance of sons, being inseparably relative and annext to the constant filiall obedience, which he indispensably requires of us, under the Gospel of conditionall promises.

The Marcusians heresie in this point, a good warning.

§. 111. Thus have I past through all your Letter and given my self the liberty of these strictures, by way of reflexion on all and every passage therein, which belonged to this subject of God's *Decrees* and his *Grace*; And without the addition of any unnecessary recapitulation of the severalls, it is already evident, how perfect the agreement is between us in all that you in any degree positively assert, or own as your *opinion*: And if in one particular which you are so carefull to propose, as a bare *conjecture*, and not allow it your favour in any other quality,

The Conclusion.

quality, it ſhould happen that we finally diſſent (though in propriety of ſpeech *conjectures* are not *ſentiments*) yet it were ſtrange the diſpute betwixt us ſhould be of any length. And ſo you diſcern the utmoſt of uneaſineſs, which is likely to be given you by this addreſs of

Dear Sir

Your moſt affectionate
brother and ſervant
H. HAMMOND.

A ſecond

A Second LETTER,

BEING

A View of two Emergent Difficultyes.

Deare Sir,

THe very freindly reception which my larger trouble found from you, is my full encouragement to proceed to the concluſion of my importunity and your exerciſe, which cannot now be far off, if I may judge by your Letter.

§. 2. Two difficultyes, you ſay, you have ſprung by farther entring into the conſiderarion of this matter, *the firſt occaſioned by my diſtinction betwixt the worke of Grace and of Providence*, the ſecond ariſing from the *Conceſſions of Scripture of Gods withdrawing his grace from thoſe that reject it.* *Two difficultyes.*

§. 3. To thoſe I ſhall make theſe returnes, which I doubt not will prove ſatisfactory. The firſt ſeemeth to favour an ἐποχὴ or *ſuſpence*, and to avert all defining in theſe points: For, ſay you, *ſince the efficacy of Divine grace followeth the acts of his Providence, ſo as it may ſeem in a manner to depend chiefly thereupon, and the wayes of his providence are* abyſſus multa, *deep and unfathomable, it ſeemeth to you to conclude ſtrongly that the manner how God effectually worketh by his grace to the converſion of a ſinner is alſo to our underſtandings incomprehenſible.*] To this you cannot but foreſee my reply, that the propoſall of that diſtinction was by *An argument from the unfathomableneſs of Gods providence.* *The diſtinction between providence and grace.*

by me deſigned as a prejudice to Biſhop *Overal's* way, which you had then mentioned as your *conjecture.* And if it ſhall have indeed that influence upon you or any man, as you ſpeake of, to encreaſe the difficulty, and to conclude ſtrongly, that *the manner of Gods working,* &c. *is incomprehenſible*; yet you know this cannot in juſtice be applyed farther then to that particular Scheme, againſt which peculiarly this diſadvantage was propoſed, and then the onely regular concluſion is, that this which you propoſed but as a *conjecture*, ſhould now grow lower in your eſteem, and ſcarce be thought worthy to be own'd as ſuch.

The force thereof againſt the foremention'd conjecture.

§. 4. And the more force there is in this one conſideration, thus to incline you, the leſſe ſhall I deſpair, that two more conſiderations, which then encompaſſed this, and the ſuperadded tender of another way, that the Scripture-grounds, eſpecially *Chriſt's parables* in the Goſpel, ſuggeſted, will in ſome degree prevaile with you, to depoſite this conjecture, which (beſide other prejudices againſt it,) hath no grounds of Scripture to pretend to, in exchange for that other, that hath, and pretends no further, then it ſhall approve it ſelfe to be thus founded.

Other conſiderations to prejudice it.

§. 5. This is all that I may ſay to an objection which I was to cheriſh and ſtrengthen, (rather then anſwer.) But I ſhall not think that needfull, onely I leave it to have that force with you, which you ſhall ſee fit to give it, remembring onely that it ought not to have force with him, that accepts not that Scheme, that alone is concerned in it.

§. 6. Which Scheme having been propoſed by you with perfect warineſſe, and profeſſion of allowing

allowing it to be no more then a *conjecture*, one ſuch difficulty as this, is, I acknowledge, ſufficient to remove you from it, and in that caſe it will not be unſeaſonable again to tender that which you may finde better qualified for your acceptance, having without queſtion an advantage, from the *parable of the ſower*, to recommend it. I ſhall endeavour to make this cleare to you. Your ſuppoſed intricacy, or unfathomable queſtion, is, what it is that makes *ſufficient grace* to be *effectuall* to any? I ſay the *parable* of the *ſower* was intended by Chriſt on purpoſe to anſwer that queſtion, which it hath competently performed, for here wee ſee, the *ſeed* being the ſame, (whether that were the *word*, or *grace*, it matters not, as long as 'tis remembred that *the word is the vehicle of grace*, and the inſtrument of conveighing it to the heart,) all the difference taken notice of, is onely in the ſoyle, *viz*: ſome *troden down*, and cruſted; ſome *ſtony*; ſome *thorny*; ſome *good*, and mellow. Proportionably to this four-fold difference of the ground, the ſeverall fates of the ſeed are deſcribed, and your one queſtion divided into four, and anſwer exactly accommodated to each.

The other way confirmed from the parable of the ſower.

The queſtion what makes ſufficient grace effectuall.

Punctually anſwered by Chriſt.

The four-fold difference of ſoile.

§. 7. The *firſt* queſtion is this, what is it that makes *ſufficient grace*, *uneffectuall*, to ſome men, ſo that though it be on Gods part freely afforded them, and as freely as to any other, yet it hath not the leaſt effect upon them? And the anſwer is evident in the explanation of that parable, *Mat.* XIII. 19. becauſe he is ἀκούων τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ συνιεὶς, *one that heares the word*, to which that grace is annexed, but either *underſtands* it *not*, or *minds* it *not*; and ſo the *Divil comes and catcheth away that which was ſown*, (and in that caſe there is

The one queſtion divided into foure. 31

The firſt.

no

no great need of that *Divil* towards the obſtructing effectuallneſs, let the ſeed ly there never ſo long, if it be not *minded*, it can ſignifie nothing toward an harveſt.)

The ſecond. §. 8. The *ſecond* queſtion is, what is it that makes ſufficient Grace, after it is *received*, and that *with joy*, (great forwardneſs and alacrity at the firſt) to become ſo uneffectuall to the ſupporting a man in time of *temptation*, that rather then endure any ſmart for piety, he falls into any the groſſeſt ſins? And the anſwer follows v. 21. becauſe ſuch a man is of a temper that yields not Grace any *depth* to *root* in, he hath ſome *ſtonyneſs* at the bottome, ſome pleaſure, or paſſion, or other remains of reſiſtance rooted in him, which he hath not diveſted himſelf of, and when duty begins any way to check that, he is impatient, and throws off Piety, of which he made very fair profeſſions, and ſuch as had, as far as his trialls formerly went, reality in them, till this laſt ſignall tryall was made of him, for which, it ſeems by the effect, he was not qualified.

The third. §. 9. The *third* queſtion is, what is the reaſon that ſufficient Grace, once received and bringing forth fruits, though it come not to combat with any ſharp tryalls, doth yet many times decay and periſh *after a while?* And the anſwer is v. 22. that there remained in the heart of ſuch ſome piece of ill temper unreformed, which in time prolified, and ſent out great and waſting ſins (though not ſo generally decryed in the world) viz. *worldly ſollicitudes*, and ſuch as the wealth of the world is apt to beget in men that have or ſeek it, and theſe being permitted to thrive in the ſoul, 'tis regular that Grace, which cannot conſiſt with ſuch (*you cannot*

ſerve

ſerve God and Mammon) ſhould be overrun, and *choaked*, and at length deſtroyed by that means, which had it not been for this cauſe of abortion, as it was ſufficient, and effectuall for a while, ſo it would have proſper'd to perſeverance.

§. 10. And this introduceth the *fourth* and laſt queſtion, What then is it that renders ſufficient Grace Effectuall both to Converſion and Perſeverance? And the Anſwer is v. 23. the *goodneſs* of the ſoile, *probity* of the *heart*, wherein that ſufficient Grace is received, and what that is, is beſt diſcerned by the oppoſition to all the former three, 1. it is a ſincerely pliable, ductile temper, that neglects not to make uſe of any grain of Grace, 2. it hath an uniform Courage to combat with difficulties, and is not enſlaved to pleaſures. 3. it utterly deſpiſes the world, the allurements and the terrors of it, and uſes it, as if it uſed it not. The former part of this temper renders it effectuall to converſion, the two latter to perſeverance alſo. And conſidering that parable is ſet down by Chriſt to give account of the various ſucceſſes of the *word of the kingdome*, i. e. of the Goſpel among all thoſe to whom it is made known, who with you are the adæquate object of the *Scripture-election*, and *reprobation*, what can be farther required to the clear ſatisfaction of your whole difficulty? *The fourth.* *The character of the honeſt heart.*

§. 11. And then remembring that the onely remaining queſtion, viz. *whence is this probity?* hath been fully anſwered in the former papers, I appeal to no other then your ſelf, whether this be not both a perſpicuous, and authorized ſtating, having ſo weighty a paſſage of Goſpel to found it, and therefore in all juſtice preferrable to your bare Conjecture, which, beſides that it is preſſed with *The Conjecture compared with the other way.*

difficulties (as your ſelf acknowledge) which to you ſeem unanſwerable, is not provided of any pretenſe of a foundation, hath no authority from holy Scripture to recommend it.

One pretenſion for the Conjecture, From the finding the hidden treaſure.

§. 12. If it have any, it is moſt probably that other ſhort parable in the ſame Chapter, v. 44. where the *kingdome of God is compared to a treaſure hid in the field, the which when a man hath found, he hideth, &c.* There the man, which found the treaſure, is not ſuppoſed to *ſeek* it (for that makes another parable v. 45.) but by the meer *providence* of God (which the heathen Philoſophers were wont to ſtile chance, and commonly give this very inſtance of it *the treaſure found in the field,*) happily to fall upon it, when he paſſeth by on ſome other errand; And this indeed is matter of frequent obſervation, *Auguſtine* is converted by S. *Ambroſe's* Sermon, when he came to it on no ſuch deſign, *Saul* is called to from heaven, and converted to Chriſtianity, when he was going to *Damaſcus* on the moſt diſtant deſign of perſecuting it. And to omit the many more examples of thoſe of whom it hath been litterally true, that they have *found* God, *when they ſought him not, asked not after him*, one eminent ſtory our books give us, of two young children brought to a city to be ſold, at a time when a devout Nun had vowed to take ſome young child, and beſtow her whole life, and utmoſt induſtry to bring it up in ſtrict piety, and accordingly came and bought one of them, and aſſoon as ſhe had bought her, a bawd came in her preſence and bought the other, by which means theſe two, which were ſo lately in the very ſame indifferent condition, by this act of Divine providence (to which this was to be attributed) were ſtrangely

The converſion of Auguſtine.

Of Saul.

The diſtant fate of two children.

ſtrangely *diſcriminated*, the one brought up and early engaged, and ſo perſevering to the lives end in all piety, and the other by the contrary diſcipline debauched, and educated to the trade of harlotry, wherein ſhe lived and perſevered. In which it is viſible how ſignal an influence this one act of Divine *Providence* had on ſo diſtant eternall fates of theſe two, and how eminent an ingredient it was in the ſaving the one and damning the other.

§. 13. But from all theſe and innumerable the like, (which are freely granted, and allowed to be competent to confirm your main concluſion, that the *Providence of God is Abyſſus multa*) you will ſoon diſcern, that there comes in no leaſt advantage to that *Learned Biſhops Scheme*, which is the matter of your Conjecture, and our onely preſent enquiry. The whole weight of that (as far as I, or any man queſtions it) being laid, not on the ſuperabundance afforded to one above the other, (which is willingly granted) but on the foreſeen *univerſall inefficaciouſneſs* of the barely *ſufficient Grace*, acknowledged to be given to all, till that ſuperadded advantage adminiſtred by *Gods providence* in the choice of the *congruous timing*, come in, as the work of *Gods Election*, to make the diſcrimination.

Answered.

The point of the difficulty. Whether the barely ſufficient Grace be univerſally inefficacious.

§. 14. Now ſeeing in all theſe examples, and in that parable, nothing like this is to be found, no evidence, or intimation of Gods foreſeeing, 1. that that man that found the treaſure, would never have been wrought on by that meaſure of *ſufficient Grace*, which that opinion allows God formerly to have afforded him, unleſs by that ſeaſonable act of *Providence* he had thus faln on the treaſure in the parable, or 2. that *Auguſtine* would never have

No pretenſe for this.

been converted, if he had not been ſurprized by S. *Ambroſe's* Sermon, or 3. that *Saul* would not have been converted at another time, without, or even with that viſion, and voice from heaven, or laſtly that that fortunate child, that fell into the *Nun's*, inſtead of the *bawd's* hands, would never have been brought to heaven any other way, and could not have miſcarried under this method: Through all theſe inſtances, I ſay, it is ſtill apparent, that nothing is gained toward the approving the Conjecture, theſe advantageous turns of providence afforded one man and not another, and the ſignall efficacy of ſuch, being moſt freely granted by thoſe who deem the *Conjecture* improbable.

§. 15. And indeed, if it be well conſidered, all that theſe, and a myriad of the like inſtances infer, is no more then this, the great and admirable *variety* of *Gods providentiall acts*, not as thoſe are all one with, but as in his hands they are inſtrumentall and ſubſervient to his *Grace*, whereby in diverſe manners *grace* is advantageouſly aſſiſted by *providence*, to one in this wiſe, and admirable manner, to another in that; No man, who is allowed the *ſufficient Grace*, being denyed ſome benefit or other of *Providence* to aſſiſt *Grace*, and make it more then probable to become effectuall to him, if he doth not betray and fruſtrate the *opportunities* of the one, as well as the *power* and efficacy of the other.

Providence allowed to aſsiſt Grace.

§. 16. So that ſtill acknowledging moſt willingly, and admiring the *abyſs of Providence*, this no way obſtructs the comprehending the manner (or perplexes the doctrine) of the *cooperation* of the *Grace of God* with the *will* of *man*, but leaves it where

But is of no force to the Queſtion.

where the Parable of the Sower ſet it, that the *efficacy* of *Grace*, and ſucceſsfulneſs, whether to *converſion*, or *perſeverance* proceeds from the mellowneſs, and preparedneſs of the ſoile, from the advantages which it meets with in the *honeſt heart*, as that again is wholly due to Gods preventing Graces, which have thus fitted the ſoile for the kindly ſeeds-time, planted pliableneſs, humility in the heart, where Grace may be deeply and durably rooted, but this ſtill *reſiſtibly* in both parts, as hath formerly been expreſt.

A Phanſie of Gods giving the Elect ipſam non-reſiſtentiam

§. 17. One phanſie I know there is, which hath pleaſed ſome men in this matter, that God gives *ſufficient Grace* to thoſe who do not make uſe of it, but reſiſt it, and yet more then ſo, the power of uſing, or accepting, or not reſiſting it, but gives to the Elect and onely to the *Elect*, *ipſam non reſiſtentiam*, *the very not reſiſting*, and this they will have to be the ſignal *diſcriminating Grace*.

Examined, and found weake.

§. 18. Of theſe I ſhall demand 1. whether in thoſe which have not this *ipſam non-reſiſtentiam* given them, this be an effect of God's Decree, which hath determined the certain infallible giving it to ſome peculiar perſons, and ſo the not giving it to all others? If it be not, then this is no foundation of *diſcriminating Grace*, or conſequently fruit of *Election* and *Reprobation*, and ſo is ſtill impertinent to the matter for which it is brought.

§. 19. But if it be the effect of Gods Decree, determining the giving it to ſome, and denying it to others, I then 2. demand, whether all they to whom it is not given, do therefore infallibly *receive the grace of God in vain*, becauſe they have not this *ipſa non-reſiſtentia* (which is more then the power of not reſiſting) given them?

§. 20. If this be not affirmed, then, as before, this comes not home to *diſcriminating Grace*, nor conſequently to the buſineſs of *Election* and *Reprobation*, which it was meant to aſſiſt. But if it ſhall be ſaid, that they therefore infallibly reſiſt, or *receive in vain*, becauſe this *ipſa non-reſiſtentia* is not given them, then it ſeems this gift of *ipſa non-reſiſtentia* is ſuch, as that they who have it not, want ſomewhat which is neceſſary to their effectuall receiving, or not-reſiſting Grace, and if this be the condition of the far greateſt part of the world, then how can it with any ſincerity be affirmed (as by thoſe that make uſe of this expedient, it is profeſt) that God hath to all mankind given *Chriſt*, and *in him all things*, and particularly *Grace ſufficient*, and the power of not-reſiſting Grace, which according to this phanſie, none can chooſe but reſiſt, who have not the *ipſam non-reſiſtentiam* given them, which yet they affirm to be given but to a few, i.e. to none but the *elect*?

§. 21. This were (by interpretation, and in effect) for God to give to all men a power to an act, which yet the greateſt part of thoſe which have it given them, can never make uſe of to that act, for want of ſomewhat elſe which is not given them, which to all them which have not that ſomewhat elſe given (and thoſe the far greateſt number of men for whom *Chriſt dyed*) is not a power to that act, viz. of not-reſiſting; which what is it other then a direct *contradiction*, a power and not a power to the ſame act? and withall ſo far from being a favour to them, that it is in event infallibly and inevitably the greateſt curſe, that could have befaln them, viz. the heightening and extreamly aggravating of their guilt and puniſhment, proportionably

tionably to their ſin of reſiſting ſuch ſufficient grace, of ſtanding out againſt Chriſt, which as it is the height of guilt, (and awarded the dregs of Gods wrath,) now under the Goſpel, and makes their condition in the world to come, much worſe, then it would have been, if Chriſt had never been borne, or preached to them, ſo it had never been thus direfully charged upon them, if they had not had the *power of not reſiſting* given them by *Chriſt*.

§. 22. This is a competent prejudice and diſcouragement to this phanſy, of founding diſcriminating grace and the doctrine of unconditionate decrees in this difference betwixt the *power of reſiſting*, and the *ipſa non-reſiſtentia*, the latter given onely to the *Elect*. *Conſidered in relation to this phanſie.*

§. 23. But it will farther be defeated, if we reflect on that place of Scripture, wherein Gods giving the *ipſa non-reſiſtentia* chiefly ſeems to be mentioned, *Phil.* II. 13. under the ſtyle of ἐνεργῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ ἐνεργεῖν, *working in us to do*, or *work*, which that it tends not to the ſupport or advantage of this phanſy may be evident by theſe three conſiderations. *Phil. ii. 13.*

§. 24. *Firſt*, by the importance of the phraſe, [*working in us to do*, as before *to will*,] which (as was formerly noted, in paſſing,) will beſt be underſtood by other parallel phraſes, as δῶναι λατρεύειν, *Gods giving to ſerve*, *Luke*. 1. 72. Which is evidently his *giving* grace, or power, or ſupernatural abilities *to ſerve*, not onely furniſhing him with a remote, and fundamentall power, or faculty, but withall having a particular immediate influence on the effect, actuating that power, when it is actuated, and ſo properly cauſing, or making

him actually to ſerve, yet ſo as to leave him power alſo to neglect, and *receive* that power *in vain*, as the *Scripture* elſewhere ſaith; Thus *Revel.* xi. 3. δώσω *I will give*, wee render, *I will give power*, *viz.* power to the ſubſequent act, *prophecying* there, as in *Luke*, *ſerving in holyneſſe*. By which analogy it is evident, that Gods *working in us* to do, or *work*, is not interpretable to any more, then his giving ſupernaturall power, or ſufficient grace to do, or worke, and cauſing him *actually*, though not *irreſiſtibly* to work, and then here is no pretenſe whereon to found the foreſaid difference, between God's *giving the power of not reſiſting*, and the *ipſa non-reſiſtentia*, theſe two being equivalent in this Text.

§. 25. *Secondly*, the ſame appeareth by the Apoſtles exhortation foregoing in this Text, *to worke* and *worke out our own ſalvation with feare and trembling*, for the inforcing whereof this reaſon is given, *for it is God that worketh*, &c. Here our own *working* is under Apoſtolical exhortation and precept, wee are commanded to worke, as elſewhere συνεργεῖν *to cooperate*, and *Worke together with God*, which could not have place, if God alone, (and not wee,) *did work* in us the *very working*, whereas interpreting it of Gods *giving* us the *power* of *working*, or doing, as well as of *willing*, and withall engaging us to make uſe of that power, and cooperating with us in the very *act*, and ſo cauſing us *actually* to work, yet ſo as to leave us a power of *reſiſting*, and fruſtrating, and *receiving* this power or *grace in vain*, this is a moſt proper and effectuall inforcement of the exhortation addreſt to us, *to work and work out our own ſalvation.*

§. 26. This

§. 26. This farther and moſt irrefragably appeares by the *perſons*, to whom both the exhortation, and this enforcement thereof is tendred, *viz:* the *brethren* indefinitely, or *beloved*, *verſe.* 12. the whole Church of *Profeſſors* at *Philippi* to whom he writes, which being not made up wholly of the elect, ſincere, and perſevering Chriſtians, but like the net, in Chriſt's parable, that *caught both good and bad*, and had no doubt ſome inſincere perſons, hypocrites, and temporaryes in it, the affirmation notwithſtanding is indiſcriminately of all, *God worketh in* them *to work*, which could not hold, if by this phraſe were meant his giving the *ipſa non-reſiſtentia*, and that as an evidence of *diſcriminating grace*, and an effect of his *Election*, for this is not ſuppoſable to have belonged to that *whole* Church, any more then it then did, or now is believed to do to *all* Chriſtians.

§. 27. I have enlarged thus far, becauſe I was not willing to omit, but rather to prevent whatſoever I could foreſee might probably be objected in this buſineſſe. And ſo this may ſuffice to have returned to your firſt difficulty.

§. 28. The ſecond difficulty you thus propoſe, *Whereas it is ſaid, and that, (as you conceive,) moſt truly and agreably to plain evidence of Scripture, that God withdraweth his grace from ſuch as rejecting it when it is offered to them by the preaching of the Goſpel, do thereby fruſtrate the Counſell of God againſt themſelves, it ſeemeth hard to conceive how the grace of God ſhould be ſo withdrawn from them, that ſo do, but that, ſo long as they are not deprived of the outward means, the ſame ſufficient grace that was offered to them at the firſt hearing* of

The ſecond difficultye. Concerning Gods withdrawing ſufficient grace.

of the Gospel, is offered to them still; which if it was then sufficient on God's part, to do the work, is also still sufficient, and that in the same degree, and how then can it be said to be withdrawn? It is true that the conversion of such a person, after so long obstinacy and refusall is more difficult then before, which may arise from the greater indisposition of the person to be wrought upon, but how it can be imputed in the least, to the withdrawing of the divine grace, (to which yet undoubtedly it may and ought to be imputed,) upon the former supposall on the like sufficiency remaining, I must professe my self not able to understand.]

§. 29. To this I shall not doubt to apply a satisfactory answer, and such as you will acknowledge to be such, by distinguishing of *Gods withdrawing his grace.* For, 1. it being Gods method to *give more grace* to those that walk worthy of it, the humble obedient children of grace, when he on our provocations stops that current, this may be called *withdrawing*. God's smitings are his admonitions, (*heare ye the Rod,*) his admonitions, as any other dispensation of his word are *vehicles of grace*, and when these prevaile not, they are thus withdrawn, *i.e.* not farther encreased, (*why should yee be smitten any more*, &c. *Is.* 1.) Yet is this *withdrawing* consistent with Gods affording *sufficient grace*, either by instruments of some other kinde, or even of the same kinde, the continuance of that proportion, which was formerly afforded; as he that gives a competency, and would if he saw it well used, daily make additions to it, though he see cause to with-hold those additions, yet he may continue that competency. But in propriety of speech, (the truth is,) this is rather *with-holding*, then

The severall wayes of Gods withdrawing grace.

The first rather with-holding.

Consists with his affording sufficient.

then *withdrawing*, yet becauſe the not giving what was promiſed to be given is tantamount to *withdrawing*, I therefore place this in the firſt ranke, ſuppoſing it cleare, that this doth not onely leave ſufficient grace; but is it ſelf deſigned to awaken and quicken thoſe that did not formerly make good uſe of it, *Leſt a worſe thing yet befall* them.

§. 30. *Secondly*, then *withdrawing* being taken in the proper ſenſe, for *taking away* from and diminiſhing the ſtock, before afforded, that may yet be but in *part*, not *totall*, and there being a latitude in *ſufficient grace*, ſome degrees of that may be taken away, and yet that which remaines be ſufficient, an image of which is that degree of *Church-cenſures*, which cutting off from the participation of the Euchariſt, or ſuſpending from it, allowes the hearing of the word, and partaking in the prayers of the faithfull, And this act of *Gods withdrawing*, again is ſo far from denying *ſufficient grace*, that it is purpoſely uſed and deſigned, as the moſt probable means to make that *ſufficient grace* effectuall, which formerly had not been ſo.

The ſecond.

Not totall.

§. 31. There may yet be a *third*, and yet further degree of *withdrawing*, which at the preſent, and as to *ſufficient grace*, may be ſaid to be *totall*, *i.e.* ſuch a withdrawing of grace at the preſent, that it ſhall truly be ſaid ſuch a man is not now allowed ſufficient for his neceſſities, whether it be that his neceſſities are grown greater, and ſo the former competency will not ſuffice, or be it alſo, that ſome of that which he had is *withdrawn*, as when he that for ſome time had no violent temptations, and was furniſhed with ſtrength proportionable

The third totall, but only for the time, and neither ſimply totall.

tionable to what he had, upon his betraying this ſtrength, and ſinning willfully againſt it, is by God called out to ſharper combats, having been foiled with the weaker, and perhaps ſome part of his former ſtrength *withdrawn* from him alſo, when he hath moſt need of ſuccours, and ſhould certainly have had them, had he not thus provoked the withholding them. In this caſe the aime of this puniſhment of Gods is yet moſt wiſe and mercifull, thus to convince ſuch a man of his guilts, and impotence, (the effect of them,) and ſo as by turning *Nebuchadnezzar* into the field, thorowly to humble him, to excite ardency of prayers, both for *pardon*, and *grace*, which God in that caſe failes not to give, and ſo to reſtore ſuch a man to a greater ſtability of his former ſtate.

§. 32. And ſo ſtill this is neither *finall*, nor ſimply *totall*, as that ſignifies *withdrawing all grace*, but onely totall for a time in the ſence declared, as it ſignified the withdrawing what was neceſſary to their preſent ſtate.

§. 33. And I need not ſhew you how far this is reconcileable with *ſufficient grace*, any farther then thus, that ſuch an one though ſeverely mulcted hath yet time for repentance and grace to make ſome uſe of it, which if he failes not in, he hath aſſurance of *more grace*, and this demonſtrated to be ſo, by his not being cut off in his ſins, (Gods *long-ſuffering leading him to repentance*,) and by the light of Gods word, and articulation of his calls dayly continued to him, which are not void of that *grace*, which is ſufficient to work conviction, and hath the promiſe of *more*, (upon asking,) made to him that is thus qualified for it.

Rom. ii. 4.

§. 34. *Fourthly*

§. 34. Fourthly, there is the *removing the candleſtick*, the withdrawing all the outward ordinary means of Grace, the preaching of the Word and Sacraments, which if it be done by the cenſures of the Church, is called the *delivering up to Satan*, or if it be done by Gods judgements, invaſion of barbarians, &c. it is yet to thoſe perſons that are thus puniſhed, perfectly proportionable to that of the *Church-cenſures*. And yet of thoſe it is ſaid expreſly by the *Apoſtle*, that the end of inflicting them is *for edification, that they may be diſciplined, taught not to blaſpheme*. This ſuppoſes continuance of Grace to them that are thus puniſhed, and that ſufficient to make uſe of this puniſhment to their amendment, nay the puniſhment, though it be the *withdrawing* of *one* inſtrument of *Grace*, is it ſelf *another*, and therefore purpoſely choſen and allowed in exchange for the former, becauſe it is looked on as the more probable to produce the Effect.

The fourth total, yet it ſelf deſigned as a Grace, moſt effectual of any.

2 Cor. xiii. 10. 1 Tim. i. 20.

§. 35. They that ſee ſo great a benefit withdrawn from them for their unworthineſs, will be thereby excited to reflect on their provocations, and bewail them, and contend by all regular means to regain what they have forfeited, and to repair their defects ſome other way, and this being the very end to which this puniſhment is by God deſigned, it is not imaginable, he doth yet (till *this* method alſo be deſpiſed) withold that degree of *Grace* from ſuch which is neceſſary for the producing of the Effect.

§. 36. All the ordinances of God, we know (and ſuch are the *Cenſures*) yea and all the wiſe diſpenſations of his *providence*, particularly his *puniſhments* of this life (and therefore this, as the laſt, beſide

Gods puniſhments inſtruments of his Grace.

beſide exciſion) are inſtruments of *Grace* in the hands of his *wiſdome*, as well as the preaching of the word is, and therefore in all reaſon to be reſolved to be the *vehicles* of *Grace* alſo, and ſo neither is this any objection againſt Gods giving *ſufficient Grace* to thoſe, whom he thus puniſhes, in caſe they begin to make uſe of it. If they do not, but continue ſtill obſtinate, 'tis juſt it ſhould at length be withdrawn from them.

§. 37. But this muſt be underſtood onely of thoſe perſons to whom the light of the *Goſpel* had formerly ſhined, not to their diſtant poſterity, which never have had any gleames of it, though their Anceſtors had the fulleſt Sunſhine. Theſe are to be reckon'd with the *heathen*, with whom you know we undertook not to meddle, treating onely of the *Scripture-Election*, terminated in thoſe to whom the *Scripture* is revealed.

The fifth totall and finall withdrawing of all Grace by exciſion.

§. 38. *Fifthly* there is a *totall* and *finall withdrawing* of all *grace*, as well as the means of it, which is viſible in the cutting off ſuch an one in his ſins, and when this comes, our former ſuppoſall of *ſufficient grace*, as of the preaching of the word, and God's calls, are utterly at an end, but this breeds no ſhew of difficulty, that man having enjoyed and miſpent his time of *ſufficient grace*, and now the *ſtore-houſes are ſhut up*.

The ſixth before exciſion.

§. 39. But there is yet poſſibly a *ſixth* ſtate of *with-drawing*, when before either cutting off, or with-drawing Gods *outward calls*, whilſt life, and the preaching of the word is continued, the obdurate ſinner, that hath long hardened his own heart againſt God, thereby provokes him *totally* to *with-draw* all inward Grace from him, as much as if he were already in hell; This ſeems to be *Pharaoh's*

raoh's caſe after the ſixth judgement, and was deſigned by God to very excellent ends, to make him an example to all thoſe that ſhould be inclined *to harden their hearts againſt God*; And though we know not that God thus deals with any others, yet it is ſure he juſtly may with all whom he may juſtly cut off in their ſins. And in this caſe I acknowledge the *non-converſion* of ſuch a man is not onely imputable to the *indiſpoſition of the perſon to be wrought on*, but alſo to the *withdrawing of the divine grace*, for then, as I ſaid, the former ſuppoſal (of the like ſufficiency remaining) ceaſeth, and is outdated.

§. 40. What freſh difficulties can ariſe from this conceſſion, I cannot divine, unleſs 1. it ſhould be objected, that then, it ſeems, the word is not alwayes the vehicle of Grace, and then 2. who knows when it is ſo, when not? And how then is this reconcileable with the doctrine of *ſufficient grace* alwayes accompanying the word? And to theſe the anſwers are obvious, 1. that it is granted that the Word is not the vehicle of Grace to the *Divils who believe and tremble*, to the damned who have received their ſentence, nay nor to thoſe that are thus arrived to the higheſt degree of obduration in this life, and have, as *Pharaoh*, this exterminating ſentence paſſed upon them. It is ſufficient if it be ſo to them that are in a capacity to make uſe of it, and have not utterly *hardened* themſelves againſt it, the Scripture-expreſſion being, that the Goſpel is *the power of God to ſalvation to every one that believes it*, and this is enough to eſtabliſh our pretenſions, the doctrine of *ſufficient grace*. There is a competent time allowed every man, and 'tis certain, death is the concluſion of it, 'tis poſſible ſome ſpace before death.

The word is not accompanied with Grace to the damned, or the higheſt degree of obdurate.

Rom. 1. 16.

§. 41.

§. 41. As for the *second*, if it were on the premiſed grounds granted, that ſometimes it cannot be known whether or no the preaching of the Word do then bring this Grace with it, yet the one regular conſequence would be that we ſhould all be the more carefull to make uſe of *Grace*, when it is afforded: But when to this is added, that this barren ſeaſon is alwayes the reward of *obſtinate* obduration (and of nothing leſs then that) As long as we have any *ſoftneſs* left, that is our aſſurance that this ſad time is not yet come upon us. They that go on in their obdurate courſe, have reaſon to expect this fatal period every hour, but they that have *remorſe*, and any degree of ſincere relenting, may know by this, that this ſtate of ſpiritual death hath not yet ſeized them, and that is ſufficient to guard this doctrine from all noxious conſequences, having provided that none ſhall hereby think his ſtate *deſperate*, that is willing to reform it.

Where any ſofineſs, none of that.

§. 42. But then it is farther to be remembred, that there appears not in the word of God, any other example of this *totall* ſpirituall dereliction finally inflicted, *before death*, but onely that of *Pharaoh*, after the time that *God* is ſaid to have *hardened his heart*; and the reaſon of this is ſet down, God *keeps him alive*, after the time due to his exciſion, that he *might ſhew in him his power*. And ſuch ſingular examples ought no farther to be taken into conſideration by us at this diſtance from them, then to warn us, that we keep as far as it is poſſible from the like provocations, And then there remains not, that I diſcern, any farther appearance of difficulty in this matter.

Pharaoh the onely example of it in Scripture.

Rom. ix. 17.

§. 43. As for any others that ſhall be apt to occur, when men ſet themſelves to conſider of theſe points,

points, not divining what they are, I may not pretend to ſpeak to them, any farther then thus, that in all probability they may be meaſured by theſe, which you have choſen to mention, and by nearer approach to them be likewiſe found not to be ſo deep, as at the diſtance they are conceited to be. This then concludes your trouble; It remains that according to my promiſe I now onely annex the *Letters of Præſcience*, and haſten to ſubſcribe my ſelf

Your moſt affectionate
brother and ſervant
H. HAMMOND.

The Extracts of three LETTERS Concerning Gods Præscience reconciled with Liberty and Contingency, referred to, and promised in the first Letter to D. Sanderson, §. 8.

THE FIRST LETTER.

§. 1. As to the distinction betwixt *inevitably* and *infallibly*, (of which you desire my sence) it is certain you must understand no more by the *infallibility*, then is vulgarly meant by *Necessitas ex hypothesi*, which is no more then that whatsoever is, cannot not be, or, *omne quod est, eo ipso quod est, necessariò est*. For so whatsoever is *seen*, or (which is all one in an infinite Deity) *foreseen* by *God*, is thereby supposed to have, in that science of his, an *objective* being; If it were not, or did not come to pass, it should have no such *objective being*, if it have, it is thereby evidenced to be seen by him, who *was, is, and is to come*, and so (being infinite) is equally present to all, and equally sees, and knows all from all eternity. What therefore you conclude (as it is most agreeable to this, so it) is most true, that *God knows all things as they are*, such as come to pass contingently, he knows to come contingently, and from thence I undeniably conclude, therefore they are *contingent*; As for *Socinus*'s resolution that he foresees onely what are foreseeable, and that contingents are not such, but onely those that come to pass by his decree, I conceive it as dange-

Necessitas ex hypothesi.

Objective being.

Socinus's doctrine.

rous

rous as M. *Calvins*, that he *predetermines* all things, and it is visibly as false. For it is evident by the prophecies of *Judas* &c. that God long (before) foresees sins, which are as certainly contingent, and not decreed or decreeable by God. If therefore any that writes against the Remonstrants go about to retort their arguments, and conclude from their acknowledgements of *Gods præscience*, what is charged on their adversaries doctrine of *prædetermination*, I conceive it is but a boast, that hath no least force in it, *prædetermination* having a visible influence and causality on the object, but eternal *vision*, or prævision being so far from imposing necessity on the thing to be, that it supposes it to be already, from the free choice of the Agent, and that being of it is, in order of nature, before its being seen. Gods seeing, or foreseeing hath no more operation or causality of any kind on the object, then my seeing your letter hath caused your letter. You wrote freely, and now I see it, and that being supposed, it is infallibly certain that you have written, and that you cannot not have written. And just so it is in respect of God. Onely I am *finite*, and so is my sight, I see few things, and those onely which are present, but God being infinite sees all *ab infinito*, that are never so long hence future.——At *Cambridge* they have lately printed *Origen contra Celsum*, and *Philocalia Gr. & Lat.* (which were rarely had and dear) the latter of which hath good Chapters on this subject.

Calvins.

Gods foresight of sins.

Difference betwixt Prædetermination and Prævision.

§. 2. This Letter met with some prepossessions, so far advanced, as to cause a Reply of some length, and that necessitated my larger endeavours to remove them, which I shall here add also; His Re-

ply, to which this referres, is none of my goodes, and therefore I may not take that liberty in disposing of that, but you will discerne the force of it, in my returnes, which were as follows.

The Second LETTER.

SIR.

§. 3. I received your Letter, and in it your sence of that difficult point, which I cannot approve of, but on the contrary assure my self, that as *Omnipotence* is not onely the power of doing all things that any or all creatures can do, but more then so, the doing all things that imply not a *contradiction*, (as the same thing at once to be and not to be, the doing of those being as impossible to God, as it is to lye,) so the *Omniscience* of God is the knowing all things which any creature can know, and not onely so, but the knowing all things which implye not a *contradiction* to be known, and then that will be extensible to all things that are past, present, or to come, of what sort soever they are; what is past, or present, or being future is decreed by him, or comes to passe by some necessary cause in nature, which he decrees not to hinder, Gods knowledge of these will not, I suppose, be doubted of. All the question will be of *future contingents*, which before they are done, are possible to be, or not to be, but whensoever they

Omniscience proportionable to Omnipotence.

Future contingents with in Gods reach.

they come to passe, are as determinately in being, as is any thing else, (the most necessary,) that is allready done. Unless then, what by being future is out of my reach, is also by being future, out of Gods reach, there can be no pretense that any such future contingent should not be objicible to Gods all seeing knowledge.

Nor knoweth the future effects other wise than present. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 12. c. 21.

§. 4. And that nothing that ever shall be, or will come to passe, is thus out of Gods reach, must sure be yeilded to *Gods immensity*, which relating to time, as well as place, it will be equally derogatory to it to limit it to the present *time*, in opposition to the future, and to the present, (be it whatsoever finite,) *place*. This therefore I take to be the one thing fit to be considered in this matter, whether Gods *immensity* comprehend not a commensuration to all time, and somewhat beyond that, as much as *infinite* is beyond *finite*.

Proved by Gods immensity.

§. 5. This I suppose cannot be denyed to the Notion which is due to a Deity, and if so, then God was immense from all eternity, and cannot be imagined to advance or arrive to this by any προκοπὴ, *proficiency*, or improvement, by continuing or enduring from the beginning to this time, or to the end of the world, but in every imaginable point of time, even before time was, he was thus *immense*, and if so, his *knowledge* being as *immense* as himself, all that he was from eternity present to, (*i.e.* all things that ever were or shall be,) must needs be objected to his knowledge.

§. 6. Against this, your prime argument is, *that it is no more derogatory to his omniscience not to know that which is in nature unintelligible, then to his Omnipotence, not to do things impossible.*] This

Socinus's argument answered.

is chiefly *Socinus's* grand argument, and to it I answer, 1. That the phrase, (*in nature unintelligible*,) may be set to signifie no more then what no naturall, *ie.* created power can *know*, and then there is no truth in the proposition, unlesse proportionably [*impossible*] signify what no finite naturall created power can *do*: and if both those phrases be meant so, there is nothing gain'd by it, because a Deity may both do and know more, then any creature can. But then *secondly*, the phrase [*in nature unintelligible*] may also signifie that which in the nature of things, whether finite or infinite, created or uncreated, is not possible to be understood; And thus I suppose you meane it, and then the interpretation of the phrase must be, that for such a thing to be objicible to any, though infinite, understanding, implyes a *contradiction*, (for nothing else is simply impossible:) And this being your meaning, I absolutely deny, that for God to be by his immensity present to all time, (and all that he is present to, he may see,) implyes a *contradiction*, or hath any appearance, (to him that considers what infinite is,) of so implying. And if you will make tryall and attempt to prove it doth, it must be by proceeding on the known definition of *contradictoryes*, a repugnance *in terminis*, as *idem eodem respectu esse & non esse*, and then you will soon discerne the unquestionable truth of my denial. For Gods seeing all future contingents, will neither imply God to be, and not to be, to see, and not to see, to see certainly, and not to see certainly, nor the future contingent to be, and not to be, or to be necessarily and not to be necessarily, or to be future, and not to be future. For the thing being future, and contingent now,

Of the contradiction.

and

and ſo continuing till it comes to paſſe, and when it comes to paſſe, coming to paſſe contingently, and ſo as it might not come to paſſe alſo, but when it actually is done, it implying a contradiction, (and ſo being impoſſible,) not to be done, and ſo being neceſſary *neceſſitate hypothetica*, i.e. *ſuppoſing that it is*, all this God ſees and knowes by the ſeverall acts of his intellect, anſwerable to the ſeverall notions of the thing.

§. 7. From all eternity, and ſo in every point of time, before it comes to paſſe, God ſees it both as *future*, and as *contingent*, and ſo, as that, which till it is, may be or may not be; and when it comes to paſſe, *in ipſo fieri*, he ſees the man that does it, act *freely*, having power to the contrary, and the thing never *neceſſary*, but as being done, and that onely by that *neceſſity*, whereof that propoſition in logick is to be underſtood, *Omne quod eſt, eo quod eſt, neceſſariò eſt*. All which is very obvious to be conceived, and there is not the leaſt contradiction, or ſhew thereof in it.

§. 8. This one would thinke you readily granted, when you ſay, *God infallibly knowes all that is paſt, preſent, or poſſible to be*, (for no man demands any more,) yet you deny it again in theſe words, [*meer contingents which with equall poſſibility may be, or may not be, have no being in act, and therefore can caſt no reflection, or objective being into the mind of God.*] To which I reply, Firſt, that you ought to advert. 1. That what may be, or may not be, may be. 2. What may be, is poſſible, and 3. You your ſelf confeſſe that God knowes all that is *poſſible*. Secondly that the *having no being in act*, (which ſeemes to be your ſtumbling block,) is a phraſe proportioned to the thing, and to our

finite underſtandings, to which the thing is *future* onely, and ſo hath no being yet: but when God is conſidered as *infinite*, then whatſoever ſhall ever be in act, that actuall being of it, is the object of Gods ſight, and hath been ſo from all eternity, and is no more removed from him, then that is removed from me, which is preſent with me; And if you ſay, *God ſees before, what in after time ſhall hang in the ballance of humane indetermination*, i.e. what he may do, deliberates, and is free to do, or not to do, but hath not yet done, I demand, why may he not alſo foreſee which end of the ballance doth at length overpoiſe? (Is not one of theſe as truly *future*, as the other, when the man is not yet borne?) And ſo again, which end doth not overpoiſe, and never will, although he ſee it might, if the man ſhould chooſe ſo, and that the man may ſo chooſe, but ſtill that he doth not. This is it, wherein you ſay the *contradiction* is, and now it is viſible there is none, nor the leaſt approach towards any.

A ſecond objection.

§. 9. Here you add, (which is your ſecond main objection,) *that it is a miſtake to call that poſſible, which God foreſees ſhall never be, for if God foreſees the contrary*, (i.e. *that it ſhall never be,*) *it is indeed impoſſible.* But, 1. I pray, is nothing *poſſible* to come to paſſe, but what *actually* comes to paſſe? If ſo, nothing that is, is *contingent*. But if ſome things be *poſſible* to come to paſſe, which yet do not come to paſſe, why may not God ſee they will not come to paſſe? And if he can, then that is no miſtake, which you ſay is. 2. Do but change the word foreſight into (which is the ſame,) ſeeing from all eternity, and then it is plain, that God from all eternity may ſee that thing will never

ver actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do, or not to do, (and God ſees that too,) and ſo is *poſſible* every way, ſave onely *ex hypotheſi, on ſuppoſition* that it will never be; And as the bare *hypotheticall neceſſity* is no *abſolute neceſſity*, ſo the bare *hypotheticall impoſſibility* is no *abſolute impoſſibility*. 3. God ſees every thing as it is, and it's being or not being ſuch, is in order of nature antecedent to Gods *ſeeing* it; Therefore it infallibly followes, that if it be *poſſible* to be, though it ſhall never be, God ſees it is *poſſible* to be, and if God ſees it *poſſible*, it unavoidably followes that it is poſſible.

§. 10. And it is not fit here to interpoſe, that *though it ſeem to us poſſible, in reſpect of ſecond cauſes, yet if God foreſee the contrary, it is indeed impoſſible*;] For what I am by God left free to do, or not to do, that, not onely ſeemes, but is indeed poſſible, and ſo it is, though in event I never do it, and being ſo in it ſelf, God's ſeeing it will never be, hath no leaſt influence upon it, ſo as to make the leaſt change in it, (for that is the work of his *will*, not of his *knowledge*,) and ſo it cannot from *poſſible* convert it into *impoſſible*.

§. 11. When therefore you ſay, *no cauſe can effect that which God ſees ſhall never be*, this is onely true *in ſenſu compoſito*, that, in caſe it ſhall never be, and ſo God ſees it ſhall never be, no cauſe ſhall effect it, but *in ſenſu diviſo* it is moſt falſe, for I am truly able to write more lines to you then I ſhall ever write, or conſequently then God foreſees I ſhall write, and even this, that I am thus able, God equally *foreſees*.

§. 12. By this you ſee how far I am from being convinced, or by any reaſon forced to grant, that

future

future determinations of free agents are not foreſeeable, and what the inconvenience is of affirming they are not, even no leſs then derogating from *Gods Immenſity*, and *Infinity*, and judging the perceptions of an infinite Creator by our finite, created meaſures, his more then unfathom'd Ocean by my ſpan, and feigning *contradictions*, where there are none.

Inconveniences enumerated and anſwered. The firſt.

§. 13. Now to the *Inconveniences* which you enumerate, I ſhall reply alſo, as oft as I perceive I have not prevented, or anſwered them already. The firſt is, that *the ſight can be no more certain then the things are which are ſeen, and therefore there cannot be a certain knowledge of thoſe things, which in their cauſes are uncertain,*] I anſwer that all the *certainty* of the knowledge of any thing depends upon its *being* firſt, and then of its being *known* to be, and not onely upon the *certainty* of its *cauſes*; I do now as certainly know that I have written nine pages to you, as I know that the fire burns, therefore that may be *known certainly*, which is not *certain in its cauſes*. And as that which is preſent to me is certainly known by me, ſo are all things to come from all eternity, preſent to an *immenſe* Creator, be they contingent, or not. And in this caſe there is not *more in the effect then in the cauſe*, for what is contingently come to paſs, being done, is certain, and cannot be undone, and God ſees it, as it is, therefore he ſees it as done, and ſo certain, yet as done contingently, and ſo as that which might not have been, the *being*, certain, the *manner* of its coming to act, *uncertain*. The being then being the cauſe of the ſeeing, or in nature antecedent to it, and the ſeeing the effect or conſequent of the being, the certainty of the effect is but

but proportionable to, and *exceedeth not the cauſe.*

§. 14. The *ſecond Inconvenience* is, that of *ſaying that every thing that happens was certain to be, before it happens*] But I ſay not ſo, unleſs by certain you mean *ex hypotheſi*, certain to be, in caſe it be; for in caſe it ſhould not be, God ſhould ſee it would not be, and then it ſhould be as *certainly* otherwiſe. The ſecond.

§. 15. The ſhort is, All *Exhortations*, *Induſtry*, *Preaching*, &c. are founded in the *liberty* of our actions, and if they be free till they be actually determined, and then are paſt freedome, and become neceſſary, ſo conſequently muſt *Exhortations*, &c. be all uſefull, till the thing be done, (and then indeed, as to the doing, or not doing that, they are not uſefull, but their ſecond ſeaſon of uſefulneſs comes in, in caſe it were a ſin, *Exhortation to Repentance*, &c.) and that is as much, as can be or need be pretended to, and this is fully competible with Gods ſeeing certainly from all eternity, whatſoever ſhall come to paſs in time; His ſeeing it ſuppoſing it done, though for the manner of its being done, that were *contingent*, and if ſo, then is it not certain to be, before it happens, but it is certain to be, when it is, and it firſt *is*, in order of nature, before it is *ſeen*, and its being already ſeen, before it be done, depends onely on the *immenſity* of Gods preſence, and ſight, which reacheth out to all that ever ſhall be; ſo that that which is future to us, he is preſent to it, and in that ſence, though he ſees it as future, tis yet preſent to him.

§. 16. Your *third inconvenience* is, that, *by this, the damnation of ſuch or ſuch men is as fixed and unalterable, as though they were reprobated from all eternity*, The third.

eternity, and it is as ill in reſpect of me, if I muſt inevitably be damned by my own free will, as if I had been ſentenced to Hell by Gods decree, and in reſpect of God worſe, for he muſt be deprived of the free exerciſe of his omnipotence, (becauſe he cannot make that not to be which he foreſees will be) and brought under a Stoicall Fatality, and ſo be an helpleſs ſpectatour of what anothers will is pleaſed to effect.] I anſwer if by [*ſuch and ſuch men*] you mean ſuch or ſuch individuall entities, without reſpect to their qualifications or demeanures, then all your conſequence, as it is *inconvenient*, ſo it is falſe, for from Gods ſeeing *ab æterno*, that *Judas* will be reprobated, it follows not, that he ſees he will be reprobated, but for his willfull Treaſon. But if you mean by [*ſuch or ſuch men*] men ſo or ſo qualified, i. e. finally impenitent, then 'tis true, but not *inconvenient*, that finall impenitents, ſhould from all eternity be reprobated. And ſpeaking of theſe in this ſence, 'tis true, which you add, that it is as ill in reſpect of the perſon, i. e. finall impenitents, meaning by [*as ill*] as ſad and penal, nay 'tis more ſad, and penal to be reprobated for final impenitence, which I am guilty of by my own *free-will*, then it would be to be onely by Gods *decree* involved in it, my willful culpable guilt being ſome addition to my miſery, and (as long as God is juſt) it being expectable that thoſe puniſhments will be ſharper, which I bring on my ſelf, by the exerciſe of my free will, then what comes on me by a decree grounded no way in my actions. And ſo ſtill this is no *Inconvenience*. But if you mean by [*as ill*] that which hath as little mixture of Gods goodneſs towards me, then your conſequence is falſe, for to Gods ſeeing *Judas* reprobated,

bated, and his ſeeing it *ab æterno*, it is no way conſequent, that he gives him no power to eſcape Damnation, viz. Grace to be able to ſtand and not fall, or Grace to recover if he will make uſe of it, but the contrary rather follows; For how can God ſee him damned for the *betraying Chriſt*, and not repenting and returning, unleſs this were done wilfully by him (ſins of *weakneſs* and *ignorance* finding mercy, as in the caſe of *Saul*, *perſecuting the Church*) and unleſs he were firſt a *Diſciple of Chriſt*, and ſo were illuminated, and aſſiſted by Chriſt, and if he were ſo, then he had this power and Grace, or might have had it, if he were not wanting to himſelf, and if ſo, then this was not ſo *ill to him* (in this ſenſe, of which now I ſpeak) as to have been irreſpectively reprobated, and never vouchſafed this Grace.

§. 17. So when you ſay *It is worſe in reſpect of God, and prove* that *becauſe he muſt be deprived of the free exerciſe of his omnipotence*] there is no truth in that conſequence, or the reaſon of it. For Gods *omnipotence* conſiſts not in being able to make both parts of a *contradiction* true, that were in the very attempt a departing from veracity, a falſeneſs, a ſin, and ſo the greateſt *impotence*, and ſo moſt contrary to *omnipotence*. And ſuch is that, which alone your conſequence, and the reaſon of that ſuppoſes, making that not to be, which he foreſees will be, for by the latter part of that expreſſion you mean that wch from eternity he ſees to be done, and then to be done and not to be done, is *in terminis contradictory*. And this impotence or not being able to cauſe the ſame thing at once to be and not to be, is far from all notions of *Stoical fatality*, that I ever heard of (els ſure all rationall creatures muſt be *Stoicks*, for they

they all resolve that what is, cannot not be) and as far from making *God an idle helpless spectator of what anothers will is pleased to effect:* for his *providence*, and *assistence*, and *efficacy* belong to other things, not to the making that not to be, when it is, but to the preventing it before it came, giving Grace sufficient, preventing, restraining, exciting, &c. ordering it and disposing of it to his own wise ends, when it is done, and punishing the doer justly, if he repent not, to which he is also ready to give Grace, if he humbly *ask*, and *seek* and *knock* for it: All this is supposed to be done by God, and so God is no *helpless spectator*, and all this is reconcileable with the effects being wrought by our free will, as long as *Gods grace* works not irresistibly.

§. 18. Here I remember that of S. *Augustin. de Civ. l. 5. c. 10. Nullo modo cogimur, aut retenta præscientia Dei, tollere voluntatis arbitrium, aut retento voluntatis arbitrio, Deum, quod nefas est, negare præscium futurorum,* (this is expresly contrary both to the *Calvinists* pretension on one side, and the *Socinians* on the other.)

The fourth. §. 19. Your *fourth inconvenience* is, that *then God never purposed to save all mankind.*] If by purposing you mean decreeing, and by saving, actually bestowing heaven upon them, then that consequence is true, but not in the least wise inconvenient, for God never decreed to save final impenitents, and such are many of mankind, after the giving of Christ, but on the contrary, hath *sworn* such *shall not enter into his rest.* The saving of mankind which God decreed is the redeeming them, and giving them Christ, and Grace, and making them *salvable*, and being deficient in nothing toward that

that end to those, that will make use of it. As for the other notion of Salvation, it is no where said that God *purposed* that in the notion of *decreeing*, but onely that he so *will'd* as to *desire* it, and to give sufficient means of effecting it, but those means proportioned to rational agents, and so not violent or *irresistible*, or such as should, by being contrary to freedome, exclude rewardableness. So when you say, *Christ could not have an intention to dye for them, who he foresees would be nothing advantaged by it*] if by *dying for them*] you mean so dying, that they should actually be saved, so 'tis true, he intended not to dye for those that are finally impenitent, and so are not advantaged by it, for sure it is no part of his Covenant or intention in dying, to save such: but if by *dying for them* you mean purchasing pardon, upon supposition of repentance, then that he intended thus to dye for them, that make not this advantage of it, (and so he sees make it not) appears evidently by many texts, which tell us of his *redeeming those that deny him, that perish*, &c. and is intimated by the very style you use of their *being nothing advantaged by it*, for if he did not purchase those advantages for them, why is that phrase used?

§. 20. Your fifth Inconvenience is, *that on this supposition, God could not seriously call upon such, whom his præscience points out for Damnation, to repent, more then I could bid him take heed that he fall not, whom by tumbling down I saw mortally bruised already.*] I answer, 1. that if you mean any more by that phrase [*his præscience points out to Damnation*] then [*he sees* ab æterno, *that they will not repent, but dye in their sins,*] I reject the phrase, as not belonging to the question, my *hy-* The fifth.

pothesis

potheſis being far from yielding, that præſcience doth any other way, but this, or in any other ſenſe, *point out* any *to damnation.* And therefore changing that obſcurer for this other more perſpicuous phraſe, I ſay that Gods præſcience of mens not making uſe of his call, is very reconcileable with the *ſeriouſneſs of his call*, which I inferr from Gods own words, and oath, *as I live, ſaith the Lord, I deſire not the death of him that dyes, turn you, turn you, for why will you dye?* what can be more ſerious then this ſpeech, directed to thoſe that dye, and he ſees, obſtinately *will dye.* But this differs widely from my *warning him to take heed of falling, whom I ſee actually fall'n*, becauſe whenſoever God thus calls not to fall, the man is not fall'n: when he calls him to ariſe again, being fall'n, he is not irreverſibly fall'n, and therefore accordingly he calls him (not, not to fall, but) to riſe again. And what God thus doth in time, God *ab æterno* decreed to do, and his foreſeeing it would not produce the deſired effect, was in order of nature after the decree of doing it, and therefore is in no reaſon to have any influence on (ſo as to change) the decree, and if not ſo, then the decree ſtanding ſtill in force, it is moſt neceſſary that it ſhould be performed, and ſo that God ſhould in time call thus ſeriouſly to repentance.

§. 21. And indeed, for God to *foreſee* (as he doth, or els would not puniſh for it,) that his moſt *ſerious* call will be *rejected*, and yet not to ſuppoſe his call is moſt *ſerious*, is an abſolute contradiction, and ſo cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed or imagined.

The foreſeeing of Judas's ſin.

§. 22. To my argument of *Judas's* ſin being *foreſeen*, and *foretold* by God, from whence I conclude

clude that that is *foreseen* which is not *caused* by God, or to which the man is not *determined* by any act of Gods will) which you say is *very pressing*, you answer by *referring to my judgement* 1. *whether the Prophecies could not have been fullfilled, had* Judas *never been born*: 2. *whether by listning to his Master he could not have repented*, &c.] The argument from thence defended. To the first I answer, that the propheey, as it was terminated in *him*, could not possibly have been *fullfilled*, had *he never been born*, and that the πληρωσις, or utmost completion of the prophecy *Psal.* 41. 9. was terminated in him, the holy Ghost by S. *Peter* tells us, *Act.* 1. To the second, that I doubt not but by listning to Christ, he might have repented, and then God foresaw that he might, yet foresaw he would not do what he might, and so *foretold* this; whereas if he would have done otherwise, it is as undoubted, that God should have foreseen that, and might, if he had pleased, have foretold it also, as Christ did not onely his treason, but also S. *Peters denyall*, and repentance also. As for that which you suggest, *that the propheey of him might be like that of Jonah, conditional*] 1, there is little probability for it, when the event hath so much otherwise interpreted it, which if it had not done, I should not have resisted your suggestion, as far as concerned his *perishing*. But then 2. you know my Argument was founded in Gods foreseeing his *sin* (and not his *perishing*) and to that his *conditional foresight*, exemplified in *Jonas* to *Nineveh*, is not applyable,

§. 23. That which you cite from *Chrysostome*, *who gives for a reason why Christ admitted Judas to the Sacrament, that nothing might be omitted that might conduce to his amendment*] belongs not to Hom 83. in Mat.

your *firſt*, but *ſecond* queſtion, and ſo I allowed of it, as you ſee, and am not prejudiced by it. For to your concluding queſtion I anſwer expreſly, Chriſt look'd on *Judas's not ſinning*, or *repenting*, as *poſſible*, till by his repudiating all the means of Grace, and his *meaſure of iniquity fill'd up*, he withdrew his Grace from him, which whether he did before, or not till his death, I have no means of defining. Onely this I reſolve, that Chriſts foreſeeing what he would do, had no leaſt influence on the effect, any more then the *effect* hath on the *cauſe*, or the *ſenſe* on the *object*, Gods foreſight being in nature conſequent to, and cauſed by his doing it, not the cauſe of it. And when you ſay, that *if it were poſſible, then the contrary was not certain*, I grant it was not certain, till it was done, and when you inferr, *then it could not be foreſeen*, I deny the conſequence, for thoſe things which are not *certain*, till they are done, may by an *immenſe Deity* be *ab æterno* ſeen to come to paſſe in time, and ſo that ſight or foreſight be as certain, as a foreſight of what is moſt neceſſary in its cauſes: and the reaſon is clear, becauſe of that which is done, it is as certain that it is done, as of that which is *in cauſis*, it is certain, that it is *in cauſis*, and being ſo, it may caſt a reflexion on the underſtanding of him that is preſent to it, and ſo is God to *futures*, as well as to the *preſent*.

§. 24. And when you ſay in your Poſtſcript, that *it is a contradiction to ſay that things paſt or future* are preſent, *and therefore all things are not, nay cannot be preſent to God*;] I anſwer, 1. that you uſe not the right definition of a *Contradiction*, in ſaying thus, for *future* doth not contradict *preſent*, but *preſent and not preſent* is a contradiction, and ſo

future

future and not future; 2. although it be granted of any finite thing, that it cannot be both preſent and future, yet God being *immenſe*, may and muſt be preſent to that which is future, or els he is bounded and limited. Yet this doth not inferr God to *ſee what is future as preſent* (which you ſay *is to be deceived*) but to ſee what is future as future, which though indeed it be future, yet he by his *immenſity* may be preſent to it. And none of the inconveniences, which you add, follow on this; onely let me tell you (on ſtrength of that Propoſition, *Quicquid eſt neceſſario eſt id quod eſt*) that as God cannot change what is *paſt*, ſo he cannot change that which is preſent, ſo as to make it, when it is *preſent*, not preſent, and then no more can he change that which is *future*, ſo as to make it not future. All that can be done is, either 1. to make that which is *contingent* (and ſo may be or may not be) to become *neceſſary*, by decreeing it; or 2. to come to paſs really, though but *contingently*, or els 3. not to come to paſs, or finally to leave it ſtill free, yet to foreſee what will *freely* be done, as much as what will *neceſſarily* be done.

§. 25. So that you ſee the maxime which you miſlike, is not ſo much, that *all things are preſent to God*, i. e. repreſented to him *ſub ratione præſentis*, as this, that God by his *immenſity* is preſent to all things, and his ſight being as infinite as his being, this is as eaſie to be underſtood, as the other, or as any *infinite* is comprehenſible by our *finite* underſtandings, which you call *duller apprehenſions*, for ſo ſure are all ours, when we imploy them upon *infinites*. You ſee into what a length I am run, indeed much above mine own intentions, but ſhall not repent of it, if it contribute to the diſabuſing

you, and ſhewing you the way out of this intricacy.

§. 26. This ſecond Letter having ſome enforcements of the old, and addition of new ſcruples, returned to it, by the ſame hand, which I accounted it my duty to anſwer at Large, by a third letter, (which I ſuppoſe will conclude this controverſy,) I ſhall here alſo ſubjoin it. It was as followeth.

The Third LETTER.

SIR.

§. 27. THough yours of—made haſt to me, yet I found no leaſure to afford it any ſerious reflections, till this—and therefore being already guilty of two long delayes, I ſhall not now encreaſe them by procœme, but fall immediately to the view of your reply. And in it, what you firſt lay down, partly by way of *conceſſion*, partly by way of *apology* for your own Notion, partly by way of oppoſition to mine, I muſt confeſſe I ſee not what propriety of application it hath to that which was the ground-work of my Paper, *viz: that whatſoever hath a being, or ever ſhall have a being, (which though by being future 'tis out of my reach, yet by being future, is not removed out of Gods reach,) is objicible to Gods all-ſeeing eye of knowledge*, and this upon the grounds of his *infinite unlimited immenſity*, by you and by all Chriſtians acknowledged,

The ground of our aſſertion Gods immenſity, and the no implicancy of a contradiction.

Gods immenſity extends to the knowledge of all things poſſible.

ledged, and the *no contradiction*, (which alone renders it impossible to God,) which it implyes, for God thus to reach out immensly, and see all *ab æterno*, which (and in the manner as it) in time comes to passe.

§. 28. In stead of shewing this *implicancy of a contradiction*, (which alone was to have been done,) you have tendred a reason to prove, [*that God's knowledge is not properly said to be immense, in regard he knowes all things possible,*] viz: *because they* conjunctim *are not absolutely infinite.* But sure this hath no force against my position, which doth not prove Gods immensity of knowledge, by this argument of his *knowing all things possible*, or by any other, but takes that for granted, and needing no proofe, and from thence inferres and concludes the other, *viz: his knowing all things past, present or future*, and against this concluding 'tis visible your reason is of no kind of force, [*for that these* conjunctim *are not infinite,*] for an *immense* knowledge may and must see all *finites*, though it self be *infinite.*

An objection against that answered.

Gods immensity supposed not proved.

§. 29. So again, when you say *his immensity cannot relate to time, and place, which are both finite, and you cannot see how any quantitative extension should be subjected in a purely spirituall essence*, and press this with *absurdityes*, and *strange consequences*, (as if it were maintained by them, against whom your debates lye,) if you consider again, you will see, there was no cause for it, I am sure in my papers there was none, which when they proposed to your consideration, whether *Gods immensity* comprehend not a *commensuration to all time*, immediately added, *and somewhat beyond that, as much as infinite is beyond finite. By comprehending*

A second objection.

What is meant by commenſuration to all time.

hending a commenſuration to all time, if when it had that immediate addition to explaine it, it can be miſunderſtood, I muſt then farther expreſſe my ſelf, that I meant, no *quantitative extenſion*, or indeed any more then this, *that God is, was, and ſhall be*, from, and to all *eternity*, and as his eſſence, ſo is his Immenſity, Omnipreſence, Omniſcience; he ſees and knowes all things, not onely that are or have been, but that ever ſhall, or will be, *i. e.* ſhall ever have an actuall being, objicible to knowledge, and even for *poſſibles*, that yet never come to paſſe, he ſees and knowes both parts. 1. That they are poſſible to be. 2. That they will never be.

§. 30. This I have added in relation to thoſe words of yours, on which you ſeem to lay weight,

A third objection.

[*The time to come is now no time, as the things which meerly be poſſible, are now no things, and therefore to apprehend that God is in ſuch time, or that ſuch things are preſent with him, is to conceive that that is not.*]

Anſwered.

§. 31. Here, Firſt, let me tell you, your compariſon, or proportion holds not, being laid betwixt the *time to come*, which is really future, and the things *meerly poſſible*, which ſhall never be; But paſſing that, 'tis certain Secondly, that though the *time to come*, according to our finite meaſures, is now to us no time, *i. e.* is not the *preſent* time, (which holds equally of the *time paſt*, which being paſt is now to us not preſent,) yet in reſpect of *Gods immenſity* this cannot be ſaid, for that were to encumber him with our *finite rules*, and meaſure infinity by our ſpan of time, which with me you profeſſe to avert, and abhor.

What is future is objicible to God.

§. 32. So

§. 32. So though the things *meerly possible* are now no things, (I shall add, nor ever shall be,) yet even these are objicible to him as they are, *i. e.* as things *meerly possible*; which yet never shall actually be, for he may and doth see that they are *possible*, and also that they shall not come to passe. *So what is meerly possible.*

§. 33. And when against this you argue, *that this is to conceive that which is not*,] If you mean by it, that which is not *actually*, I grant it, but find no inconvenience in affirming, that God sees or conceives that to be *possible*, which he sees is not, nay shall never be; But if you meane, that if so, *then God conceives contrary to truth*, there is then no shew of truth in that consequence, for his *conceiving* that to be *meerly possible*, which is *meerly possible*, is to see *according*, (and that is not contrary,) *to truth*. *Nazianzen*'s speech that God ἔστιν ἀιὲι, *alwayes is*, but neither properly ἦν *was*, nor ἔσται, *shall be*, and that eternity is neither χρόνος *time*, nor χρόνου μέρος, *part of time*, is so far from having any unkind aspect on my notions, that it is the very thing that I contend, that we must not go about to fathom eternity by our finite lines of time, but lay all that is done in time, or ever shall be, γυμνὸν καὶ τετραχηλισμένον, *naked and bare* before him, and still acknowledge that beyond this, there is an *infinite abysse*, which we cannot fathom. *A fourth objection answered.* *Orat. 42.* *No proportion between our finite and Gods infinite.*

§. 34. On this what you build, and apply equally to that which is *past*, and *future*, [*that which is past vanishing*, say you, *into nothing, and before it was, being nothing*,] might (me thinks) by being reflected on, extricate you out of your labyrinth. For can you doubt that God knowes what *A fift objection answered.*

God may know that which actually is not.

is now *past*? I presume you do not, can not; And then why may he not as well know what is *future*? When the onely objection to that, being [*because it is not, and he must then know that, that is not,*] you have equally resolved, that *that which is past, is not*, as that that is *future*; and so that your objection, either holds against both, or neither, I pray consider this.

A sixt objection answered.

§. 35. Next when you insist, *that the acts of his infinite understanding, in relation to the creature, must needs be finite, as the creatures are finite.*] I cannot apprehend, how you can reap any the least advantage by it, meaning, as the words import, *that God sees things as they are*, for this you know and acknowledge is *my ground* also, and to this it is consequent, (and so not strange,) that whatsoever he sees *ab æterno*, he must *see, as it is*, *i. e.* as it is done in time, whether *necessarily*, or *contingently*, but no way consequent, that he can see nothing *ab æterno*, because it is in time that it comes to passe, for that which comes to passe in time, he that is *eternall*, and *immense*, and omniscient, may (seeing it *implyes no contradiction*,) *see ab æterno*, though I who am *finite*, and whose sight is limited, and finite, cannot.

Gods seeing every thing as it is.

A seventh objection answered.

§. 36. When therefore you argue, *that it is no more derogatory to his eternal wisdome, to say that he sees or knowes this or that in time, and not* ab æterno, *then it is to his infinite power, to say that it workes in a finite manner,*] *Me thinks* the fallacy should be to gross to impose on you, upon a second view: The former member of your comparison expressly denying his *seeing or knowing ab æterno*, which is the greatest derogation to *immensity*, and *omniscience* and *eternity*, when the latter

latter hath no such negation of his *power of working*, but affirmes onely that he *workes in a finite manner*, (which he may do sometimes, when there is no need of interposing his *infinite* power,) but not that he *workes not ab æterno*, which the proportion, if it were observed, would exact, and then that would be as *derogatory to his power* also.

§. 37. The observing of this will I hope cleare to you that which you say is so *strange, it being but* the same fallacy again in another dresse, (which therefore I shall no farther pursue,) or if the reason which you add, from the *temporarinesse of the creature, which* ab æterno *had no being, save onely in mere possibility,*] have still any force with you, I hope it will cease to have so, when 1. you consider that an *objective being* is sufficient to cause *knowledge*, and that it's being in time is no hindrance to an *immense* Deity to see it *ab æterno*, for if he may see it a day before it comes to passe, why may he not equally *ab æterno* ? 2. That *futures*, though contingent, differ from *meer possibilityes*, that which is *meerly possible* never coming to an actuall being, and so being not *future*, and of such I should erre indeed strangely, if I thought God did *foresee* them as *future*, or see them as having an *actuall* being. It suffices that he sees them as they are, *i. e.* as *meerly possible*, and why that which is possible, though it never be, God may not see *ab æterno* to be *possible*, I neither see, nor am offered by you any shew of reason. How you come to conceive it said by your adversaryes that *the acts of Gods understanding are all necessarily eternall*, (you meane I suppose by your whole discourse *ab æterno*,) I gues not, when he that saith *God sees ab æterno*,

An eigth objection answered.

Difference between possible and future.

All Gods acts are not ab æterno.

æterno, what now I do, muſt alſo grant that he now, *i. e.* in time ſees me do it, or elſe could not believe him *Omniſcient*. 'Tis the part of *immenſity* to do both, and of *Omniſcience* to know all things both future, and preſent, and the affirming one of theſe is very far from denying the other.

A ninth objection answered.

§. 38. You ſay this *is no convincing argument, Gods underſtanding was infinite* ab æterno, *therefore whatever he knowes, he knew* ab æterno, *more then this, Gods power*, &c. *was infinite* ab æterno, *ergo: what he does now, he does* ab æterno.] But 1. Who urged that former argument in that forme? Not I ſurely. 2. If I now ſhall, your parallel bears no proportion with it, unleſs the antecedent and conſequent be better ſuited then they are; For in your antecedent you ſpeak of *power*, in the conſequent of *doing*, which belongs to Gods *will*, not to his *power*, (for ſure God *does* onely what he *wills*, not whatſoever he hath *power* to do, or to will.) But ſet both to the ſame, *viz.* to his *power*, and then it will follow inevitably thus, Gods power and ability of doing whatſoever he pleaſed was infinite *ab æterno, ergo.* Whatſoever he now does he had *power* to do *ab æterno*; And this is the argument which alone is ſuitable to the former, *Gods underſtanding was infinite* ab æterno, *ergo. Whatſoever he knowes*, (or now ſees,) *he knew or ſaw* ab æterno, *i. e.* Whatſoever now is, or ever ſhall be done. Both theſe are apparently true, though one of thoſe which you had ſuited amiſs, were falſe, the other remaining true.

Gods knowledge ſuitable to his power.

§. 39.

§. 39. Having removed theſe rubs, which you ſay thus hinder your conſent, I ſhall hope you will yeild to as much as I pretend, which is not, you ſee, *that God coexiſts to things that neither are, nor ever will be, i. e.* to things onely *poſſible*, but not *future*, but that Gods immenſity is ſuch, as that he reacheth out and is preſent, *ab æterno*, to all that is done in time, and ſo that all that ever ſhall be, is *ab æterno* objected to his knowledge; Againſt this nothing that you have ſaid in your five firſt pages hath any ſemblance of force, and therefore I hope this now will be granted by you, and then I have it under your hand at the bottom of your fift page, that moſt of your objections will be eaſily anſwered, which therefore I might leave your ſelf to do; but having a little more leaſure then ordinary, I will a while accompany you in the view of every of them; and begin with your defence of your *firſt objection.*

Gods coexiſtence to all that ever is, not to what never ſhall be.

§. 40. And there Firſt, when to prove it to imply a *contradiction that a thing* that is not, (as, ſay you, *all mere poſſibles are,*) *ſhould be intelligible*, you thus argue, *it's being intelligible implyes that it is, ſo it is, and it is not, (which is a contradiction,)* the fallacy is two fold, 1. You confound *futures* that are, (by being ſuch,) ſuppoſed to have an *objective* being, though not as yet an actuall, with *meer poſſibles*, which never ſhall be, and ſo are not *future*, but onely *poſſible* to be, and agreeably are ſeen and known onely to be *poſſible*, but not to be *future*, and 2. You confound an *objective* being which alone is implyed in being *intelligible*, with *preſent*, or *actuall* being; and now take it out of theſe ambiguities, and ſet it as it is, that God ab æterno *did, or now doth ſee that which*

The enforcements of the former objections anſwered.

The firſt enforcement of the firſt.

which to day is not, but to morrow ſhall be, and then what is become of that, [*is and is not,*] *i. e.* of the *contradiction* ? or conſequently of your whole cauſe ? Nothing being impoſſible to God, but what implyes a *contradiction*; which therefore again I preſſe; ſhew the *contradiction*, or yeild the cauſe.

The ſecond. §. 41. Secondly, when to your ſaying that *all things paſt, preſent, or poſſible, are known to the divine wiſdom, I returned* a parentheſis, [*No man demands any more,*] and you now reply, *that I did not fully apprehend your meaning, which was that God knew all things poſſible, not as future*, my rejoynder is, that I well diſcerned the difference betwixt *poſſible* and *future*, all things being not future, which are poſſible; Yet becauſe all futures are poſſible, (though all poſſibles are not future,) I could not miſapprehend your words, which ſpake of *all things poſſible*,] in concluding that all futures were comprehended under that ſtyle of *all things poſſible*, for ſure *futures* are in that number, and then if all futures were intelligible to God, and by you granted to be infallibly known by him, this as I ſaid, was all I demanded.

Poſſible and meerly poſſible differ. There is difference I conceive, betwixt *poſſible* and *meerly poſſible*, all futures are *poſſible*, but what is *meerly poſſible* excludes futurity. Sometimes you ſpeake of *meer poſſibilityes*, and then I never apprehend you to meane *futures*, as, when you ſpeake of *all that is poſſible*, I am obliged to do.

§. 42. Now then if you ſpake, or ſpeake of *meer poſſibilityes*, and ſay that God knew all things meerly poſſible, as meerly poſſible, and not as future, you ſay moſt truly, but then your example of

of *A. B*'s *future marriage* is nothing to your purpose, for if it be considered as future, then though it be yet possible to be, or not to be, yet it is not *meerly possible*, for by being supposed *future*, it is consequent that it shall be, whereas what is *meerly possible*, shall never be. When therefore you say, *both are known by God as possible*, (viz: *that he shall marry, and that he shall not,*) *neither as future*, you deceive your self, for though he sees both as *possible*, yet he sees one as *future, viz:* as contingently future, future when it might be otherwise, and the other as *meerly possible*, *i. e.* not future, sees it, I say, as future, not by consequences, or *per scientiam mediam* onely, in the ordinary notion of that, *viz*, if this be, that will follow, (for which science there is place sometimes in things *meerly possible*, and not *future*, as in the example of the Oracle concerning the men of *Keilah*, that if *David* trusted them, they would deliver him up, when yet he not trusting himself to them, they did not, could not deliver him,) but by reaching out so far as to see it done, in that other notion of *Scientia media*, whereby God sees what man *will freely do*, and not onely *conditionally* what he *might* or would do.

Scientia media.

§. 43. Your following objections against this, *that what is known as future, is certainly known will be, but* A. B's *marriage is altogether uncertaine,*] is of no more force then the answer of the double necessity, *simplex*, and *ex hypothesi* evacuates, for what is *certainly known will be*, may be also in respect of the agent uncertain, as being free for him to do, or not to do, which notwithstanding when he hath done, it is then certainly what

what it is, and as ſo, it is ſeen by God from all eternity.

§. 44. Thirdly, when I ſaid that the *having no being in act, is a phraſe proportioned to the thing, and to our finite underſtandings*, 'tis viſible. 1. That I ſpake of the *phraſe*, and nothing elſe. 2. That my meaning is, *that to our finite underſtandings* that is not preſent, or in act, which is ſtill future, but yet God by his *immenſity* may reach out, and be preſent to it, or ſee it, as wee do that which is before our eyes.

The third §. 45. And when againſt my words you argue thus, [*if it be proportionable to the thing, then it is alſo to Gods underſtanding which depends thereon,*] 'tis plain again, that you miſapprehend mee, for I oppoſe Gods *infinite*, to our *finite* underſtandings, and not *Gods underſtanding* the thing, to the *reality* of it; God underſtands it, as it is, and ſo ſees that future, and contingent, which is truly ſo, (as *Cicero* ſaith, *Ut præterita ea vera dicimus quorum ſuperiori tempore vera fuerunt inſtantia, ſic futura, quorum conſequenti tempore vera erunt inſtantia, ea vera dicemus,*) but till it actually be, God ſees it by his *infinite ſcience*, which by our *finite* we cannot reach. *de Fato.*

§. 46. Let it then be granted that *Gods underſtanding depends on the thing*, what followes thence? No more but this, that future contingents having yet no being in act, and therefore being not viſible to our finite faculties, have yet a being objective, as being really, though contingently future, *and Gods knowledge being proportioned to the things*, and depending on them as ſuch, *i. e.* as future contingents, and not as actually being, theſe he knowes by his infinite knowledge.

§. 47. But

§. 47. But ſay you, *his underſtanding can be no more actuall then the thing is from whence he derives that underſtanding,*] what truth is there in this? I know what is *paſt*, my knowledge is *actuall*, but the thing *paſt* is not ſo; I know if the courſe of nature be not altered, (or, which as to this matter, is equivalent, I believe,) the Sun will riſe to morrow, here my *knowledge* or belief, is *actuall*, but the *object* is *future*, not yet actuall, ſave onely that it is now actually true, that the Sun will riſe then. And then why may not *Gods knowledge* be *actuall* either of what is *paſt*, or *future*, (and ſo now actually is not,) and yet he ſee it as it is, *i. e.* what is paſt as paſt, what future, as future?

§. 48. Fourthly, when to my queſtion, [*Why, if God ſees before, that which in after time hangs in the balance of humane indetermination, he may not alſo foreſee which end of the balance will at length overpoiſe?*] You anſwer, *that the foreſight of the former is the foreſight of poſſibles, but the foreſight of the other is the foreſight of a contingent future, and that the one is not as truly future, as the other,*] you cannot but ſee, you do not render any anſwer to the queſtion, *i. e.* any reaſon why he may not ſee what is *really*, though *contingently future*, as well as that which is *meerly poſſible?* It is true, one is not as truly *future*, as the other, but what ſhew is there of reaſon, that what is leſſe future, or not future at all, ſhall be ſeen, and that which is *future*, and ſhall really be, ſhall yet not be ſeen by him that is *Omniſcient*? can it's no kind of being, not ſo much as in *futurition*, ſet the advantage on that ſide, and make that moſt intelligible, which hath no being, and that leaſt, which hath?

If

If it do, yet ſure it ſhall be no ground of reſolving that the really future is not at all, even to God *foreſeeable*, or that there is any contradiction in this; which if you remember was incumbent on you to prove, by that of *hanging in the balance*, &c. but is not now attempted by you.

The firſt inforcement of the ſecond.

§. 49. I proceed to your defenſe of your *ſecond objection*. And firſt when you grant *that many things are poſſible, which will never be brought to act*,] how could you ſay before, *that it was a miſtake to call that poſſible which God foreſees ſhall never be?* Is that a miſtake which is perfectly true? Or is not Gods *foreſight* agreeable to what is?

§. 50. But ſay you now, *God that ſees all things as they are, ſees them as poſſible, not the one ſide of a contradictory propoſition as determinately true, and the other as aſſuredly falſe, for ſo he ſhould ſee them as they will be hereafter, but not as they are now*,] I anſwer, 1. God that ſees them as they are, ſees them not onely as *poſſible*, but as *future*, for they are not onely *poſſible*, but *future*, 2. Of contradictory propoſitions, as, that I ſhall kill my ſelf to morrow, and I ſhall not kill my ſelf to morrow,] one is determinately true, I mean not by *determinately true*, that God hath decreed it ſhall be, but it is true on the one ſide, and not on the other; for if I kill my ſelf to morrow, then it is true to day, that I will kill my ſelf to morrow, and if ſo, then it is falſe, that I ſhall not kill my ſelf to morrow. What then is determinately true, God ſees as determinately true, and ſo *ſees it as it is*. 3. If he ſees them as they will be hereafter, ſure this is ſufficient, who would deſire any more? Nay this is to ſee them as they now are, for now they are *future*;

ture, i. e. things that now are not, but ſhall hereafter be.

§. 51. In your reply to my ſecond anſwer, it is no way pertinent which you ſay of a *bare ſuppoſition proving nothing, yet being granted proving any thing that is neceſſarily deducible from it.* For 1. when I ſpeak of a bare *hypotheticall neceſſity*, you ſpeak of a bare *hypotheſis* or ſuppoſition, which is quite another thing, your bare ſuppoſition is a ſuppoſing, (though no more then ſuppoſing) that to be, which is not, but our bare *hypotheticall neceſſity* is a conditional, as that is oppoſed to an abſolute neceſſity. How wide are theſe one from the other? 2. Then if you review that my ſecond anſwer, to which you make this reply, you ſhall ſee how little propriety it hath to it. It was this, *Change the foreſight into ſeeing from all eternity, and then it is plaine, that God from all eternity may ſee that will never actually be, which yet is free for the agent to do or not to do, (and God ſees that to,) and ſo is poſſible every way, ſave onely* ex hypotheſi *that it will never be, and as the bare hypotheticall neceſſity is no abſolute neceſſity, ſo this bare hypothetical impoſſibility is no abſolute impoſſibility.* To this your reply is, *that though a bare ſuppoſition prove nothing, yet it being granted, it infallibly proves any thing neceſſarily concluſible from it.*] You ſee now how little this is *ad Iphicli boves*, and yet, 3. If it were pertinent, it would not be for your advantage, for ſuppoſing, (as I alſo do,) that God ſees the thing as *contingently future*, free for the agent to do or not to do, it muſt by your rule neceſſarily follow, that the thing is *contingent*, and ſo not abſolutely neceſſary, or any other wayes, then that when it is, it cannot not be, which was all

The ſecond.

I had to make good in that anſwer.

The third. §. 52. In my *third anſwer* you grant all I aske, onely you interpoſe, *that to our purpoſe it is all one whether Gods preſcience render the object certain, or preſuppoſe and find it certain*; and, as if this were, upon the meer ſaying it, preſently granted, as a Maxime cleare by it's own light, you add no word of proof to it. Which how far from reaſonable it is, you will now diſcover. And 1. to *render*, and to *find*, are as far from all one, as to cauſe and not to cauſe, for ſure what I *render certain*, I cauſe to be ſo, *what I find certain* is cauſed by another and not by me. And being thus diſtant in themſelves, it is ſtrange they ſhould *to our purpoſe be all one*. Is it all one to our purpoſe, whether I commit ſin freely, when I had grace to abſtain from it, or God cauſe or work it in me? What two things can be leſſe all one then theſe? and this the *one purpoſe*, for which the men, with whom you diſpute, do inſiſt on this ſubject, and diſtinguiſh betwixt Gods *foreſight* and his *decree*. And therefore as you are very ſollicitous that your opinion ſhould be freed from the imputation of derogating from the *Divine immenſity*, and *Omniſcience*, ſo at this time it concernes you to be as carefull, leſt you offend againſt Gods *purity*, and other attributes, when you make it all one for his preſcience to *find* and to *render* the object certain; *i. e.* to ſee all the ſins that wee commit, and to cauſe them. I pray conſider this, and it will force you either to acknowledge that God *foreſees certainly* what we do freely and contingently, or to deny our ſins, (*i. e.* voluntary actions,) to be *free*, or to deny that Chriſt foreſaw that *Peter* would deny, or *Judas* betray him, both which he foretold to his Diſciples.

Great difference betwixt rendring and finding certain.

The great conſequence of this difference.

§. 53. I

§. 53. I proceed to your defense of the *objected inconveniences* against my answers to them. And first, it breakes no square, whether [*in themselves*,] be inserted, or omitted, 1. because what is in it's *causes* utterly uncertain, is so in *it self*. 2. because you yeild to all I said on this head as rationall and convincing, and onely question the truth of my *principle*, which you know I was not again to prove in that place, when I was answering the *objections*, or *inconveniences*. *The defence of the objected inconveniences, answered.* *The first.*

§. 54. Your second inconvenience I understood before in the very sence that your instance now sets it, and accordingly I rendered answer to it, and shewed wherein it was that *Exhortations*, &c. were founded, viz. *in the liberty of our actions, so long as till they be actually committed, and no longer.* And to this you give no answer at all, nor to ought I say on that head, but onely say over in another Scheme the same thing to which I answered. *The second.*

§. 55. In this your new Scheme you say, that *had it been known aforehand, that* A. B. *would obstinately have continued in his wickedness, it had been vain to have used exhortations, and so for God (supposing his præscience,) it were vain to enjoyne them.*] Here the word [*vain*] in the obvious notion imports unprofitable, or useless, and then, 1. I pray consider, whether it be fit to speak thus of God. It is certain Christ saw *Peter* would fall, *Judas* would betray him, yet he told them both of it before, and that telling them was a timely admonition, and equivalent to an exhortation, adding of *Judas* a terrible threat, or denunciation, *that it was better for him, that he had never been borne.* Would you think it tolerable for any Christian to say hereupon, it was vain, for Christ to do *Præscience makes not exhortations vain.*

all this? I trow you would not, and therefore will your ſelf think fit to avoid it.

The example of Pharaoh.

§. 56. Should you have any ſcruple in this, the ſtory of *Pharaoh*, and the paſſages, *Rom.* IX. referring to it, would, *à multò majori & fortiori*, ſuperſede or anſwer it. God had there foretold *Moſes*, that he *would harden Pharaoh's heart*, which I hope is much more toward inferring a neceſſity, then Chriſt's *foretelling Peter*, or *Iudas* of the fall of the one, and treaſon of the other. And yet God exhorts *Pharaoh* after that, and he that objects againſt his doing ſo, *Rom.* IX. that ſaith τί ἔτι μέμφεται; *Why doth he yet*, (after that ſixt judgement, when God himſelf hath *ſent his plagues on his heart, why doth he ſtill, or yet*) *find fault*, is anſwered, *Nay but, O man, who art thou, that diſputeſt againſt God?*

§. 57. In the former part of that ſtory, when it was not come to that height, yet it is moſt evident that from the beginning of *Moſes*'s miſſion to *Pharaoh*, *God had foretold that Pharaoh*, would *harden his own heart*, and that (alone) is perfectly parallel to our caſe, which is of *preſcience* of future contingent acts of mans will, yet are all Gods meſſages and ſignes by *Moſes* purpoſely ſent to melt, and perſwade him to *let the people go*. Doth any man now want a perſpective to diſcerne that theſe meſſages of heaven were not *vaine*? Or that ſuch acts of Divine wiſdom, (*his wayes, that are not like ours*,) are not to be ſubmitted to our tribunall, but adored and reverenced, and no otherwiſe approached by us? But then,

Acts of Gods wiſdome not ſubmitted to our cenſure.

§. 58. Secondly, if by *vain* you meane no more, then that which doth not finally obtain the effect principally deſigned, ſo there will be no difficulty in affirming with S. *Paul*, that *Gods grace* and

ſo

ſo his exhortations, *&c.* may be *received in vain*, for ſo God knowes it is too frequent for us to do, mean while what thorow our default becomes fruitleſs to us, doth not returne ſo to God, but ſerves Gods *ſubſequent*, (though it reſiſts his,) *antecedent will*, which is alſo Gods will, *viz*: to puniſh the obdurate, as well as his antecedent is to ſave the humble and tractable, and the more frequent the exhortations are, ſuppoſing grace annext to enable to make uſe of them, (as you know we ſuppoſe,) the more culpable is the obſtinacy againſt ſuch meanes, and the more culpable, the more juſtly puniſhed, and ſo Gods juſtice vindicated from all aſperſion, and mans freedome aſſerted: And the exhortations, that have contributed to all this, will not be deemed vain, though they attain not the fruit primarily intended, the ſalvifick effect or deſigne of them.

Gods antecedent and conſequent will.

§. 59. And whereas you compare this to a *Phyſician preſcribing a medicine, which he foreſees will do him no good.*] I muſt ask by what meanes it comes to paſſe that that medicine will do him no good? By it's own inſufficiency or impropriety to the diſeaſe, or by the obſtinacy of the patient, that he will not take it? If by the former, I then acknowledge with you that *Phyſician* were *vain*; but that is no way applyable to God, whoſe medicaments are ſufficient, being *the power of God to ſalvation to all that believe.* But if it be by the ſecond onely, then the *Phyſician* is far from *vain*, as doing all that the wit of man can do, or wiſh toward the recovering of his patient. For he that will not uſe his recipe's, ſeemes bent on his own death, and as guilty of it, as he that cuts his own throat, and 'tis no diſparagement to the *Phyſician*,

The uneffectualneſs of Gods acts not chargeable on him;

that when he is prescribing remedies for his feaver or consumption, he doth not cure his *obstinacy*, or that he prescribes to him, as to a wise man he would prescribe, (though indeed the event be much other, then it would be in a wise man, but that is not the Physicians fault,) and as little can the vanity be imputed to Gods operations, when by our defaults onely they prove uneffectuall; God himself, *Isa.* V. appealing to us in the like case, *what could he have done more to his vineyard which he had not done*, when yet *pro uvis labruscas, instead of grapes it brought forth nothing but wild grapes.*

Force not compatible to a rational vineyard.

§. 60. In that place no doubt it was possible for God to have done somewhat which he did not, *viz.* to have forced the ground to bring forth good grapes, but to a vineyard interpreted there to be the house of *Israel*, to a *rational vineyard*, and to that which was to be left in a state of rewardableness, of doing and not doing, of freedome, the dowry of the will of men and Angels, with which they were created, this was not competible and therefore 'tis truly said, *God could do no more, then he did*, or doth, (whatsoever the event be and be foreseen by him,) and that is as contrary as is possible to the objection of *vainnesse*.

The third.

§. 61. For the enforcing the *third inconvenience*, *you say it seemes hard that finall impenitents should from all eternity be reprobated, unlesse conditionally*, never considering, what was most conspicuous in my answer, that *final impenitence* it self is that onely *condition*. When therefore you say, *It were, as if a person should be sentenced to death for a fact before it be committed*, you fall back into the two mistakes, which my answer, if adverted to, had prevented. 1. You speak of a person simply, and abstract-

abſtracted from guilt, when I ſpeak of a *final impenitent*, *i. e.* a perſon ſo very ill qualified, and fouly guilty. 2. I ſuppoſe his ſentence to be founded in his guilt, and his guilt, in order, before his ſentence, but both of them in the mind of God, (who ſeeing his guilt, awards that puniſhment, adapts his revenge to that fact,) ſeen as paſt, before ever that ſentence goes out againſt him.

§. 62. Here you ſay *A. B's, Salvation was* ab æterno *poſſible*, (which I grant,) *and thence infer, that God did not* ab æterno *ſee his damnation as certain, but onely as poſſible.* But I deny the conſequence, for he may ſee both his ſalvation and damnation as poſſible, and yet ſee one of them as onely poſſible, the other being alſo future, which is ſomewhat more, then *onely* or *barely poſſible.* Meane while nothing hinders, but what is, (and God ſees,) thus future, *he might by his omnipotent power have prevented*, (which yet, you ſay, by my reaſon he could not,) onely then, he had not ſeen it as future, but as that which would have been, if he had not prevented it.

§. 63. Again you ſay, *that if God had infallibly foreſeen that* A. B. *living longer would unavoidably have fallen into ſin, and therein have perſevered till death, you verily believe, in regard of his goodneſs and love to mankind, not onely in generall,* 1 Tim. II. 4. 2 Peter III. 9. *But to* A. B. *himſelf,* Ez. XVIII. 32. *that God would take him away in his infancy, aſſoon as baptized, when he was in the ſtate of grace and ſalvation.*] In this proceſſe of yours, I wonder whence the word *unavoidably* came. For I that according to your ſuppoſition, look on *A. B.* as one *baptized*, and in the *ſtate of grace, and ſalva-*

Wilfull falls are not unavoidable.

tion, can never grant that he *unavoidably falls* and finally perſeveres in ſuch ſin, as brings damnation; I grant he may fall, and that finally, but ſure not *unavoidably*, for by that grace he was enabled to ſtand, and if he fall, he falls *willfully*, but that is not *unavoidably*.

Nor made ſo by Gods preſcience.

§. 64. And what if *God ſees from all eternity that he will* thus *fall*, doth that render his *fall unavoidable?* No, but Gods foreſeeing that he would fall willfully, when he had grace to ſtand, (which circumſtance he foreſaw, as well as the fall it ſelf,) muſt infer the quite contrary, that when he falls he might have ſtood, and ſo fell not *unavoidably*.

§. 65. But then leaving out that unſeaſonable word, [*unavoidably*,] which in all reaſon you might have done, when in relation to the certitude of Gods preſcience you had ſaid, [*infallibly foreſees*,] there will then be no ground of truth in that propoſition, no ſhew of proof of it from the *goodneſs* and φιλανθρωπία *of God to all*, or to any particular, as thoſe texts or any other expreſs it, for from none of thoſe it is rendred probable in any degree, that they which are baptized, and have *ſufficient* grace given them, and promiſe of *abundance*, if they make uſe of it, ſhall have violent reſtraints, or be taken out of the world, rather then they ſhall *fall into wilfull ſin*. Conſult the places again and you will ſoon find there is no propriety in them for the proofe of this.

Gods love to mankind engages him not to prevent them by death, whoſe fall he foreſees.

If it did, it is nothing to the caſe of preſcience here.

§. 66. And yet if even this alſo were true, it would no way incommodate our pretenſions, for in that caſe of Gods taking away ſuch a man, in his infancy, it would follow by our doctrine, that God foreſaw that from all eternity, and ſo that he

fore-

foreſaw not *A. B.* a finall impenitent, which is the deſtroying and voiding your whole ſuppoſition.

§. 67. How then this ſeeming advantage could reaſonably incline you, to profeſs it your *thought, that the doctrine of preſcience is very much inconſiſtent with the omnipotence and goodneſs of God*, &c. and that 'tis *ſwallowed without examination*, I now leave you candidly to conſider, by your reflexions on the ſtrength of that reed you laid this weight on. Judge I pray, might not God, if he would, have created a world of men, taken them up into heaven, and crowned them, (if crowning it could be called,) with everlaſting bliſſe, and ſo left none of them in the hazards of this world? Yet did not, (it is evident by the fact,) his love of mankind oblige him to this, but men are left to vaſt dangers, and multitudes fall under them. Muſt all this now be imputed to Gods ignorance how all things would frame in the world in this other courſe, which yet it appeares he hath choſen? The conſequences are too horrid to inſiſt on. Let us inſtance once for all in *Adam*, 'tis certain he fell, and in him all his poſterity, did not God foreſee or know this, till the effect told it him? Then how was Chriſt given *in decreto divino*, before the creation of the world? I hope you will not ſay he was not ſo given, when the Scripture is in many places ſo expreſſe for it, eſpecially, *Epheſ.* I. 4. and when Gods decrees are *ab æterno*, and ſo eſpecially this, the foundation of all the reſt, of thoſe that concern our ſalvation. Yet can I as little imagine what elſe you can ſay, unleſſe you will forſake your hypotheſis.

Adams ſin foreſeen by God, yet not prevented.

§. 68. For

Evidence that it was foreseen.

§. 68. For if he decreed Christ before the creation, then he foresaw there would be need of him, if so, then he foresaw *Adams* fall, and then why may he not have foreseen all other mens sins, all contingent future events, of which he is no more the author, and of which there is no more necessity that the free agents should act them, then there was that *Adam* should sin before he was created. I pray consider this, and it will do your whole businesse.

The same of all other sinnes.

That prescience derogates not from omnipotence.

§. 69. But let us examine your reasons, by which you will approve your affirmation, that *prescience* ab æterno *derogates from omnipotence.* You instance in *King Charls's death*, and you might have done the like in the death of Christ, whereof the sacred writ testifies, that it was *by the determinate counsell and foreknowledge of God.* Now *prescience being admitted*, say you, *it was as certain that* King Charles *should die*, Jan. 30. *as now it is that he did die that day, and to that it is consequent, that it could not have been prevented by omnipotence it self.*] Your consequence I deny, *sub hâc formâ*, because he that saw it would be that day, equally saw, both that he might, and that he would not prevent it. By his *omnipotence* it is certain, he might, by his *will* and *wisdom*, (now revealed,) that he would not prevent it, by his *Omniscience*, that from all eternity he knew he would not, by his very mercy to him, and for other most wise ends, that he would actually deliver him up to the wills of the malicious, *able to destroy the body*, but no more, which again is founded in his foresight of their malice, and must suppose it. All which makes it as infallible, that God might have prevented it, as that he would not, did not, therefore this is far from

from *derogating from his omnipotence*, in this of his not being able to prevent it, the contrary to which is by this our Scheme expresly established.

§. 70. This πρὸς ἔνστασιν; for my positive answer, you cannot but know already, all the necessity consequent to prescience is the *necessity ex hypothesi*, it is necessary to be while it is, and because it will be, therefore God foresees it will be, and if men would have done otherwise, God would have foreseen otherwise.

§. 71. When you take it for mine *acknowledgment* then, that *God cannot change that which is future, so as to make it not future*, I answer, that *sensu diviso* it is most false, for whatsoever is future, God can change, and make it not future, and then foresee it not future. But if you meant *Conjunctim*, that remaining future, he could not make it not future, 1. That is a great impropriety of speech, and most unreasonable, that he that speakes of *changing*, should mean keeping it still as it is, *unchanged*, and 2. You see the fallacy, that most palpable one, of a *benè divisis ad male Conjuncta*, which I hope will no longer impose upon you. The *ill consequentes* you feare and exaggerate, should *God be thought not to have been able to have prevented it*, I shall not need insist on, detesting the thought, as much as is possible, and having so far secured our Scheme from it, that if God foresees not that he *could prevent any future* whatsoever, I shall not think he foresees any thing.

Gods prescience derogates not from his goodness.

§. 72. So likewise for his *goodness*, you cannot doubt but I acknowledge that as fully as you, in relation to our salvation: Let us see then how I am obliged to deny this again by admitting his

Presci-

Preſcience. Why, ſay you, *if God willingly ſuffer ſo many to be damned, whom he might have ſaved where is his* φιλαν θρωπια? &c. I anſwer, juſt where you your ſelf will, and muſt place it, unleſſe you believe many ſhall not be damned finally. For 'tis moſt certain, God by his abſolute power might have ſaved all them, that yet are now damned, and the ſhew of inconvenience is exactly the ſame, whether God be believed to *foreſee all things ab æterno*, or no. For ſuppoſe we, that God foreſaw not, but ſaw in time as we do every thing that happens in our preſence, and ſuppoſe we a wicked man *filling up the meaſure of his iniquityes*, or ready to die in his ſins, I demand might not God, if he would, reſcue him out of that ſtate, convert him into a *Saint*, and aſſume him, as he did *Elias* in the ſanctified ſtate? Queſtionleſſe he might, yet without all controverſy he doth not thus to every wicked man, for if he did, none ſhould be damned; Do you now reconcile this with Gods φιλαν θρωπια, his words and many vehement aſſeverations, (as I doubt not but you are well able to do,) and then review your own queſtion, [*If God willingly ſuffer ſo many to be damned whom he might have ſaved, where is his* φιλαν θρωπια?] 'Tis not poſſible you ſhould need more words to diſintangle this ſnarle, and in my former papers I ſhewd you in this place to what Gods φιλαν θρωπια belongs, giving ſufficient grace, *&c.*: to which you reply nothing, and therefore I ſuppoſe conſent to the truth of it, though 'tis ſure both that God by his abſolute power might do more then he doth, (and therefore I like not your expreſſion, that he *does what omnipotence could performe*, citing, *Iſa.* v. 4. In place of it, I ſhould have ſaid, what his *covenant*, promiſe,

promiſe, mercy, juſtice, equity, wiſdom, obliged him to do, or what was reconcileable with all theſe, without intereſting his *abſolute power*, or *omnipotence* in it,) and that obſtinate ſinners do actually reſiſt, and fruſtrate all the methods that are uſed by him.

§. 73. Of the manner of S. *Auſtin's* aſſerting *preſcience* I need not farther inſiſt, then that by the expreſſe words of that period I produced, he will have it reconciled with the *free will of man*, which if all would do, there were little more to be required of them. Yet becauſe you have endeavoured to take off the force of S. *Auſtin's* words, and from *Ludov. Vives's* words on Chapter, IX. (*Quod ſi indignum*, &c. *Dicamus à providentia voluntateq; Dei cognitionem ejus proficiſci, voluntatem ſtatuere quod futurum ſit, ſcientiam quod voluntas ſtatuerit, noſſe,*) to draw him to *Calvins* ſence, I ſhall read over that IX. Chapter, both Text, and Comment, and give you ſome paſſages out of it; In the Text, 1. That *they are much more tolerable that bring in* Syderea Fata, *a fatality depending on the ſtarrs, then they which take away* præſcientiam futurorum, *foreknowledg of futures: and that it is a moſt open madneſs*, confiteri Deum & negare præſcium futurorum, *to confeſs God, and to deny his preſcience.* 2. *Nos ut confitemur ſummum & verum Deum, ita voluntatem ſummamque poteſtatem & præſcientiam ejus confitemur, nec timemus ne ideò voluntate non faciamus quod voluntate facimus, quia id nos facturos eſſe præſcivit cujus præſcientia falli non poteſt, as we confeſs the ſupreme and true God, ſo we confeſs his will, and ſupreme power and preſcience, neither do we feare leaſt we ſhould not do voluntarily, what we do volun-*

S. Auguſtine and Lud. Vives their ſenſe of preſcience.

voluntarily, because he foresaw it, whose prescience cannot be deceived, making it the heathen feare of *Cicero*, which now is yours, lest the *infallibility of the prescience should impose necessity, and frustrate Lawes, exhortations*, &c. 3. *Nos adversus sacrilegos ausus & Deum dicimus omnia scire, antequam fiant* (marke *omnia*) *& voluntate nos facere*, &c. Contrary to the darings of sacrilegious men, we both affirm that God knowes all things before they are done, and that we do them voluntarily. 4. *Novit incommutabiliter omnia quæ futura sunt, & quæ ipse facturus est*, he knowes unchangeably all things which are to come, and which he will do, not onely the latter, but the former, and all of one as well as the other. 5. *He that foreknew all the causes of things, among them could not be ignorant of our wills*, quas nostrorum operum causas esse præscivit. *Which he foresaw to be the causes of our workes.* 6. *Qui non est præscius omnium futurorum non est utique Deus*, he that foresees not things to come, is not God. 7. Of our liberty, *Voluntates nostræ tantum valent, quantum Deus eas valere voluit, & præscivit, & ideò quicquid valent, certissime valent, & quod facturæ sunt ipsæ, omnino facturæ sunt, quia valituras atque facturas esse præscivit cujus præscientia falli non potest*, our wills can do as much as God will'd and foreknew they were able, and therefore whatsoever they can do, they most certainly can do, and what they will do, they altogether will do, because he foresaw they could and would do it, whose prescience cannot be deceived. Next in *Vives*'s comments you have, *Non res futuræ ex scientia Dei manant, sed scientia potius Dei ex illis, quæ tamen futuræ non sunt Deo, ut est error multorum, sed præsentes. Quocirca non recte dicitur præ-*

præscire, nisi relatione ad actiones nostras, dicendus est scire, videre, cernere. Quod si indignum videtur, &c. *Things future do not flow from Gods science, but rather Gods science from them, which yet are not future to God as the error of many is, but present, Wherefore he is not rightly said to foresee unlesse it be in relation to our actions, he must be said to know, to see, to perceive, which if it appeare unworthy*, &c. There come in the words by you recited, *of Gods science coming from his will*, which you say is *Calvinism*, but is not set by *Vives* to interpret S. *Augustin's* sence that way, no nor to assert it as his own, but to recite another opinion, that hath lesse impiety in it, then the denying of prescience would have. Thus you see what that Chapter in the Father, or his Commentator gaines you. Mean while I take you at your word that you *grant with S.* Augustin *the prescience of God*, and if you *grant it with him*, you must grant it not onely in things which come to passe necessarily, (as all that God decrees do,) but simply in all things, and particularly in those, wherein *voluntatis arbitrium retentum*, *freedom of will retained* is concerned, for to those you see he thorow out the IX. and X. Chapters applyes it, and if you grant prescience in them, you grant as much as I desire, if not, you deny it, (which yet you again say you do not,) *more then* S. *Augustin.*

§. 74. What you here add as your conclusion from S. *Augustine* in his *confessions*, lib. II. c. 18. *videri non possunt sed prædici possunt ex præsentibus quæ jam sunt & videntur*, they cannot be seen but they may be foretold from those things that are present, and are now seen, and from *Origen* ἐπεὶ γεγονε τόδε, τόδε ἔπεται, viz: *That Gods knowledge of* Thilica c. 23.

future

future contingents is meerly hypotheticall, this being ſuppoſed, that will follow, &c.] I ſhall now proceed to examine, 1. By a view of your two Teſtimonies, then of your concluſion from them. And firſt for S. *Auguſtin's* words, they are not ſpoken of *Gods preſcience* or predictions, but of *ours*, and that of things coming from natural cauſes, *Intueor auroram*, ſaith he, *oriturum ſolem pronuncio*, &c. *I behold the morning, I pronounce the Sun will riſe.* Look and you will ſee it manifeſtly, ſo then it is nothing to *Gods preſcience* of future contingents, and you can conclude nothing from it.

c. 21. §. 75. And for the Chapter in *Origen's Philocalia*, it cannot be, but you muſt have noted in it,

Origens teſtimony. the weight that he layes on the prediction of *Judas's* treaſon, the general reſolution, that ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων πρὸ πολλοῦ οἶδεν ὁ Θεὸς γενησόμενον, *every thing that is future, God ſees it will come to paſſe*, (and yet ὁ προγνὼς πάντων οὐκ αἴτιος προεγνωσμένων, *the foreknower is not cauſe of all that are foreknown,*) citing from *Suſanna*, 42, 43. *That God is* κρυπτῶν γνώστης, ὁ εἰδὼς τὰ πάντα πρὶν γενέσεως αὐτῶν, *the knower of ſecrets, that knowes all things before they are*, then he propoſes the queſtion, Πῶς πρόγνωστος ὤν ὁ ἐξ αἰῶνος τῷ Θεῷ περὶ τῶν ὑφ' ἑκάστου πρᾶττεσθαι νομιζομένων, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν σώζεται, *how God from all eternity foreknowing thoſe things that are thought to be done by every man, our free will may be retained.* Which he treats againſt the *heathen that ſay Gods foreknowledge takes away all praiſe and diſpraiſe*, &c. and maintain it juſt as you do, as you will ſee,

p. 72. if you compare your, and their arguing. Now to theſe his anſwer is, *that God from the beginning of the creation of the world, nothing being without a cauſe*, ἐπιπορεύεται τῷ νῷ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων ὁρῶν,

by

by the progresse of his mind thorow all things that are future, sees them, that if this be, that will follow, &c. and so μέχρι τέλους πραγμάτων, *proceeding to the end of things, he knowes what shall be.* Which he doth expresse, to shew that he sees the dependence of all things, not from his *own will, Who by knowing them*, as it followes, *causes them not, but in a concatenation of humane acts and choises, as* p. 736
when by temerity one walkes inconsiderately, and meeting with a slippery place falls, which he that sees, is no way the cause of his fall, saith he, adding that *Ibid.*
God foreseeing ὁποῖος ἔσαι ἕκαστος, *how qualified every one will be, sees also the causes that he will be so, mean while his foreseeing is not the cause of their being what they are, but though strange, saith he, yet 'tis true,* τὸ ἐσόμενον αἴτιον τοῦ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὴν *Ibid.*
περὶ αὐτὸν πρόγνωσιν, *the thing future is the cause that such a foreknowledge is had of it, for it doth not because it was known come to passe, but because,* (ἔμελλε ἔσεσθαι,) *it was to come to passe, it was known.* Then he comes to a distinction in what *Ibid.*
sence it is true, that *what is foreseen* πάντως ἔσαι *shall altogether be*, and states it just as we do all along. From all which, (that I may now follow, you to your inferences,) you can with no reason conclude, that it was his and the rest of *the Fathers doctrine, that Gods foreknowledge of future contingents is meerly hypothetical.* You see most evidently from their sayings, every where scattered, (competently by those which I have now set down,) that this was not their doctrine. And this one passage, if it were favourable to your conceit, (as it is not,) yet could in no reason evacuate all others.

§. 76. In your conclusion that which I misslike is not the word, [*hypothetical*] but [*meerly*] for

that ſignifies God to have no other foreknowledge but that. I doubt not but of all things that are, God foreſees, as *Origen's* words were, *that if this be, that will follow*, and ſo I deny not *hypothetical foreknowledge*. But I cannot confine Gods foreknowledge to this one head, for why may he not alſo ſee, (and as eaſily,) that this, and that will both be? The principall uſe of *hypothetical foreknowledge*, is in things *meerly poſſible*, which come not to paſſe, (as before I applyed the example of *Keilah*, which you now mention.) But what can that have to do with thoſe things, which do actually come to paſſe, and that meerly by the free will of man, and by no neceſſity of conſequences? Though, (as I ſaid,) even in thoſe, God that ſees them as they are, both in their cauſes, and moſt caſuall, or voluntary mutations, and progreſſion, and all circumſtances concomitant, ſees one thing following, (though but freely, not neceſſarily,) out of another, firſt this, and then that, and becauſe this, or upon this motive, therefore that; Which as it is far from aſſerting any neceſſary chain of cauſes, contrary to the freedome of mans will, which in that very place *Origen* largely eſtabliſhes, ſo it is far from a knowledge *meerly hypothetical*, for that is not the knowledge of what is, but what will be, if ſomewhat elſe make way for it, which being uncertain, whether it will be or not, there can be no determinate knowledge, that the other will be, which is quite contrary to his inſtances of *Judas's betraying Chriſt*, &c. Which were as really and determinately foreſeen and foretold, as they were really acted. And therefore I muſt deſire you not to think this favourable to the *Socinian's* opinion of *Gods foreknowledge of future contingents being onely or meerly hypothetical*, (though

Hypothetical foreknowledge.

God

God foresee *hypothetically*, yet not *onely* so,) or that this key will fit all places of Scripture, which foretell things to come, because it fits the case of *Keilah*, and *Jer.* 38, 17. and some few others.

§. 77. I have the more largely insisted on this, because it seemed so likely to mislead you, there being some examples of foreknowledge meerly hypothetical, from whence yet to infer that *Gods foreknowledge* indefinitely, is meerly such, *i.e.* that he hath no other, is the same errour as from particular premisses, or from one or two examples to make an universal conclusion.

§. 78. On view of your fourth objected inconvenience, you grant all I said in answer to it, onely, say you, *the former difficulty seemes to recurre, how A. B. may be truly salvable, when if absolute prescience be granted, his damnation was as certain before he was borne, as it will be when he is in Hell.*] I answer, 1. That in answer to objected inconveniences all that can be required of any man is, to shew that that inconvenience doth not follow, not to establish the principal doctrine again, (which before had been done by the no implicancy of contradiction, which left it possible for God to foresee future contingents, and then by consideration of his omniscience, which qualifies him to know every thing which is *scibile*, or the knowing of which implyes no *contradiction*, and then by the testimonies of the *Prophets*, who from Gods prescience foretold such futures,) having therefore done all that was incumbent on me, I had hoped the difficulty would not still have remained, when all I said was granted. But seeing it doth, I answer, 2. That supposing *Gods eternal prescience*, it cannot but as clearly appeare, that *A. B.* not onely may be, but is truly salvable, The fourth

whilſt he is *in Viâ*, as that he is damned, or no longer ſalvable, when he is in Hell. For ſuppoſing *A. B. in viâ*, to be one, for whom in Gods decree Chriſt dyed, and ſuppoſing Gods eternall preſcience of all that is, (unqueſtionably of all that he himſelf will do, as he ſure will all that is under his *decree*.) It muſt thence neceſſarily follow, that God foreſees him ſalvable, and ſuppoſing that at length he is damned, it doth but follow, that God foreſees him damned; Theſe two things then by force of *præſcience* are equally cleer, that he is one while ſalvable, another while damned, and ſo they are equally certain, and if his having been ſalvable do not hinder his being damned, then neither will his being damned hinder his having been ſalvable. He is truly ſalvable who God foreſees will not be ſaved. How ſo? becauſe God truly beſtows upon him all means neceſſary to ſalvation, and that being all that is required to make him *ſalvable*, this is as truly done, when the effect followes not, as when the meanes are moſt ſucceſsfull. And Gods preſcience of the ſucceſsleſsneſs, makes no change, hath no influence either on the meanes, or the man, any more then my ſeeing a thing done hath cauſality in the doing it. Now if he be ſalvable, (though in event he never be ſaved, but damned,) and Gods *præſcience* that he is *ſalvable*, be as efficacious to conclude him ſalvable, as his preſcience that he is damned, to infer him damned, what a palpable partiality is it to infer from preſcience, that his damnation is certain before he is borne, and yet not to infer from the ſame principle, that his ſalvability was certain before he was borne? Nothing can more irrefragably prove the weakneſs of your inference, then that it is ſo obvious to retort it.

Salvability of Judas as conclu ſible from Preſcience, as damnation.

§. 79. The

§. 79. The ſhort is, that which is *future* onely *contingently*, it is certain that it is foreſeen by God, yet till it is, it may be otherwiſe, and if it be otherwiſe, God ſees it to be otherwiſe, and what may be otherwiſe, is not certain to be ſo, and therefore his damnation is not certain before he is born, which is the direct contradictory to your inference, and that method which will equally infer contradictories, of what force it is to eſtabliſh truth, I leave you to judge who propounded the difficulty.

§. 80. Here then is the errour, becauſe God cannot erre in his foreſight, therefore you conclude from ſuppoſition of his preſcience, that the thing, which you ſpeake of, is certain, when yet it no way appeares to you or me, that God ever foreſaw it, but by our ſuppoſing that it comes to paſs. Hence then comes all the ſuppoſed certainty, from ſuppoſing it to come to paſs, which is the *certitudo ex hypotheſi*, a certainty that it is, as long as it is ſuppoſed to be, and then Gods preſcience hath nothing to do with it, but it would be as certain without ſuppoſing Gods preſcience, as now it is by ſuppoſing it. And now would you have me ſhew you how *A.B.* is truly ſalvable whilſt you retain your ſuppoſition that he is damned? This, if you marke, is your difficulty, for you have no other ground to ſuppoſe that God foreſees him damned, but becauſe you ſuppoſe him damned, and ſeeing it is, you ſee what a taske you have ſet me, even to make two members of a contradiction true together. This I confeſſe I cannot do, and I grant God cannot, yet thus much I will do for you, I will mind you, that even when *A. B.* is in Hell, the propoſition is ſtill true, that *A.B.* when he was on earth was *ſalvable*, and if it be true when he is in Hell, I appeale to you whether it be

not true, when God foreſees he will be in Hell, doth Gods foreſeeing him in hell impede more then his actuall being in it ? If not, then notwithſtanding Gods preſcience, *A. B.* is ſalvable, and ſo now I hope you ſee both that, and how he is ſo.

The fifth. §. 81. In your fifth inconvenience, you ſtill adhere that *you think it ſcarcely reconcileable with that determinate preſcience which I hold, for God ſeriouſly to call thoſe whom he foreſees* ab æterno *that they will not repent.* But you take no heed to the place of Scripture, which I demonſtrated it by, *turne you, turne you, why will you dye?* and, *as I live, I delight not in the death of him that dyes*, where it is evident, God ſeriouſly, (if an oath be a note of ſeriouſneſſe,) calls thoſe who dye and will dye. Why do you not lay this to heart, when it is ſo cleare, and (you yet give me your leave to ſay,) unanſwerable?

Gods ſerious call to thoſe who he ſees will die.

§. 82. I ſaid, *when God calls to a man not to fall, he is not fallen*, and, you ſay true, *but he is fallen in Gods preſcience.*] I now ask you, how you know he is? Your onely poſſible anſwer is, that if he be fallen, then by the doctrine of preſcience, God muſt foreſee him fallen, and you now by way of ſuppoſition, (which 'tis lawfull for diſputations ſake to make,) take it for granted, *i.e.* ſuppoſe he is fallen. And then, (as even now I ſaid,) to your voluntary ſuppoſition all is due, and with that I cannot reconcile the contradictory, and ſo ſtill what is this to *preſcience?*

§. 83. Again you conclude, *that God ſees*, A. B. *will never riſe again*, how do you know, or imagine God ſees it, but becauſe you ſuppoſe it true, that he will never riſe again? and if it be true, then it is alſo infallibly true, whether God ſee it or no. And ſo ſtill what have you gained, your ſuppoſing it true is it to which adheres the ſuppoſition of Gods foreſeeing,

ſeeing, and infallibility conſequent to that, but that addes no weight to that which was before ſuppoſed infallible.

§. 84. Again you aske, *can God ſeriouſly call him, who [he ſees] will never repent, ſeriouſly do that he ſees uſeleſs, and abſolutely ineffectuall?*] I have oft told you, and proved to you, that he may, 'tis certain he called *Pharaoh*, when he had predicted he would not hearken, and he moſt ſeriouſly doth things to ſalvifick ends, which do not eventually attain thoſe ends, and he foreſees they do not.

§. 85. I ſaid that what *God doth thus in time, he* ab æterno *decreed to do*, this (as it is apparent by the antecedent, to which the relative [*thus*] belongs,) I ſpake of *Gods calling men, ſome not to fall, others to riſe again*, and you reply, that *it ſeemes to you utterly improbable that God ſhould do whatſoever he doth, by an antecedent decree.*] I have no temptation to leave our preſent taske, which is ſufficient for the day, to diſpute that queſtion with you in the latitude, as your, (*whatſoever he doth,*) importeth. It will ſuffice, if God doth *any thing* by an antecedent decree, or decree any thing before he do it, for if *any thing*, then ſure his calls and warnings, which are parts of his covenant of grace, and that is *ſub decreto*, decreed by him. And then what I ſaid before, is ſtill of full force, *Gods foreſeeing mens diſobediences to his calls, was in order of nature poſteriour and ſubſequent to his decree of calling and giving them grace*, and being ſo, cannot move him to change what went before, or preſently to diſannull it, and till it be diſannulled, 'tis certain, and exacted by veracity, that he act according to it, *i. e.* that he call thoſe *ſeriouſly*, who yet he foreſees reſiſt him. Why you ſhould here farther inlarge, of the greater *improba-*

bility, that God should without consideration decree what afterward he perceives would be useleſſe, I gueſs not, being ſure no words of mine gave you temptation to think that I affixt inconſiderate decrees to our God of all wiſdome, or counted thoſe calls *useleſſe*, which through our obſtinacy, (oneſy) faile of their deſigned good effect.

§. 86. No more did I give you cauſe for that harſh-ſounding phraſe of *Gods neceſſarily purſuing it, becauſe it was decreed.*] I ſhould rather have ſuggeſted to you theſe words, inſtead of them, that God is *faithfull*, and juſt, and veracious, and ſo performes his part of the covenant of grace with men, howſoever they are, (and he foreſees them,) wanting to their own part.

Gods foreſight of mans rejecting his calls and the criminouſneſs thereof, a proof of the ſerioußnes of them.

§. 87. What you ſay you underſtand not in my laſt papers, I thus explaine; thoſe calls of God which the obdurate reject, are moſt ſeriouſly meant by God to their reformation, elſe he would not puniſh them for rejecting them, as he doth by withdrawing them, &c. This God decrees to do *ab æterno*, which he could not, unleſſe he foreſaw their rejection of them, and yet neither could he foreſee their ſo criminal rejecting them, unleſſe he foreſaw the ſeriouſneſſe of them, and if he foreſaw that, then it is as certain as any thing, that God foreſees that they are ſerious, and although God do not actually inflict puniſhment upon bare foreſight of ſin, yet ſure he may decree to puniſh thoſe whom he foreſees to deſerve it, and that is all that is neceſſary to my arguing. Elſe I might tell you that God that accepts not a temporary faith, will never accept ſuch a man as is anſwerable to the *ſtony*, or *thorny ground*, (who in time of *tryall would fall away*,) though he ſhould be taken away before temptations approach.

§. 88. In

§. 88. In that of *Judas*, you grant *that the prophecy, as terminated in him, could not have been fulfilled, had he never been born, but then your quere remaines*, ſay you, *whether it might not have been fullfilled in another?*] I anſwer, 1. it could not have been fullfilled in another, without ſome other diſciples doing what he did, and 'tis certain no other did ſo, and therefore what was foretold muſt have been fulfilled in him, or elſe, (which may not be believed of a divine Oracle,) had not been fulfilled. But then, 2. Chriſts words to *John* pointing out *Judas* for the Traitour, *he that dippeth*, &c. was a prediction of God perfectly terminated in *Judas's* perſon, and could not be fulfilled in any other, and ſo your new quere is anſwered alſo. And that gives you a farther reaſon, (if what was ſaid before to your ſecond quere were not ſufficient,) that our *Saviours prediction* was not *conditional*, but categorically enunciative, *verily I ſay unto you that one of you ſhall or will betray me*, and he that *dippeth, at that time* when Chriſt ſpake it, deictically, *i.e. Judas*, is that perſon.

The predictions of Judas could not be fulfilled in another.

Not conditionall.

§. 89. In your view of what I ſaid to your ſecond queſtion, you firſt inſiſt on *my* anſwer, that the event proved the denunciation againſt *Judas* was not like that againſt *Niniveh* conditional, but I foreſaw the ſmall force of that, which I uſed onely εἰς ἔνστασιν, and therefore added a ſecond, that the prediction of *Judas* was *of his ſin*, as well as *puniſhment*, and the prediction of his *ſin*, could not be *conditional*, nor the prediction of the *Ninivites* puniſhment any way be applicable to it, leaving therefore the weaker, I adhered onely to this, which when you labour alſo to evacuate, by interpreting, [*one of you will betray me,*] by [*unleſſe he repent*, &c. *he will betray*

tray me.] You conſider not, 1. that Chriſts death, as it was from all eternity decreed by God, ſo it was oft predicted by Chriſt, and his reſurrection, and many other things depending on it, and among theſe ſtill the treachery of one of his diſciples is one, and that is not reconcileable with this interpretation. 2. That foreſeeing that he *would be ſo diſpoſed, as unleſſe he repented he would betray him*, is the foretelling of a future contingent. 3. That one particular prediction, wherein *Iudas* was deictically ſignified, was private to S. *Iohn*, that *lay in Ieſus his boſome*, as appeares, *Ioh.* XIII. 24, 25, 26. And though the words to *Iudas* himſelf, *Mat.* XXVI. 15. may better beare that ſence you aſſigne, yet the words to *Iohn*, which *Iudas* heard not, could be no ſuch admonition to *Iudas*, and therefore were without queſtion abſolute, and ſo thoſe other to *Peter verily I ſay to thee, before the Cock crow twice, thou ſhalt deny me thrice*, when he had profeſſed he would rather *die, then deny him*, are not eaſily healed with this φάρμακον, [*unleſſe thou repent thou wilt deny me,*] for aſſuredly *Peter* meant not now to deny Chriſt, but reſolved the contrary, and therefore had nothing to *repent* of in this behalfe. And when you ſeeme to demonſtrate it *could not be abſolute, becauſe* Judas *might confeſſedly have repented, and if he had, then it muſt have been interpreted conditionally*, I anſwer according to my hypotheſis, that if *Iudas* had repented, Chriſt had never foreſeen, or declared of him, as he doth, *i.e.* that he ſhould betray him.

So that of Peters denyall.

§. 90. But, ſay you, *you ſee not why a conditional prediction may not be applyable as wel to the prevention of ſin, as of puniſhment,*] I ſhall ſhew you why it may not, becauſe the puniſhment is Gods work, and for the averting of that there is force in the

Ninivites

Ninivites repentance, which is the *condition* required on their part, on the performance of which God hath generally promiſed to ſuſpend his puniſhments, and therefore the threats are conditional, which in equity will not be inflicted, if the condition be performed. But the *ſin* is man's work and to the commiſſion of that no other party contributes but himſelf, and ſo neither is the prediction of it a threat, but a down-right *enunciation*, neither is there any *condition* imaginable to be performed on the other party, anſwerable to the other caſe, unleſſe God ſhould forcibly interpoſe to avert it, (and that cannot be imagined to be the meaning, [*except I reſtrain* Judas *he will betray me*,] or if it were, it were ſtill an act of Gods *abſolute foreknowledge*, that he will do ſo, if not violently reſtrained) all probable meanes to his amendment, and particularly the admitting him to the Sacrament being, ſaith S. *Chryſoſtom*, already uſed to him, and yet, ſaith Chriſt, *he will betray me.*

Prediction of ſin cannot be conditionall.

91. Now for defence of your Poſtſcript, and the contradiction which that charged on our hypotheſis, I pray marke the Iſſue of it. If you can prove that it implyes a contradiction for God to foreſee future contingents, then you certainly prevaile, as on the other ſide if you ſucceed not in this attempt, you muſt reſolve your opinion erroneous, becauſe nothing being impoſſible to God but to lie, and ſo to make good both parts of a contradiction, if preſcience bring not this conſequence, it muſt be poſſible to God, how inexplicable or unintelligible ſoever it be to me, who for want of *facultatem analogam*, cannot judge of the actions of an eternal God, and if it be yeilded poſſible, then the predictions of Scripture will be prooſes beyond queſtion of the truth of it.

The iſſue of the whole queſtion whether preſcience of contingents imply a contradiction.

it. To this one teſt then let us come. The contradiction you aſſigned was, our ſaying, *that things future are or may be preſent to God.* I ſhewed you the definition of contradictoryes was not competible to theſe, of which *eſt* and *non eſt* is the known example, and preſent and future are neither preſent and not preſent nor future and not future. And again in contradictions both parts muſt be conſidered in the *ſame* reſpects, whereas future being enunciated in reſpect of us, and our finite ſight, preſent is expreſt to be in reſpect of God, whoſe ſcience is immenſe, and infinite.

The lawes of contradictions.

§. 92. Now to this you reply, 1. *That preſent and future, though they are not formal contradictions, yet really and in ſence they are, for future is that that is not preſent, but to come, and preſent and not preſent are formally contradictory.* 2. *That my conceſſion that no finite thing can both be preſent and future is enough for you, for God cannot be preſent to that which is not preſent to him.*] I now anſwer to your firſt, that there is nothing ſo falſe, that I cannot make good by this your arguing. In particular, by this the doctrine of the *Trinity* and *Unity* were equally confuted, for *Trinitas* in the wonted notion is not one, but three, and one, and not one, are formally contradictory. This is the direct image and tranſcript of your arguing, *mutatis mutandis,* yet I know you deny not the *Tri-unus Deus*, how then can you on no better proofe deny *preſcience*? The *Socinian's* conformably deny both, but you are partial, and deny but one of them. It is never ſafe to deſpiſe the ordinary rules of art, but ſeldome more dangerous then in this, whereas if Logick were duely revered in it's dictates, and nothing thought contradictory in ſence, but what is an affirmation, and negation

The argument, holds equally againſt the Trinity, and unity.

of

of the same thing, this intricacy would be unfolded, and that which is future to me, be present to God, without the encumbrance or dread of a contradiction.

§. 93. To the *second* I answer, that it cannot suffice to your pretensions, that no finite thing is both present and future, meaning, (as it is plaine I did,) in the *same respect*, present and future *to me*: When yet what is future to me, may be present to one that lives a year hence, and so much more to God who liveth for ever. When therefore in your proof you seeme to suppose me to *hold, that what is future to me, is not present to God*, you did mistake me, for as I said, that God being immense may and must be present to that which is future, or else he is bounded and limited, and so not immense, infinite, so I deemed that, which God is thus present to, to be objectively present to him, and so it was from all eternity, though to us it be not yet present, but future. So that the other part of the definition of contradictoryes, if it had been adverted to, had superseded this part of your answer also, *viz.* that it is the *affirmation and negation of the same thing in the same respects*, as here you see it was not, and so was not usefull to you.

§. 94. But say you, *if all future contingents are and* ab æterno *were all present to God, then they are all eternall.*] I deny that consequence, what is finite, and in it self yet future, by it's objective presence to God, is not changed into *eternall*, nay even that which really is, and so is really, (and not onely objectively,) present to him, is yet as far from eternall, as Christ's body, by being united to his infinite divinity is from becoming infinite. This then was but a Sophisme that you will soon see thorow.

What is present to God, is not eternall.

§. 95. And

§. 95. And so your other part of the same passage of S. *Augustin Confess.* L. II. c. 18, that again you resort to, was in effect formerly answered, by shewing that it belonged onely to what is *future*, *and present to us*, and so to *our sight*, not to *Gods*. I have now gone thorow your papers and wearied you, and almost my self, yet if what is written prove usefull to you, to the depositing that which I cannot but deem an Errour, although I lay no Epithets upon it, it will be far from burthenous to

Your very affectionate

friend and servant

H. HAMMOND.

Postscript.

POSTSCRIPT.

§. 96. TO extricate you finally out of this difficulty, I shall desire you by way of recapitulation, to consider apart these two propositions, the first that Gods science being as immense and infinite, as himself, is not limited to things past or present, or futures, by him decreed, but extends to all that ever shall be, or may be; to what may be, so as to see it may be, though it be not, to what shall be, so as to see it come to passe, as in time it doth come to passe, contingent things, contingently, *&c.* Of which proposition if there can be any doubt to any man, who stedfastly believes Gods immensity, let the predictions recorded in the Scripture be considered, those especially which are of sinnes, which it is as impossible for God to decree or predetermine, as to cause, and yet he foresees and foretells them, witnesse Christs foretelling *Peter*, that he should deny him thrice, when *Peter* himself was so far from foreseeing, or purposing it, that he resolved the contrary. The second proposition, that there are future contingents, that all the sinnes (at least) of men are not decreed, and predetermined by God, or caused by any necessity. Of which no man can doubt, which believes the Scripture, and therein the procedure of the judgement to come, the difference in respect of guilt and punishment betwixt voluntary and involuntary actions, (the motions of men and of stones,) and again the exhortations and menaces of God in Scripture, and the great seriousnesse, expresse, and protestations prefixt to them.

Two propositions.

The first of God immense science.

The proof of it.

The second of contingency and liberty.

The proof of it.

§. 97. If

The conclusion.

§. 97. If taking these propositions apart, any Christian can doubt of the truth of either of them, he sees the shelves he splits upon, and the shipwrack of a great part of the Faith, whither on this, or that side. But if he cannot but assent to these truths severally, and onely wants the skill of reconciling the seeming difficulties which they beget, when he attempts to put them together, (of which sort are all the inconveniences, or objections, produced in this matter,) let him on that occasion consider, how (more then) credible it is, that he doth not understand all things, that are, having but *finite* facultyes, and *finite* measures, which are not proportioned to *infinite* powers, or objects; Which makes it most seasonable to supersede all farther enquiries, and to acquiesce in an assurance, that God can reconcile his own contradictions, such I meane, as though by the known rules of Logick they appeare to be really no contradictions, yet by us are conceived to approach nere to such, through prejudice, or thinking (not too little, but rather) too much upon them. In which case to restrain our farther searches is the same necessary mortification, which it is to restrain inordinate appetites, and is a principall peice of duty owing to the Apostles precept of φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, *being wise to sobriety*: God give the world of Christian professors more of it, then is yet discernible among them.

Febr. 20th 1674 Θαῦ δάξα.

FINIS.

[illegible] ἡ προείρηται, διὰ τοῦτο διαπεπρακται, [illegible]
[illegible] πράξειν ἔμελλον ἃ μὴ ὄφειλον, τὸ ἀλάθητον [illegible]
πιστόπον ὄμμα τοῦ Θεοῦ λαβεῖν [λαθεῖν in marg.] οὐκ ἔχον τὸ [illegible]
Διὰ τοῦτο τοιγαροῦν καὶ ὁμακάριος Πέτρος, οὐχ ὅτι προεῖπεν ὁ [illegible]
ἠρνήσατο, ἀλλ' ὅτι προσολισθάνειν τῇ ἀρήσει ἔμελλε, καὶ προγ[illegible]
τῷ διδασκαλῷ καὶ προανακηρύττεται. Photius. epist. 178. ubi plura [illegible]
Vide etiam Justin. p. 129. edit Steph. l. 40. & seq. p. 128. & Autor. Res[illegible]
[illegible] Dioxos. quæst. 58. inter opa Justini. Chrysost. in 1. Cor. 11. 19. & T. 6. p. 654 [illegible]
[illegible] Aug. de Civit. Dei. 5. 9. 10. Sed nulla sit præsentio fortuitorum: ne Deo quidem. Cicero. de [illegible] Di[illegible]
fol. 127. p. 2. edit. Manutij. Sed vide Aug. de Civ. Dei. 5. 9. ubi diserte [illegible]
Ciceronem disputat. Alio sensu, quam Cicero, præscientiam non esse in Deo a[illegible]
Gregorius Moral. XX. 25. Vide omnino. S. Chrysost. T. 5. p. 779. 10.

Augustinus in Psal. 43. aliàs 44. 7.

Deo & futura tam certa sunt tanquam præterita sint. Nobis ea quæ præteri[illegible]
certa sunt, quæ futura incerta sunt. Novimus nunc aliquid accidisse, & non [illegible]
fieri, ut omnino accideret quod accidit. Da prophetam cui tam certum sit futurum [illegible]
præteritum: & quæ tibi quod meministi factum non potest fieri ut omnino sit [illegible]
tam illi quod novit futurum omnino potest fieri ut non fiat. Ideo de securi[illegible]
cunte tanquam præterita, quæ adhuc futura sunt. /. Ita S. August. Autori [illegible]
optimè consentit; in necessitate sicâ ex Hypothesi. /. V. Greg. M[illegible]